Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. The U.S.

• Decision Date: 03 November 1971
• Docket Number: C.D. 4292.
• Citation: 67 Cust. Ct. 328
• Parties: MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL COMPANY, LTD., ET AL. <I>v.</I> THE UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT ET AL.
• Court: U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)

Page 328

67 Cust. Ct. 328

MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.v.

THE UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT ET AL.

C.D. 4292.

United States Customs Court.

Dated November 3, 1971.

William R. Shapiro and Weil, Gotshal & Manges for the plaintiffs.

L. Patrick Gray, III, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.

RAO, Judge:

On July 1, 1971, plaintiffs filed with this court a "Summons" stating that "a civil action, seeking mandatory, injunctive and declaratory relief, has been filed in the Customs Court to contest acts of the defendants, taken under the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 160 et seq.), in the case entitled Television Receiving Sets, Monochrome and Color, From Japan (ATS 643.3; AA 1921-66)."

In a "Petition for Mandatory, Injunctive and Other Relief," filed on the same day, plaintiffs request this court to enter an order vacating all determinations and findings in the television antidumping proceeding, dismissing the proceeding, enjoining defendants from taking any further action in connection therewith, and declaring the invalidity and unconstitutional nature of the proceeding; or, to enter an order declaring the invalidity and unconstitutional nature of the proceeding and vacating the dumping determination and requiring defendants to conduct the proceeding in the manner requested.Presently before the court are two separate motions made by defendants pursuant to the provisions of Rules 4.7(b) and 4.12 of the Rules of the United States Customs Court.

The first motion is to quash and dismiss the summons and the civil action on the ground that the jurisdiction of this court has not been properly invoked.

The second motion is to strike the certificates of service of the "Petition" or complaint and the affidavit of service of the summons and petition on the ground that service had not been effectuated in conformity with Rules 4.3(a), 4.1 and 3.2(e) of the Rules of the Court.

This case involves antidumping proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and the Tariff Commission which culminated in a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that television receiving sets, monochrome and color, from Japan are being, or are likely to be, sold at less than fair value within the meaning of section 201(a) of the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended. 5 Cust. Bull. ___, T.D. 71-76 (1971). Accordingly, they are subject to dumping duties under the Antidumping Act. However, no such duties have as yet been levied. The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that in the course of the proceedings, defendants have exceeded their statutory authority, have deprived plaintiffs of their right to a fair and impartial administrative adjudication and have denied them minimum procedural rights guaranteed by the due process clause of the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act. It is alleged that plaintiffs have suffered irreparable injury and have no adequate remedy except the specific judicial relief sought in this action.

Plaintiffs concede that the summons does not comply with formal requirements of a summons in a protest proceeding, as provided in Rule 3.4 of the Rules of this Court, and that their pleadings cannot and are not intended to comply with the Rules of the Court. It is their claim, rather, that the jurisdiction of this court may be invoked under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which provides:

§ 1651. Writs. (a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.Thus, leaving technical considerations aside, the court is presented with the novel issue as to whether it may under the All Writs Act grant injunctive and declaratory relief in a case where no duties have been assessed and no protest filed or denied.This is a court of limited statutory jurisdiction which has no equity powers. Cummins-Collins Distilleries v. United States, 20 Cust. Ct. 93, 97, C.D. 1090 (1948), aff'd 36 CCPA 88, C.A.D. 403 (1949); Eurasia Import Co., Inc. v. United States, 31 CCPA 202, C.A.D. 273 (1944). In Match Import Co., Inc. v. United States, 4 Cust. Ct. 694, Reap. Dec. 4762 (1940), it was pointed out (p. 696): The United States Customs Court is a statutory court of special and limited jurisdiction. It is the court exercising original jurisdiction in tariff matters to the exclusion of all other courts. It is the tribunal established by Congress providing a complete system of corrective justice for the administration of customs laws. (David L. Moss Co., Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. 2nd, 395.) Although its jurisdiction covers a wide scope, to include almost every legal controversy arising between an importer and the Government with respect to the rate assessable upon and the dutiable value of imported merchandise, nevertheless such jurisdiction is necessarily subject to the restrictions imposed by the various provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930.

