Matter of Bufalino

Decision Date30 September 1965
Docket NumberInterim Decision Number 1517,A-10607337
Citation11 I&N Dec. 351
PartiesMATTER OF BUFALINO In Deportation Proceedings
CourtU.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals

The case comes forward on appeal from the order of the special inquiry officer dated March 17, 1965, denying the respondent's various applications for discretionary relief, ordering respondent deported on the charges contained in the order to show cause and on the lodged charge to Brazil, in the alternative, to Italy, and further ordering that the respondent's application for withholding of deportation to Italy under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act be denied.

The order of the special inquiry officer sets forth the prior action in the case. The respondent is a native and citizen of Italy, 61 years old, male, married. The proceedings were instituted on December 16, 1957 by the issuance and service of an order to show cause which charged the respondent with being deportable on the two grounds set forth in the caption. The second charge was amended by being restricted to allege the respondent's failure to furnish notification of his address to the Attorney General only during the years 1956 and 1957. A third charge was lodged that the respondent was deportable under the provisions of section 241(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)) as one who was excludable at time of entry into the United States at New York, New York on May 5, 1956 because he was then an alien immigrant who entered by claiming to be a citizen of the United States and was not in possession of an unexpired immigrant visa or valid entry document.

The respondent through counsel admitted the charge of entry without inspection and the lodged charge of entry without proper documentation. The second charge under section 241(a)(5) was disputed. After hearing, the then presiding special inquiry officer entered a decision on April 2, 1958 finding respondent deportable on all three charges. Applications for discretionary relief from deportation were denied and deportation was directed. On appeal, this Board initially remanded the cause for further hearing. Then, upon motion for reconsideration, it certified the case to the Attorney General, who, in turn, directed that a decision be entered by the Board on the merits and on September 2, 1958, this Board dismissed the respondent's appeal.

A petition for review of the order of deportation and denial of the applications for discretionary relief, filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was dismissed on April 8, 1959. This grant of summary judgment by the District Court was affirmed on April 1, 1960 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Bufalino v. Holland, 277 F.2d 270) and certiorari was denied (364 U.S. 863 (1960)).

Administratively, and not as part of the deportation proceedings, the respondent then sought the creation of a record of lawful admission for permanent residence, pursuant to the provisions of section 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1259), and alternatively, withholding of deportation to Italy, the country directed by the District Director pursuant to the provisions of section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1253(h)). The determination on each of the applications was adverse to the respondent who then sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Summary judgment was entered against the respondent on June 7, 1962. The respondent appealed and the appellate court, on June 6, 1963, reversed (Bufalino v. Kennedy, 322 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir.)) and directed that the cause be returned to the District Court for a trial upon the limited issue of the respondent's contention that there had been adverse prejudgment of his applications by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Subject to the approval of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, respondent's counsel and the United States Attorney on September 26, 1963 stipulated that the cause be remanded through the District Court to the Immigration and Naturalization Service with directions to reopen the administrative deportation proceedings. The stipulation specifically limited the scope of the further proceedings to a redetermination of the previous administratively denied applications of the respondent for withholding of deportation and for creation of a record of lawful admission for permanent residence and to a determination of the country of deportation in accordance with section 243(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1253(a)). Leave was also granted in the stipulation for the respondent to raise, promptly both before the special inquiry officer and the Board of Immigration Appeals, the claim of prejudgment which he had asserted during the litigation. After approval of this stipulation by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on October 14, 1963, the District Court, in turn, on October 31, 1963, remanded the cause to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Board of Immigration Appeals then, on November 15, 1963, administratively remanded the cause for further proceedings consistent with the District Court's order and the stipulation. Pursuant to further stipulations between counsel and the trial attorney for the Service, the proceedings were enlarged to permit the respondent to file applications for suspension of deportation and voluntary departure in lieu of deportation under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1254, as amended), and for change of status to that of a lawful resident alien under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1255, as amended), and to require a determination on each of the applications.

At the outset of the reopened proceedings on March 2, 1964, respondent's counsel moved for disqualification of the special inquiry officer and for the appointment of an attorney outside the Department of Justice to conduct this hearing. The motion was denied. A similar motion had been denied by the Acting Attorney General on January 27, 1964. The applications were bottomed upon respondent's contention that the ultimate determination in this cause had been prejudged, as indicated by public statements made by the Attorney General with respect to the respondent and his activities. The special inquiry officer stated unequivocally and without hesitation, that he has received no advice, instructions, or directions whatsoever in this cause from anyone (other than the mere assignment to preside); that the interim determinations and rulings and this decision were premised solely upon his understanding and knowledge of the applicable laws and regulations and his honest and sincere evaluation of the evidence adduced, including his appraisal of the credibility of the...

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