Matter of C. P., 12823.

• Decision Date: 15 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 12823.,12823.
• Parties: In the Matter of C. P., Appellant.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 643

411 A.2d 643

In the Matter of C. P., Appellant.

No. 12823.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued October 3, 1978.

Decided February 15, 1980.

Roger H. Moore, Washington, D. C., appointed by the court, for appellant.

Dennis McDaniel, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom Louis P. Robbins, Acting Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., when the brief was filed and the case was argued, and Richard W. Barton, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellee.

Before NEBEKER, HARRIS and FERREN, Associate Judges.

HARRIS, Associate Judge:

After a factfinding hearing in the Juvenile Branch of the Family Division of the Superior Court, appellant was found guilty of attempted robbery while armed. D.C. Code 1973, §§ 22-2902, 22-3202. Prior to that hearing, alleging Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations, appellant moved to suppress an inculpatory statement which he had made to his mother in the presence of a police officer at the station house, as well as a statement which he made thereafter to the officer. This appeal challenges the denial of that motion; we affirm.

I

One night at about 10:30 p. m., there was an attempted robbery of a woman who had stopped her car at a traffic light. She hurriedly drove off, frustrating the youthful would-be robbers. Shortly thereafter, appellant (who was 13 years old) and three other juveniles were arrested by Officer Spooner Underwood. They first were taken to a police substation and then to Robbery Squad Headquarters, arriving at the latter location at about midnight. Appellant made no statement at that time. Appellant's mother was called; she arrived at about 1:30 a. m. Officer Underwood told her that charges had been placed against appellant, that she could sit with her son, and that he (Officer Underwood) would talk with them later.

Appellant was given a Metropolitan Police Department rights card, which he read with his mother. While he had never had a comparable experience with law enforcement authorities before (nor had his mother), he signed the card indicating that he understood his rights. He also indicated that he did not wish to answer questions and that he did want an attorney. Appellant's mother testified at the suppression hearing that at about that time (she did not indicate exactly when) another officer remarked to her, as she sat by her son, something to the following effect: "I should get him to tell about what happened because he was in serious trouble." She also testified that soon after appellant filled out the rights card, he repeated that he did not want to say anything.

About 30 minutes after appellant signed the rights card, Officer Underwood went with appellant and his mother into an adjoining room. He sat down with them, and again advised appellant of his rights. The officer then informed the mother that the youths who had been apprehended with her son had confessed and implicated appellant. Thereupon, as Officer Underwood sat silently, appellant's mother called on her son to tell the truth about the incident. At his mother's urging, appellant admitted to having taken part in the attempted robbery, and to having wielded a BB pistol during the episode.

Thereafter, Officer Underwood led appellant and his mother into another room where the other arrested juveniles and their parents were gathered. Each of the youths recounted the part he or she had played in the crime, with appellant apparently then adding to what he had already confessed the fact that he had pointed a pistol at the complainant during the robbery attempt.

At the suppression hearing, appellant alleged that the police officer's "use" of his mother to gain incriminating statements after appellant had indicated his desire to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel violated both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The hearing judge, after carefully considering all the evidence and closely questioning both counsel on the nature of the alleged Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations, expressed the following extensive findings and conclusions: The Court finds on the basis of Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 [the rights card] that this respondent had indicated that he did not wish to make statements without having an attorney present, and indeed he said he did not wish to answer any questions.

He stated, however, that he understood his rights. And he also indicated that his rights had been read to him, and to repeat, that he understood his rights.

The Court finds on the basis of [the rights card] without any evidence to the contrary that this respondent did understand his rights and that indeed he said he did not wish to answer any questions. The Court further finds that this respondent after speaking to his mother while yet in the Robbery Squad's office did state or give an incriminating statement in the presence of the officer and in the presence of the respondent's mother.

The Court finds on the basis of the testimony that that incriminating statement, the substance of which has not been revealed to the Court, was not the result of continued questioning or interrogation by the officers, but was indeed a result of a conversation between the respondent and his mother. The Court does not find that the mother employed any kind of coercion or that this was a ploy established or set up by the police for the purpose of inducing the respondent to waive his rights. Indeed it appears to the Court and the Court finds that this respondent was responding to his mother's urging, albeit, in the presence of the officer when he gave the incriminating statement.

It is a matter of policy that parents ought to be asked to come to the precinct and to the Robbery Squad or any place else where a youngster is being held. And [defense counsel] in his argument candidly points out that the evidence certainly reveals that the officers — and also [the prosecutor] argued to that effect — that the officer did not wait until after this youngster had rendered some statements before calling in the parent. Indeed the parent was called.

And as far as it appears the officer had respected this youngster's indicating that he did not wish to speak, and as I previously stated there was no further questioning by the officers.

The Court is not prepared to hold that a parent may not ask a child to tell the truth or to make a statement concerning the incident. Whatever has been held by Miranda and Gault and other cases and including Brewer v. Williams [430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977)], the latter case of course applies to Gault, there is certainly nothing that the Court can glean from any of them which suggests that a parent or a relative or indeed some other person may not ask a respondent or perhaps an adult to make a statement.

And if the Court need only to confine its findings in this case to a respondent, . . . on the basis then of all the evidence the Court makes the findings that it has enunciated. On the basis of those findings the Court concludes that this respondent had waived his rights [not] to speak concerning this crime, and that that waiver was not induced by any coercion on the part of the officer, and there certainly was no evidence that it was the result of any coercion on the part of the parent. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion.

Following that determination, appellant was found guilty at a hearing in which his inculpatory statements were admitted into evidence.

II

Our scope of review is limited. See, e. g., D.C.Code 1973, § 17-305(a). As reflected by the above-quoted excerpt from the transcript, the trial court found that appellant understood his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, that there was no police questioning after appellant had indicated his desire to remain silent and to have an attorney, and that the inculpatory statement he made in response to his mother's questioning, in the officer's presence, constituted an effective waiver of his rights. The trial court also found that appellant's mother had not been used in a police ploy to induce appellant's waiver, and that his mother did not overbear his will by coercion.¹ In short, the trial court, properly evaluating the totality of the circumstances, determined that the government had satisfied its burden of showing that there had been no infringement of appellant's rights and that his confession was voluntary.²

The trial court's ultimate factual finding of voluntariness is not to be overturned unless it is without substantial support in the evidence. See, e. g., Jackson v. United States, D.C.App., 404 A.2d 911, 924 (1979); In re W.B.W., Jr., D.C.App., 397 A.2d 143, 145 (1979); Taylor v. United States, D.C.App., 380 A.2d 989, 992 (1977); United States v. Lyon, D.C.App., 348 A.2d 297, 298-99 (1975); In re M.D.J., D.C.App., 346 A.2d 733, 735 (1975); United States v. McNeil, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 3, 433 F.2d 1109 (1969).³ The record unquestionably supports the trial court's ruling.

III

It is useful to note basically what the Supreme Court resolved in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In a recent case, the Court reversed a decision of the California Supreme Court and reinstated a trial judge's determination that a juvenile's confession (given during police interrogation, which is not the situation here) had been voluntary. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). In doing so, it succinctly characterized Miranda as follows:

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (1966), this Court established certain procedural safeguards designed to protect the rights of an accused, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to be free from compelled self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. The Court specified, among other things, that if the accused indicates in any manner that he wishes to remain silent or to consult an attorney, interrogation must cease, and any statement obtained from...