Matter of Anderson, Interim Decision #2669

Decision Date31 August 1978
Docket NumberA-22154419,Interim Decision #2669
Citation16 I&N Dec. 596
PartiesMATTER OF ANDERSON In Deportation Proceedings
CourtU.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals

In a decision dated November 4, 1977, an immigration judge found the respondent deportable as charged, denied his application for suspension of deportation under section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(a), but granted him the privilege of voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. The respondent has appealed. The appeal will be dismissed.

The respondent, a 55-year-old native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the United States on August 3, 1969, as a nonimmigrant visitor. He has conceded deportability as a visitor who has remained here beyond the period authorized. The finding we are asked to review on appeal concerns the denial of suspension of deportation.

In order to establish eligibility for section 244(a)(1) relief, an alien must prove that he has been physically present in the United States for the last seven years, that he has been a person of good moral character for the same period, and that his deportation will result in extreme hardship to himself or to his United States citizen or permanent resident spouse, children, or parents.

The immigration judge appears to have found that the respondent failed to establish two of the three statutory criteria, continuous physical presence and extreme hardship. The issue of the respondent's good moral character was not challenged by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In view of our conclusions on the hardship issue, we find it unnecessary to reach the question of continuous physical presence.

In testimony given at the hearing, the respondent contended that the economy of the Dominican Republic is so severely depressed that he will find it difficult to support himself and his wife, who is also in the United States illegally. Medical treatment for her psychological maladjustments could not be afforded, according to the respondent. The immigration judge concluded that the thrust of the respondent's argument was that he would suffer economic detriment if deported. The judge correctly noted that under the prevailing interpretation of the extreme hardship requirement, financial hardship in the absence of substantial additional equities has not been a persuasive factor. See Matter of Uy, 11 I. & N. Dec. 159 (BIA 1965); Matter of Sangster, 11 I. & N. Dec. 309 (BIA 1965); Matter of Gibson, Interim Decision 2541 (BIA 1976).

At oral argument, counsel for the respondent directed our attention to recent comments by the House Judiciary Committee on the issue of extreme hardship. Counsel was referring to a report by the committee in the 94th Congress on § 4 of H.R. 8713, a bill which provided for discretionary...

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