Declaratory judgment and injunctive remedies are equitable in nature (Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 155 (1967)) and have not been considered within the purview of this court. Eurasia Import Co., Inc. v. United States, supra.

The Customs Courts Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 274) has set forth the jurisdiction of the Customs Court as follows:

§ 1582. Jurisdiction of the Customs Court

(a) The Customs Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions instituted by any person whose protest pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, has been denied, in whole or in part, by the appropriate customs officer, where the administrative decision, including the legality of all orders and findings entering into the same, involves: (1) the appraised value of merchandise; (2) the classification and rate and amount of duties chargeable; (3) all charges or exactions of whatever character within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury; (4) the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery under any provisions of the customs laws; (5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry, or a modification thereof; (6) the refusal to pay a claim for drawback; or (7) the refusal to reliquidate an entry under section 520(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.

(b) The Customs Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions brought by American manufacturers, producers, or wholesalers pursuant to section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.

(c) The Customs Court shall not have jurisdiction of an action unless (1) either a protest has been filed, as prescribed by section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and denied in accordance with the provisions of section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, or if the action relates to a decision under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, all remedies prescribed therein have been exhausted, and (2) except in the case of an action relating to a decision under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, all liquidated duties, charges or exactions have been paid at the time the action is filed.

As to antidumping proceedings, it is stated in 19 U.S.C. § 169, as amended:

§ 169. Protests from determinations of customs officers

For the purposes of sections 160 to 171 of this title, the determination of the appropriate customs officer as to the foreign market value or the constructed value, as the case may be, the purchase price, and the exporter's sales price, and the action of such customs officer in assessing special dumping duty, shall have the same force and effect and be subject to the same right of protest, under the same conditions and subject to the same limitations; the United States Customs Court, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals shall have the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties in connection with such appeals and protests as in the case of protests relating to customs duties under existing law.

Under predecessor statutes, where questions involving the assessment of duties under the Antidumping Act have been brought before this court by way of an appeal for reappraisement or by protest, it has accepted jurisdiction. United States v. Elof Hansson, Inc., 48 CCPA 91, C.A.D. 771 (1960), cert. den. 368 U.S. 899 (1961); Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 50 CCPA 36, C.A.D. 816 (1963); United States v. William Prym of America (Inc.), 17 CCPA 180, T.D. 43475 (1929); James S. Kean v. United States, 20 CCPA 388, T.D. 46186 (1933). In such cases it may review the actions of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Tariff Commission to determine whether the procedures prescribed by Congress have been followed and whether the Secretary, the Tariff Commission, or their delegates have proceeded within the statutory authority or whether their actions are ultra vires and void. Kleberg & Co. (Inc.) v. United States, 21 CCPA 110, T.D. 46446, 71 F.2d 332 (1933); United States v. Elof Hansson, Inc., supra; City Lumber Co. et al. v. United States, 64 Cust. Ct. 826, A.R.D. 269, 311 F.Supp. 340 (1970) (appeal pending).

The case here, however, is outside the framework of the general statutory scheme for customs litigation and the question is whether this court has any authority to entertain it.

In actions brought in the district courts for equitable relief, it has been consistently held that the importer has an adequate remedy at law in the Customs Courts and that equitable relief is barred. Kreutz et al. v. Durning, 69 F. 2d 802 (1934); Cottman Co. et al. v. Dailey, 94 F. 2d 85 (1938); Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819 (1956), aff'd 352 U.S. 921 (1956); J. C. Penney Company, Inc. v. United States Department of the Treasury, 319 F. Supp. 1023 (1970), aff'd 439 F. 2d 63 (1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 869 (1971).

In the Cottman case, the court said (pp. 88, 89):

* * * Congress has provided a complete system of corrective justice with respect to matters arising under the customs laws. * * * * * *...