Matsumoto v. Labrador

Docket Number1:23-cv-00323-DKG
Decision Date08 November 2023
PartiesLOURDES MATSUMOTO, NORTHWEST ABORTION ACCESS FUND, and INDIGENOUS IDAHO ALLIANCE, Plaintiffs, v. RAUL LABRADOR, in his capacity as the Attorney General for the State of Idaho, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

HONORABLE DEBORA K. GRASHAM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, or, in the alternative, a Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. 12.) Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the Defendant from enforcing Idaho's abortion trafficking statute, Idaho Code Section 18-623. The Motion is fully briefed and at issue. On September 14, 2023, the Court heard oral argument and took the Motion under advisement.

Having carefully reviewed and considered the entire record and the parties' arguments, the Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion and will preliminarily enjoin Defendant from enforcing Idaho Code Section 18-623. For the reasons explained below the Court finds Plaintiffs have named the proper Defendant demonstrated both subject matter jurisdiction and Article III justiciability, and established the requirements for a preliminary injunction.[1]

BACKGROUND

In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs contest the constitutionality of Idaho's criminal abortion trafficking statute, Idaho Code Section 18-623. (Dkt. 1.)[2] The statute provides that: [a]n adult who, with the intent to conceal an abortion from the parents or guardian of a pregnant, unemancipated minor either procures an abortion, as described in Section 18604, Idaho Code, or obtains an abortion-inducing drug for the pregnant minor to use for an abortion by recruiting, harboring, or transporting the pregnant minor within this state commits the crime of abortion trafficking.” Idaho Code § 18-623(1). The offense is punishable by imprisonment for no less than two years and no more than five years. Idaho Code § 18-623(5). The statute allows for an affirmative defense where a parent or guardian of the pregnant minor consented. Idaho Code § 18-623(2). It is not an affirmative defense “that the abortion provider or the abortion-inducing drug provider is located in another state.” Idaho Code § 18-623(3). The statute was signed into law by Idaho Governor Brad Little on April 5, 2023, and went into effect May 5, 2023, due to its emergency clause.[3]

On July 11, 2023, Plaintiffs Lourdes Matsumoto, Northwest Abortion Access Fund, and Indigenous Idaho Alliance (collectively Plaintiffs)[4] filed this action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Defendant Raul Labrador, in his official capacity as the Attorney General for the State of Idaho. (Dkt. 1.) Plaintiffs are an individual and two organizations who provide assistance to pregnant people, including minors, who are located both within and outside of Idaho, with accessing legal abortion care.

The Complaint raises four claims challenging Idaho Code Section 18-623. (Dkt. 1.) Claim one asserts the statute is unconstitutionally void for vagueness in violation of Plaintiffs' due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Claim two asserts the statute infringes on the Plaintiffs' fundamental right to interstate travel. Claim three asserts the statute infringes on the Plaintiffs' fundamental right to intrastate travel. Claim four asserts the statute infringes on the Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, assembly, association, and petition. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment concluding that, among other things, the abortion trafficking statute is unconstitutional, and to enjoin Defendant Labrador from enforcing the statute.

On July 24, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or, in the alternative, a Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. 12.) Plaintiffs' Motion is supported by the declaration of Plaintiffs' counsel and declarations of each of the Plaintiffs. (Dkt. 12-2, 127, 12-8, and 12-9.) Defendant was granted an extension of time to file a response, and Plaintiffs filed a timely reply. (Dkt. 27, 31, 34.) On July 31, 2023, the Attorney General for the State of Washington, on behalf of nineteen states and the District of Columbia (collectively Amici States), filed a Motion for Leave to submit an amici curiae brief in support of Plaintiffs' Motion. (Dkt. 20.) Neither party opposed the Amici States' Motion, and the Court granted the same on August 22, 2023. (Dkt. 30, 31.) Having taken Plaintiffs' Motion under advisement, the Court now finds as follows.

LEGAL STANDARD

Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions generally serve the same purpose of “preserv[ing] the status quo ante litem pending a determination of the action on the merits.” Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980); Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. “A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.' Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)).

“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likely irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction; (3) that the balance of equities weighs in favor of an injunction; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.” Hecox v. Little, 479 F.Supp.3d 930, 971 (D. Idaho 2020) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). When the government is a party, the last two factors merge. Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court may consider and rely upon declarations in deciding a motion for preliminary injunction. Earth Island Institute v. Muldoon, 630 F.Supp.3d 1312, 1335 n. 10 (E.D. Cal. 2022); Brinton Bus. Ventures, Inc. v. Searle, 248 F.Supp.3d 1029, 1032 (D. Or. 2017) ([I]n deciding a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court has broad discretion to consider all arguments and evidence, including hearsay and other inadmissible evidence, [and] declarations from interested parties[.]) (citing Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009); Lane v. Dep't of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008)).[5]

DISCUSSION

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only hear cases as authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and statutes enacted by Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus, federal courts cannot consider claims for which they lack jurisdiction. Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992). The burden is on the party invoking the court's jurisdiction to prove that the case is properly in federal court. McCauley v. Ford Motor Co., 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001).

Because subject matter jurisdiction and Article III justiciability are prerequisites to a federal court exercising its authority to adjudicate a case, the Court will first address those challenges raised by Defendant before turning to the Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) ([T]hose who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy.”); Wang, 975 F.2d at 1415 (“Federal courts have no power to consider claims for which they lack subject matter jurisdiction.”).

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Justiciability

Defendant contends Plaintiffs have not shown an injury in fact or threat of prosecution, which are fatal to subject matter jurisdiction under both the Eleventh Amendment and Article III. (Dkt. 32.) Plaintiffs maintain they have demonstrated the requirements for Article III jurisdiction and named the proper Defendant. (Dkt. 12, 34.)

A. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity Exception

The Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over suits by individuals against a State and its instrumentalities, including official-capacity suits, absent the State consenting to waive its sovereign immunity or Congress's abrogation. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984). “However, under Ex parte Young,.. .this immunity is subject to an exception for actions for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities for their alleged violations of federal law so long as the state officer has some connection with enforcement of the act.” Mecinas v. Hobbs, 30 F.4th 890, 903 (9th Cir. 2022) (marks and citations omitted); see also Sullivan v. Ferguson, 636 F.Supp.3d 1276, 1287 (W.D. Wash. 2022) (“Ex parte Young provides an exception to state sovereign immunity by permitting parties to sue state officials in their official capacity for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief from unconstitutional state laws so long as there is some connection between the officer and enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional act.”) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908)).

“The ‘connection' required under Ex parte Young demands merely that the implicated state official have a relevant role that goes beyond ‘a generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision.' Mecinas, 30 F.4th at 903-04 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 919 (9th Cir. 2004)). While the connection to the enforcement of the challenged act must be “fairly direct,” the Ninth Circuit describes this as a “modest requirement.” Id. In the context of a state attorney general, the requisite connection exists where the attorney...

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