Matter of GLS

• Decision Date: 05 April 1984
• Docket Number: Misc. No. 2086.
• Citation: 586 F. Supp. 375
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
• Parties: In the Matter of G.L.S.

586 F. Supp. 375

In the Matter of G.L.S.

Misc. No. 2086.

United States District Court, D. of Maryland.

April 5, 1984.

Edward Smith, Jr., Baltimore, Md., for petitioner.

Before MILLER, MURRAY and BLACK, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

G.L.S. has applied for admission to the Bar of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. In his application for admission, he stated that in January, 1968, he was convicted of bank robbery in this Court. On January 23, 1984, a hearing was held before a three-judge panel to determine whether G.L.S. meets the criteria for admission.¹

All federal courts have the power to establish requirements for admission to practice before the court. See, e.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1276, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1957); 28 U.S.C. § 1654, § 2071; Fed.R.Civ.P. 83. In exercising its power, this Court promulgated Local Rule 2 which reads in pertinent part:

"It shall be requisite for the admission of any person to practice in this Court that such person shall make written application and be sponsored by a member of the Bar of this Court and shall satisfy the Court that he or she is a member in good standing of the Bar of any Court of the United States, or the highest Court of any State, and that his or her private and professional character is good."

It is undisputed that G.L.S. has filed a written application; is sponsored by a member of the Bar of this Court; and is a member in good standing of the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The question in this case is whether G.L.S. possesses good private and professional character.

Factual Background

The facts of this case are set forth in detail in In re G.L.S., 292 Md. 378, 439 A.2d 1107 (1982). They are summarized here.

After an honorable discharge from the United States Army in 1966, G.L.S. was employed until he was laid off in June, 1967. On October 9, 1967, he, along with two armed men, robbed the Lovettsville Branch of Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Hamilton in Lovettsville, Virginia. G.L.S. pleaded guilty in this Court to the charge of armed robbery and was sentenced to ten years in prison. He was 19 years old at the time.

He was incarcerated for a period of six years in several federal penal institutions. On May 17, 1974, he was released on parole.

Upon his release, he enrolled in Morgan State College from which he later received, with honors, a degree in political science. While attending Morgan State, he was married. His parole was successfully terminated approximately 13 months before his sentence expired.

In 1977, he was admitted to the University of Maryland School of Law, having disclosed to the school his conviction for bank robbery. After graduation in 1980, he applied for admission to the Bar of Maryland. The application required G.L.S. to list every place of residence for the previous ten years. He did not list any residence or address for the years he was incarcerated. The application also called for a complete record of all criminal proceedings to which he was a party. In response, the applicant wrote: "11/67 — U.S. Dist. Ct. for the District of Maryland." He did not describe the nature of the proceedings or the disposition of the case.

After an interview with G.L.S., a member of the Character Committee for the Eighth Judicial Circuit refused to recommend him for admission to the Bar and suggested a full committee review of the case. After a hearing of the Character Committee, which recommended G.L.S. for admission, the State Board of Law Examiners again conducted a full hearing. The State Board also recommended that he be admitted to the Bar. The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with the State Board's determination and ordered that G.L.S. be admitted to the Bar upon successful completion of the requisite bar examination. In re G.L.S., 292 Md. at 398, 439 A.2d 1107. This requirement was met when G.L.S. passed the February, 1983 bar examination.

Legal Analysis

It is well accepted that the highest standards of integrity and conduct must be met before a lawyer can be admitted to the bar of this, or any, court.

"It is a fair characterization of the lawyer's responsibility in our society that he stands `as a shield' ... in defense of right and to ward off wrong. From a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as `moral character.'"

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247, 77 S.Ct. 752, 760, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Of course, "the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an individual .... The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. But it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the bar should be maintained, and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved." In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094, 1099 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1038, 96 S.Ct. 574, 46 L.Ed.2d 413 (1975), citing Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 529-30, 6 L.Ed. 152 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).

