OPINION
GEORGE BRODY, Bankruptcy Judge.
The question presented is whether the delivery of a check is equivalent to payment for the purpose of section 547(c)(2).
The facts have been stipulated and are as follows:
1. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc. (defendant) sold to the Joseph Frenkel Division of Advance Glove Manufacturing Company (debtor) certain merchandise by invoice dated December 11, 1980.
2. The merchandise was delivered to the debtor on or about December 11, 1980.
3. The terms of sale provided that the debtor was to receive a 1% discount if the invoice was paid within 30 days.
On or about January 20, 1981, the debtor issued and delivered a check in the amount of $2,483.04 to the defendant in payment of the invoice.
4. The check was not honored and paid by the drawee bank until February 24, 1981.
5. On March 19, 1981, the debtor filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Thereafter, the Chapter 11 proceeding was converted to Chapter 7 and a trustee was appointed. The trustee filed a complaint to recover the $2,483.04, contending that the payment was preferential and, since the facts were not in dispute, moved for summary judgment.
Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, except as provided in subsection (c), the trustee may avoid any "transfer of property of the debtor —"
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made —
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the petition, if such creditor, at the time of such transfer —
(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if —
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
The defendant concedes that the factual elements of section 547(b) are present but relies upon paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (c), as a defense to the trustee's action. Section 547 provides in pertinent part that a trustee may not avoid a transfer which is preferential under section 547(b)
(1) to the extent that such a transfer was —
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent such transfer was —
(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms; . . .
§ 547(c)(1), (2).
Initially, the defendant contends that the sale and payment were intended to be, and in fact were, a contemporaneous exchange and, therefore, the transfer is protected by section 547(c)(1). This contention is without merit. The facts clearly reveal that the sale was a credit transaction.
Additionally, the defendant contends that the payment was made within 45 days after the debt was incurred and, therefore, the payment is protected by section 547(c)(2). To decide the issue raised by this defense, it is necessary to determine when the debt was incurred and when payment was made.
A debt is incurred whenever the debtor obtains a property interest in the consideration exchanged giving rise to the debt. 4 Collier on Bankr. § 547.39 (15th ed. 1982).1 A buyer obtains a property interest in goods
by identification of existing goods to which the contract refers. . . . In the absence of explicit agreement, identification occurs
(a) when the contract is made if it is for the sale of goods already existing and identified;
(b) if the contract is for the sale of future goods other than those described in paragraph (c), when the goods are shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to which the contract refers.
M.C.L.A. § 440.2501. The debtor obtained a property interest in the goods on December 11, 1980, when the goods were shipped.2 The debt was incurred on December 11, 1980. Hertzberg v. Hirschfield, (In re Caro Products), 23 B.R. 245 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Mich. 1982); Iowa Premium Service Co. v. First National Bank (In re Iowa Premium Service Co., Inc.), 676 F.2d 1220, 9 Bankr.Ct. Dec. (CCH) 111 (8th Cir.1982); Trauner v. Stephenson (In re Valles Mechanical Industries, Inc.), 20 B.R. 350, 9 Bankr.Ct.Dec. (CCH) 334 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga.1982). See also, 4 Collier on Bankr. § 547.38 (15th ed. 1979). Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 Am.Bankr.L.J. 173 (1797).
Since the debt was incurred on December 11, 1980, it is necessary to determine when payment was made. The check in payment of the debt was delivered on January 20, 1982, clearly within 45 days from the date that the debt was incurred. However, the check was not paid by the drawee bank until February 24, 1981, 75 days after the debt was incurred. Thus, the validity of defendant's defense depends upon whether delivery of a check or cashing a check by the drawee bank constitutes payment within the meaning of section 547(c)(2).
The Code defines transfer to mean "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property. . . ." § 101(40). The delivery of the check constituted a transfer of property. Additionally, the Code provides that
a transfer of . . . property other than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
§ 547(e)(1)(B). While the Bankruptcy Code defines the term "transfer," the Bankruptcy Code does not deal with the operative events that determine when a transfer has taken place. To make this determination, it is necessary to look to state law. McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 65 S.Ct. 405, 89 L.Ed. 305 (1945); see also, Dudley v. Eberly, 201 F.Supp. 728 (D.Or.) aff'd. 314 F.2d 8 (9th Cir.1962); Countryman, The Use of State Law In Bankruptcy Cases, 47 N.Y. U.L.Rev. 631 (1972); 3 Collier on Bankr. ¶ 60.39 at 957 (14th ed. 1977). The Uniform Commercial Code which has been adopted in Michigan, provides that a check "does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its repayment, and a drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it." M.C.L.A. § 440.3409. A check is merely
an order to the drawee bank to pay the sum stated and does not constitute a delivery of the fund until it is paid. The date of payment and not the date of delivery is crucial in determining when the preferential transfer occurred.
In re Duffy, 3 B.R. 263, 265 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N. Y.1980). Until a check is honored by the drawee bank, a third party can acquire a right in the funds superior to that of the payee. Additionally, prior to the release of the funds by the bank, the transferor can stop payment on a check. It follows, therefore, that a transfer of property by check is not perfected until the check is honored by the drawee bank. See Gropper v. Samuel Kunstler Textiles, Inc. (In re Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc.), 22 B.R. 1013 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y. 1982); Carmack v. Zell (In re Mindys, Inc.), 17 B.R. 177 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 1982); Larimore v. Weyand & Son, Inc. (In re Kimball), 16 B.R. 201 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1981); Itule v. Luhr Jensen & Sons, Inc. (In re Sportsco, Inc.), 12 B.R. 34 (Bkrtcy.D.Ariz. 1981); In re Duffy.
The defendant, however, contends that the conclusion reached, that the date of payment is the date when the check is cashed, ignores the legislative history which expressly states that
Contrary to language contained in the House Report, payment of a debt by means of a check is equivalent to a cash payment, unless the check is dishonored. Payment is considered to be made when the check is delivered for purposes of sections 547(c)(1) and (2).3
All the cases relied upon by the trustee which hold that the perfection of a transfer involving a check takes place when the check is honored reach this conclusion without considering the legislative statement now relied upon by the defendant. In re Garland, 19 B.R. 920, 929 (Bkrtcy.E.D. Mo.1982), reaches a contrary result based solely upon this statement. The courts that have ignored the September 28th and October 6th statement apparently did so on the theory that resort to legislative materials is irrelevant when a statute is clear and unambiguous. This theory clearly has no substance in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 1938, 48 L.Ed.2d 434 (1976). In that case, the court held that
when aid to construction to the meaning of words, as used in the statute is available, there certainly can be no "rule of law" which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on "superficial examination."4
Thus, even though the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the legislative history is not to be ignored, if it casts any light on the question before ...
