Matter of Estrada-Betancourt
| Decision Date | 12 April 1967 |
| Docket Number | A-17251270. A-17251272. A-14326873.,Interim Decision Number 1725 |
| Parties | MATTER OF ESTRADA-BETANCOURT In Exclusion Proceedings |
| Court | U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals |
The record relates to three male aliens, natives and citizens of Cuba, who, on December 12, 1966, crossed to the United States from Mexico by boat at a point near the mouth of the Rio Grande, about 20 miles east of Brownsville, Texas. They then proceeded by automobile to the airport at Harlingen, Texas, which is approximately 20 miles northwest of Brownsville and 10 miles inland from the international boundry. They were there taken into custody by Service officers, at which time they had been on United States soil nearly three hours.
The subjects stated that they were en route to Miami, Florida, and that they intended to present themselves for immigration inspection as political refugees at that place, because: "* * * that is where all other Cubans are living now and being helped * * *". They were, however, transported to Brownsville for further interrogation. Subsequently, they were referred to a special inquiry officer for a hearing in exclusion proceedings, pursuant to sections 235 and 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1225 and 1226).
The special inquiry officer ordered those proceedings terminated, concluding that expulsion proceedings were required as to these aliens, under section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1252). He then certified the case to this Board for review and final decision.
The Service strenuously urges that the special inquiry officer erred in ruling that exclusion proceedings were improper in this instance. It argues that the aliens were still in the act of entering the United States until they reached their interior destination, to wit, Miami, Florida. It would have us give full faith and credit to the testimony of the aliens that they intended to be inspected at that point.
The case of Brazil v. Ahrens1 involved a group of Haitian aliens who arrived in the United States on a vessel which had to be towed into a port in Florida by a Coast Guard boat. They, too, apparently desired to be admitted to the United States as political refugees; they were paroled into the United States pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182); and they were subsequently referred to a special inquiry officer for a hearing in exclusion proceedings. In the course thereof, it developed that they had never been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence; that they desired to remain in the United States indefinitely; and that they were not in possession of appropriate documents to permit them to do so. In rejecting their claim that they were entitled to an expulsion proceeding rather than an exclusion proceeding, the court held:
The controlling question in determining whether Petitioners were entitled to a deportation proceeding rather than an exclusion proceeding is the issue of whether they had in fact made an "entry" within the meaning of that word as it is used in the Immigration and Nationality Act.
That is the test which must be applied in determining whether exclusion or deportation proceedings are proper in the case now before us for consideration. The question of whether that "entry" is legal or illegal is immaterial (Lam Fo Sang v. Esperdy, 210 F.Supp. 786).
The case of United States v. Ju Toy (198 U.S. 252), involved a person of the Chinese race detained aboard a ship for deportation to China pursuant to an administrative decision that he was not a United States citizen. In denying his petition for habeas corpus, seeking a judicial trial on the issue of his citizenship, the Supreme Court of the United States pointed to the well-established principle that all persons attempting to enter the United States are subject to inspection by immigration officers for determination of their right to enter, regardless of the ground on which their claim to that right is based (p. 262). Accordingly, it is clear that the aliens in this case were subject to immigration inspection.
Section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1251) provides that: "Any alien in the United States * * * shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who — * * * entered the United States without inspection at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General * * *.". Under the law, then, expulsion proceedings are required as to any alien who has entered the United States at other than a designated "port of entry."
The case of Thack v. Zurbrick (51 F.2d 634), involved an alien previously admitted to the United States for permanent residence who was returning to this country from a visit to Poland, by way of Canada. He proceeded by train to the last Canadian station before reaching the Vermont border, where he sought advice from the American consular agent as to how he should get to his home in Massachusetts.2 He was advised to go to the immigrant inspector at Newport, Vermont, six miles south of the border, and got a ride there but found the Immigration Office closed. He then stayed at a hotel in Newport overnight, and appeared at the Immigration Office as soon as it opened the following morning. He was thereupon made the subject of expulsion proceedings, on the ground that he had entered the United States without inspection. In ruling that the case was improperly in expulsion proceedings, in that the facts recited did not constitute an "entry without inspection," the court said:
* * * Such entry cannot be, in all cases, completed by that technical entry which occurs when the international line is crossed. If such crossing were not in connection with or merged into an actual inspection at the appropriate place, "entered" might have this technical meaning, but if the alien merely follows the ordinary path from the international line to the nearest inspection point and presents himself for inspection, his action in so doing cannot be an offense for which Congress intended he should be sent to his former foreign residence and forbidden return to this country. * * *
We cannot agree with the Service that the aliens involved in this case, who did not arrive in the United States at a "designated port of entry" did not have to "follow the ordinary path from the international line to the nearest inspection point," because they actually intended to be inspected at some other port, to wit, Miami, Florida. The language of the court in question is clear and unequivocal. It permits no other reasonable interpretation than the one we have placed upon it.
That aliens who do not cross the border at a "designated port of entry" must proceed directly to the nearest such port for inspection is, we think, made clear by the decision in Giaconi v. Corsi (64 F.2d 18). Therein, a resident alien returning from a short visit in Canada was arrested by a Customs border patrolman about one-half mile beyond the Customs and Immigration Office and charged in expulsion proceedings with entry without inspection and a crime prior to entry. The alien claimed that he intended to be inspected, but could not find the inspection station. The court, in upholding the propriety of expulsion proceedings, ruled that the inspector was not obliged to accept the alien's claim as to his intention where the circumstances of his presence beyond the inspection point (nearest) contradicted his claims. In that case they did, the alien having six fur coats and other dutiable items in his car.
To the same effect is the case of Natali v. Day (45 F.2d 112). Therein, a resident alien went to Montreal to assist another alien to enter the United States. They paid a taxi driver to convey them to the St. Lawrence River, and an Indian to row them across the river. They crossed the border without inspection and were apprehended by a United States officer shortly thereafter. Under those circumstances, the court held that Natali was properly ordered deported for "entry without inspection" — at other than a designated port of entry — in expulsion proceedings.
We think the foregoing authorities clearly call for the conclusion that these aliens, who did not arrive in the United States at a "designated port of entry," were required to proceed by the ordinary route to the nearest such port for their inspection. According to the list of such "ports" for these aliens who arrived in the United States by other than aircraft, Brownsville, Texas, was that "port" (section...
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