Matson v. State, 04A03–1112–CR–567.
| Decision Date | 17 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 04A03–1112–CR–567.,04A03–1112–CR–567. |
| Parties | Timothy MATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Benton Circuit Court; The Honorable Rex W. Kepner, Judge; Cause No. 04C01–0802–FA–31.
Timothy Matson, Indianapolis, IN, Appellant Pro Se.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McClean, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Timothy Matson (“Matson”), pro se, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to correct erroneous sentence. Matson raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Matson's motion to correct erroneous sentence. We affirm.
On February 15, 2008, the State charged Matson in Count 1, with Class A felony attempted murder; in Count 2, with Class D felony operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content (“B.A.C.”) of at least .08 with a prior operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”) conviction; in Count 3, with Class D felony OWI in a manner that endangers another person with a prior OWI conviction; in Count 4, with Class D felony operating a vehicle with a Schedule I substance or its metabolite in the body with a prior OWI conviction; in Count 5, with Class D felony operating a vehicle with a Schedule II substance or its metabolite in the body with a prior OWI conviction; in Count 6, with Class D felony resisting law enforcement; and in Count 7, with Class D felony resisting law enforcement; and Count 8, Class D felony battery.
On August 26, 2008, the State filed a motion to amend the charging information. Specifically, the State noted that several of the OWI counts alleged in the charging information were elevated to Class D felonies based on a prior OWI conviction. The State acknowledged that under Indiana Code section 35–34–1–2.5, the allegations relating to the prior conviction should be made on a separate page. The State also sought to dismiss the charge of operating a vehicle with a Schedule II controlled substance or metabolite in the body. On August 27, 2008, the trial court granted the State's request to remove references to prior convictions from the charging information in order to allow the charging information to be submitted to the jury.
Accordingly, the final information submitted to the jury indicated that Matson had been charged as follows: Count 1, Class A felony attempted murder; Count 2, Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content (“B.A.C.”) of at least .08; Count 3, Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”); Count 4, Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a Schedule I substance or its metabolite in the body; Count 5, Class D felony resisting law enforcement; Count 6, Class D felony resisting law enforcement; and Count 7, Class D felony battery. The State also filed separate information alleging that Matson had a prior OWI conviction within five years of the charged offenses, and alleged that Matson was a habitual offender and a habitual substance offender. Matson also faced a petition to revoke his probation in a separate cause, Cause Number 04C01–0401–CM–31 (“Cause No. 31”).
The jury found Matson guilty of Counts 2 through 7.1 Matson then admitted to having a prior OWI conviction and pleaded guilty to the habitual offender and habitual substance offender enhancements. At Matson's October 14, 2008 sentencing hearing, the trial court set aside the guilty verdicts on Counts 3 and 7, as well as the habitual offender enhancement. The trial court entered judgment of conviction on each of the remaining offenses and adjudicated Matson a habitual substance offender. The trial court also found that Matson had violated his probation in Cause No. 31. Matson received concurrent three-year sentences on Count 2 and Count 4, and the trial court enhanced the sentence on Count 4 by eight years based on the habitual substance offender adjudication, with one year suspended. Matson also received three-year sentences on Counts 5 and 6, and one year of each sentence was to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed on Count 4, with the remaining two years served concurrently with the sentence imposed on Count 4. The trial court also revoked Matson's probation in Cause No. 31 and ordered him to serve the one and one-half year balance his previously suspended sentence consecutive to his sentences on the current convictions. Accordingly, Matson received an aggregate sentence of twelve and one-half years executed, with one year suspended to probation.
On February 4, 2009, the trial court entered a nunc pro tunc order indicating that the October 14, 2008 sentencing order and the abstract of judgment had incorrectly labeled Counts 2 and 4 as Class C misdemeanors when they were, in fact, Class D felonies. The February 4, 2009 order corrected the October 14, 2008 sentencing order to reflect that Counts 2 and 4 were Class D felonies and directed the trial court clerk to amend the abstract of judgment accordingly.
On November 3, 2011, Matson filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence asking the trial court to declare his sentence “facially erroneous” and to resentence him “within the confines of the Laws of the State of Indiana, pursuant to the Indiana Sentencing Guidelines.” Appellant's App. p. 43. Matson also requested the court to “apply an appropriate sentence to Count # 2, whence he was convicted at trial, of a Misdemeanor” and to sentence him “to the advisory sentence for his Habitual Substance Offender Enhancement.” Id. at 44. Matson also asked the trial court to consider the fact that Matson had “been accepted in the State's premier re-entry educational facility” and that Matson had admitted to having substance abuse problems and being a habitual substance offender, which, according to Matson, would allow the trial court to fashion a more appropriate sentence. Id. at 44–45. Matson also filed a memorandum of law in support of his motion to correct erroneous sentence, in which he appears to suggest that the State improperly relied on the same prior OWI conviction to elevate his sentences on Counts 2 and 4 to Class D felonies and to support the habitual substance offender enhancement.
The State filed a response and motion to strike arguing, in part, that Matson's motion to correct erroneous sentence should be denied because it required consideration of matters outside the face of the sentencing judgment. The trial court agreed, and on November 30, 2011, entered an order denying Matson's motion to correct erroneous sentence. Matson now appeals.
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying Matson's motion to correct erroneous sentence. We review a trial court's decision on a motion to correct erroneous sentence for an abuse of discretion. Fry v. State, 939 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. An inmate who believes he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion to correct the sentence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35–48–1–15, which provides:
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
A statutory motion to correct erroneous sentence may...
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