Matter of Coury, 86-849.

Decision Date22 May 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-849.,86-849.
Citation526 A.2d 25
PartiesIn the Matter of Bradley R. COURY, Respondent.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Bradley C. Coury, pro se.

Michael S. Frisch, Asst. Bar Counsel, Washington, D.C.

Before PRYOR, Chief Judge, STEADMAN, Associate Judge, and PAIR, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a reciprocal discipline case. By order dated July 30, 1985, respondent was suspended in Virginia for seven years from the practice of law for repeated personal use of a client's trust fund. Acting under our provision for reciprocal discipline, D.C. Bar R. XI, § 18, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends that we impose an identical sanction, to run concurrently with his Virginia suspension. Respondent does not contest the recommendation.

This could have been a troublesome case. When we are imposing reciprocal discipline in its pure form, this court is required to impose "identical discipline" to that imposed by the other disciplining state. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 18(5); In re Brickle, 521 A.2d 271, 273 (D.C.1987). This is so even though the form of the discipline is one not provided for in the choice of sanctions provided for in D.C. Bar R. XI, § 3, that are available in disciplinary proceedings undertaken in the District in the first instance. See In re Branham, No. 86-124 (D.C. Oct. 31, 1986) (license revoked, with leave to apply for reinstatement at any time upon a showing of fitness to resume the practice of law); In re J.F.M., No. 86-50 (D.C. May 20, 1986) (court approved Board's confidential official reprimand); In re Rosen, No. M-69(81) (D.C. Nov. 20, 1981) (per curiam) (public "reprimand" by this court). In each instance, the sanction imposed, although not strictly conforming to our disciplinary scheme, was functionally equivalent to one that we might have imposed had the case arisen before us in the first instance. By adopting the terminology and form of discipline imposed by our sister jurisdiction, without significant difference in practical effect upon the disciplined attorney, we were cognizant of the desirability of avoiding "inconsistent disposition involving identical conduct by the same attorney." In re Velasquez, 507 A.2d 145, 147 (D.C.1986) (per curiam).

However, under our rules, we are not to impose "identical discipline" where we find that clearly "the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this jurisdiction." D.C. Bar R. XI, § 18(5)(d). This provision may be invoked where the foreign sanction, whatever its form, is effectively either significantly heavier or lighter than that which we would impose for the same misconduct. See, e.g., In re Brickle, supra (intentional misappropriation of funds would result in disbarment in D.C. for minimum of five years; Virginia sanction of revocation, with right to apply for reinstatement at any time "substantially different" and therefore rejected). Thus, in the case before us, Virginia imposed a seven-year suspension upon respondent. Our disciplinary system has no provision for a seven-year suspension. On the contrary, in this jurisdiction no suspension may be ordered for a specific period in excess of five years. D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 3(2). Furthermore, even with disbarments, an attorney may apply for reinstatement after five years, id. § 21(2), unless disbarred for conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. In re Kerr, 424 A.2d 94 (D.C.1980) (en banc).

Therefore, we might here have been faced squarely with the issue whether a seven-year suspension is "substantially different" from a five-year disbarment. The Board concluded that the two sanctions were not "substantially different" within the meaning of D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 18(5)(d), a proposition with which we might have taken issue. However, since respondent has filed an affidavit certifying that he has not practiced law within the District of Columbia subsequent...

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23 cases
  • In re Ditton, No. 06-BG-44.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • August 14, 2008
    ...in either greater or lesser sanctions than those imposed in the foreign jurisdiction. Jacoby, 945 A.2d at 1198 (citing In re Coury, 526 A.2d 25, 26 (D.C.1987)). However, as a prerequisite, the attorney or Bar Counsel must demonstrate, or this court must find on the face of the record on whi......
  • In re Fuller
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • August 9, 2007
    ...it is appropriate to "apply the foreign discipline in haec verba." In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 970 (D.C. 2003); In re Coury, 526 A.2d 25, 25-26 (D.C.1987). This court has previously held that a public censure is the functional equivalent of a public reprimand issued by the Supreme Cour......
  • In re Zdravkovich
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • September 11, 2003
    ...form of discipline not authorized by Rule XI, § 3(a) in original disciplinary proceedings in this jurisdiction, see, e.g., In re Coury, 526 A.2d 25, 25-26 (D.C.1987), we are not aware of any provision prohibiting such discipline and indeed, more recently, we have demonstrated a willingness,......
  • In re Zdravkovich, 01-BG-96.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • September 11, 2003
    ...form of discipline not authorized by Rule XI, § 3(a) in original disciplinary proceedings in this jurisdiction, see, e.g., In re Coury, 526 A.2d 25, 25-26 (D.C. 1987), we are not aware of any provision prohibiting such discipline and indeed, more recently, we have demonstrated a willingness......
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