Matter of Astorga
| Decision Date | 19 June 1979 |
| Docket Number | A-20952928,Interim Decision Number 2711 |
| Citation | 17 I&N Dec. 1 |
| Parties | MATTER OF ASTORGA In Visa Petition Proceedings |
| Court | U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals |
The United States citizen petitioner applied for immediate relative status for the beneficiary as her spouse under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1151(b). In a decision dated July 25, 1978, the District Director denied the petition on the ground that the beneficiary had previously entered into a marriage in Mexico that this prior marriage had not been dissolved, and that the beneficiary was not free to marry the petitioner. The petitioner appealed from this decision. In a decision dated November 24, 1978, this Board remanded the record to the District Director so that he might consider a court order from the Superior Court of Washington for King County declaring the prior marriage invalid from its inception, and a letter from the Municipal President of Cuautla, Jalisco, Mexico, stating that no record of the prior marriage existed in the archives there. The record is now back to us upon certification by the District Director pursuant to our order. In his decision of February 12, 1979, he again found that the petitioner had not provided proof that the declaration of invalidity made the marriage between the petitioner and the beneficiary valid for immigration purposes and reaffirmed his first decision. He did not discuss the letter from the President of the Municipality. However, as we have concluded that the petitioner's marriage is valid for immigration purposes, there is no need to again remand the record.
The petitioner and the beneficiary were married on March 12, 1978, at Seattle, Washington. Previously, in statements made to the Service, the beneficiary and his purported first wife had contended that they were married. Thus, when the present petitioner submitted the visa petition on behalf of the beneficiary, a question arose as to the dissolution of the first marriage. The petitioner submitted an affidavit by the beneficiary that he had not previously been married, and a statement from a City President and Judge of the Civil Register of the State in Santiago Papasquiaro, Durango, Mexico, and letters from five persons attesting to the fact that the beneficiary had not previously been married. Among those submitting the letters was the purported first wife. The District Director found the evidence submitted self-serving, not credible, and not sufficient to overcome the prior information given by the beneficiary and the alleged first wife.
On appeal, the petitioner submitted a copy of an order issued by the Superior Court of Washington for King County on October 6, 1978, and a letter from the Municipal President of Cuautla. The court order was in the form of a "Declaration of Invalid Marriage" and stated that the marriage was invalid from inception. The President's letter stated that no record of marriage existed in that municipality. The record was remanded so that the District Director could consider this evidence. He did, as noted, consider the Declaration of Invalid Marriage and found it unpersuasive.
Since we also find that the letters and the statements of the beneficiary are self-serving and weak evidence, in the fact of the previous information provided, we will focus on the Declaration of Invalid Marriage as the major piece of evidence presented by the petitioner to prove the validity of his present marriage.
In 1973, the Washington legislature to a great extent overhauled the laws dealing with domestic relations. As part of this process, it instituted a Marriage Dissolution Act.1 Included in this Act was a section codified as Washington Revised Code § 26.09.040.2 This is the section under which the beneficiary here proceeded to have his purported first marriage declared invalid. Since this is the case, it is necessary for us to consider first the legal effect of this action under Washington law, and secondly, its effect for purposes of the immigration law.
As to the first point, the Declaration states that the marriage was "declared invalid for all purposes from its inception and the relationship of the parties hereto does not constitute a marriage under the laws of any jurisdiction where they have resided in the past." It is clear that by the terms of Wash.Rev.Code § 26.09.040 a court can "... declare the marriage invalid as of the date it was purportedly contracted;" and that:
(c) If it finds that a marriage contracted in a jurisdiction other than this state, was void or voidable under the law of the place where the marriage was contracted, and in the absence of proof that such marriage was subsequently validated by the laws of the place of contract or of a subsequent domicile of the parties, shall declare the marriage invalid as of the date of the marriage.
These provisions clearly grant the court jurisdiction to do what it did. It would also appear that the question of whether or not the purported marriage was either void or voidable according to Mexican law is irrelevant. The Marriage Dissolution Act in 1973 repealed Wash.Rev.Code § 26.08.050 which provided for the annulment of void marriages.3 The Act has eliminated distinctions between void and voidable marriages and simply authorizes a declaration of invalidity. The apparent purpose of this action was to avoid argument over the meaning of the words "void"nd "voidable" and also to avoid conflict of laws questions.4 This being the case, it is not necessary to decide whether or not there was a common-law or other type marriage entered into in Mexico, and to identify it as "void" or "voidable."
The fact that the Act repealed the annulment statute, however, and in effect replaced it with a hybrid, is important in the sense that the Washington law consequently stands outside the traditional annulment laws which have previously been considered by this Board. See generally, Matter of B----, 3 I&N Dec. 102 (BIA 1947); Matter of F----, 9 I&N Dec. 275 (BIA 1961). By its clear terms, this section indicates that the marriage declared invalid is invalid from inception. The Act consequently provides a means for the parties to have a marriage declared invalid as if it had never existed and in essence renders the question of the existence of the marriage totally irrelevant, but does this in a procedure more analogous to divorce than annulment.5
The legal effect under Washington law having been established, the next question that arises is the effect such a declaration has for purposes of the immigration laws. It is apparent from previous cases that the issue of void, voidable, and annulled marriages has been a difficult one. Generally,...
To continue reading
Request your trial