Matter of Grant v. Senkowski

• Decision Date: 13 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 10,10
• Citation: 721 N.Y.S.2d 597,95 N.Y.2d 605
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: (Ct.App. 2001) In the Matter of Jason Grant, Appellant, v. Daniel Senkowski, as Superintendent of Clinton Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents. 3

Page 597

721 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Ct.App. 2001)

In the Matter of Jason Grant, Appellant, v. Daniel Senkowski, as Superintendent of Clinton Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents.

3 No. 10

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS

February 13, 2001

Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, Ithaca (Brendan O'Donnell, Tom Terrizzi and Joshua Elman of counsel), and New York State Defenders Association, Albany (Alferd O' Connor of counsel), for appellant.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney Gerneral, Albany (Marcus J. Mastracco, Preeta D. Bansal, Daniel Smirlock and Peter G. Crary of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

LEVINE, J.

Petitioner, while an inmate at the Coxsackie Correctional Facility, brought this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge a determination finding him guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule prohibiting the possession of a weapon. The sole issue on appeal is whether petitioner timely complied with CPLR 304's commencement-by-filing requirements when he delivered a proposed order to show cause, verified CPLR article 78 petition and request to proceed as a poor person to prison authorities for mailing to the appropriate court.

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, submitted his proposed order to show cause, petition and request for poor person relief to prison authorities on Wednesday, October 21, 1998, five days before the applicable Statute of Limitations period expired (see, CPLR 217[1]). Because he requested that the papers be sent by certified mail, petitioner also submitted a form authorizing the Department of Correctional Services to deduct the required additional postage from his prisoner account. The prison business office processed that request and, on Monday, October 26, 1998, mailed petitioner's papers to Supreme Court, Albany County, where they were received in the court clerk's office on October 28, 1998, two days after the Statute of Limitations expired. A Supreme Court Justice signed the order to show cause on November 5. Thereafter, the signed order to show cause and verified petition were filed with the court clerk.

Respondents moved to dismiss the proceeding as time-barred. Supreme Court granted the motion and entered a judgment dismissing the proceeding. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. We granted leave to appeal and now affirm.

Under this State's commencement-by-filing system, an article 78 proceeding is "commenced by filing a notice of petition or order to show cause and a petition" (CPLR 304). Claims asserted in such proceedings are deemed "interposed" for Statute of Limitations purposes at the time of filing (see, CPLR 203[c]). The term "filing" is statutorily defined as "the delivery of the * * * notice of petition or order to show cause to the clerk of the court in the county in which the action or special proceeding is brought or any other person designated by the clerk of the court for that purpose together with any fee required * * * for filing" (CPLR 304).

Relying on the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Houston v Lack (487 US 266), petitioner urges us to adopt a pro se prisoner "mailbox rule," under which the term "filing" would be redefined to mean the delivery of a notice of petition or order to show cause by a pro se prisoner to prison authorities for forwarding to the appropriate court. Because he delivered his proposed order to show cause, verified petition and request for poor person relief to prison authorities before the Statute of Limitations expired, petitioner argues that his CPLR article 78 proceeding should be deemed timely commenced. We disagree.

In Houston, the Supreme Court held that a pro se prisoner's notice of appeal was filed when delivered to prison officials for transmittal to the court. That holding was based, in part, upon the Court's interpretation of the term "filing" as used in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which were promulgated and adopted by the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court's authority in interpreting its own rules exceeds our authority in interpreting the CPLR, which consists of statutory provisions that we are constrained to interpret so as to give effect to the will of the Legislature. Here, the Legislature's intent to treat papers commencing litigation as "filed" upon the actual receipt of those papers by the clerk of the court -- rather than upon delivery to prison authorities for forwarding to the court -- is manifest from the statute's language and purpose.

After defining the term "filing" as the delivery of certain litigation papers to the clerk of the court or other person designated by the clerk, CPLR 304 specifies that, "[a]t the time of filing, the filed papers shall be date stamped by the clerk of the court who shall file them and maintain a record of the date of the filing and who shall return forthwith a date stamped copy, together with an index number, to the filing party." In addition, CPLR 306-a(a) provides that an index number shall be assigned "[u]pon filing." This express statutory language -- which requires an immediate temporal link between (1) the litigant's physical act of filing, (2) the court's date stamping of filed papers and (3) the assignment of an index number -- evinces the Legislature's intent to treat litigation papers as "filed" within the meaning of CPLR 304 only upon the physical receipt of those papers by the court clerk or the clerk's designee.

Moreover, construing the term "filing" as requiring the actual receipt of litigation papers which are date-stamped by the court clerk or the clerk's designee furthers one of the primary purposes underlying the filing...