The Court of Appeals of Maryland has considered the issue of this applicant's moral character and has found him fit to become a member of the Bar of that Court. In re G.L.S., 292 Md. at 398, 439 A.2d 1107. Although "admission to practice before a federal court is derivative from membership in a state bar, the federal courts maintain independent control over admission, discipline, and disbarment of attorneys in the federal courts." Galahad v. Weinshienk, 555 F.Supp. 1201, 1211 n. 15 (D.Colo. 1983); see also Brooks v. Laws, 208 F.2d 18, 22 (D.C.Cir.1953); Petition of Merry Queen Transfer Corp., 269 F.Supp. 812, 813 (E.D.N.Y.1967); Lark v. West, 182 F.Supp. 794, 796 (D.D.C.1960), aff'd, 289 F.2d 898 (D.C.Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 865, 82 S.Ct. 114, 7 L.Ed.2d 63 (1961). Therefore, admission to the Bar of the highest court of Maryland does not automatically require admission to the Bar of this Court.

In its decision in In re Braverman, 549 F.2d 913 (4th Cir.1976), the Fourth Circuit recognized the importance "of symmetry in the standards of qualification of coordinate courts in the same state." Id. at 914. That court said because "`there is no federal procedure for examining applicants either as to legal ability or moral character ... reliance is placed on prior admission to the bar of a state supreme court.'" Id. at 921 citing In re Dreier, 258 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir.1958). In expressing concern over the effect of disparate treatment in admissions to the bars of coordinate courts, the court noted that disparate treatment would result in "`confusion in the minds of the public, which justifiably may speculate why an attorney not qualified to practice in a federal court has sufficient moral character to practice in the state court.'" Id. at 921 citing In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094, 1106 (3d Cir.1975).

Although we recognize the value of symmetry in the admissions decisions of coordinate courts, complete symmetry would divest this Court of the authority granted to it by statute to establish appropriate standards for its bar. If this Court is to exercise the power vested in it by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, § 2071, and recognized by case law and commentators, see, e.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. at 281, 77 S.Ct. at 1276; In re Roberts, 682 F.2d 105, 109 (3d 1982); Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir.1968); Cheatham, The Reach of Federal Action Over the Profession of Law, 18 Stan.L.Rev. 1288, 1289 (1966), the interest of symmetry must be balanced against the interest of the public sought to be protected through the independent control of this Court over admissions to its bar.

We do not read Braverman to require complete deference in all circumstances to a state court's decision to admit an applicant to its bar. In fact, when the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded Braverman with instructions to admit Mr. Braverman to practice in this Court, it did so "because of a proper deference to the considered judgment of the coordinate Maryland Court of Appeals." In re Braverman, 549 F.2d at 921 (emphasis supplied). In the view of this Court, the requirement of "proper deference" strikes a balance between the need for symmetry and the independent authority of this Court to establish standards for its bar. Proper deference, we believe, requires this Court to look closely at the state court decision granting or denying admittance to the state bar, to assess the reasons given for the decision, and to take into consideration whether the opinion was or was not unanimously rendered and, as well, to examine the mechanisms available to this Court, if any, by which an independent investigation as to the moral character of an applicant might be conducted. Only after such consideration, we believe, is deference proper.

Thus, this Court observes that, unlike the Braverman case in which the Maryland Court of Appeals in a virtually unanimous decision,² based on uncontroverted evidence of Mr. Braverman's rehabilitation, readmitted Mr. Braverman to the Bar of Maryland, In re Braverman, 271 Md. 196, 200, 203, 316 A.2d 246 (1974), the case of G.L.S. comes to this Court in a different posture. The Maryland Court of Appeals handed down a 4-3 decision to admit G.L.S. The evidence of the applicant's moral character was not uncontroverted. The majority felt that the crime in question was a single, isolated incident in the life of G.L.S. and that he had shown remorse for the crime, but the majority also recognized that G.L.S. failed to provide complete information on his bar application. Id. 292 Md. at 397, 439 A.2d 1107. The majority, over a strong dissent, decided to admit the applicant to the bar. Id. at 398, 439 A.2d 1107.

The dissenting members of the court answered an...