Matter of Harutunian
| Decision Date | 28 February 1974 |
| Docket Number | A-19230396,Interim Decision Number 2263 |
| Citation | 14 I&N Dec. 583 |
| Parties | MATTER OF HARUTUNIAN In Section 245 Proceedings |
| Court | U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals |
The District Director found the applicant ineligible for adjustment of status and certified this matter to the Regional Commissioner for review pursuant to 8 CFR 103.4.
The applicant, a female native of Turkey, is now stateless. She resided in Roumania from 1931 to 1970. For the reason conditional entry visa numbers were not available, she was paroled into the United States in September 1970.
The applicant submitted the instant application on October 5, 1972 seeking status as a permanent resident under the provisions of section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, as a nonpreference immigrant. During the interview conducted on May 24, 1973 in conjunction with her application, it was determined that she had been granted "old age assistance" by the California State Department of Social Welfare upon her arrival in the United States and that her monthly grant was increased from $204.00 in November 1972 to $209.00 in December 1972.
The District Director stated in part that the applicant has been on welfare since her arrival in the United States in September 1970 and denied the application on June 1, 1973 reasoning that she was excludable under section 212(a) of the Act which provides in pertinent part as follows:
Counsel submitted a brief in response to the Notice of Certification (Form I-290C) for the Regional Commissioner's consideration wherein he stated that the "welfare" the applicant receives was, and is "old age assistance, a form of categorical aid." Counsel added as follows:
There is no provision in the laws of the State of California requiring repayment of old age assistance benefits of the type received by Haigouhi A. Harutunian (California Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 12000, et seq., and County of Alameda v. Janssen, (1940), 16 Cal.2d 276, 283, 106 P.2d 11), nor is there any provision in the laws of the State of California which provides for a charge to be made against the recipient of such aid as was received by Haigouhi A. Harutunian, except where the recipient subsequently acquires property (California Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 17403). (Amended Finding of Fact No. 8, Emanuel Braude v. United States of America, Civil No. 68-1973-EC).
The term `public charge,' as used in the exclusion provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(15)), ... is to be defined in the same way as the phrase `public charge' is used in the deportation sections of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(8)). (Amended Conclusion of Law No. 1, Emanuel Braude v. United States of America, supra). Therefore, the definition of `public charge' used in the Immigration decision Matter of B----, 3 I. & N. Dec. 323, (BIA, 1948), controls this case. (This decision was approved by the then Attorney General of the United States, 3 I. & N. Dec. 337.)
Counsel's contention that "There is no provision in the laws of the State of California for repayment of old age assistance of the type received ..." by the applicant, is not free from dispute. While that statement appears to be true with regard to the individual who is the recipient of such assistance, in a decision dated December 12, 1973 by the Supreme Court of California (Swoap v. Superior Court of Sacramento County), the Court held that the state law requires the adult children of a recipient of public assistance under California's Old Age Security Law to reimburse the county to the extent of their ability. However, for the reasons indicated below, this issue is not pertinent to the decision in the instant case.
The term "public charge" appears in sections 212(a)(15) and 213 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. That term also appeared in section 19(a) of the Act of February 5, 1917 which provided grounds for deportation.
The counsel for the applicant cites as persuasive the leading administrative decision stating the essential elements of proof of deportability for becoming a public charge within 5 years after entry, Matter of B----, 3 I. & N. Dec. 323 (Acting Attorney General, 1948). He also cites an unreported lower court decision interpreting a public charge bond, Emanuel Braude v. United States, C.D.Cal., Civ. No. 68-1973-EC, May 15, 1970. His determination rests on the proposition that the term "public charge" should be defined the same way wherever it appears in the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely in Sections 212(a)(15), 213, 241(a)(8); [8 U.S.C. 1182, 1183, 1251].
3. there was a failure to repay.
Braude expressed doubt concerning the soundness of Matter of B----. However, in the light of that administrative interpretation the court held that a bond provision guaranteeing that an alien immigrant would not become a public charge was not breached when the alien received old age assistance in California, since there was no obligation under California law to repay.
Applying the deportability standard contained in Matter of B---- to the case under consideration, the Counsel for the applicant finds, as the court did in Braude, that under California law there is no provision for a charge to be made against the recipient of old age assistance, and he concludes that an alien dependent for support on old age assistance is not thereby rendered ineligible for a visa.
Matter of B---- defines deportability for having become a public charge after entry. But its appraisal of the deportation statute is not necessarily controlling in relation to the provisions for exclusion. While the exclusion and deportation statutes both refer to aliens who become a public charge, it does not follow necessarily that Congress intended that the same criteria be applied in both situations. The exclusion statute deals with aliens seeking to enter and who must satisfy detailed qualitative requirements. The deportation statute dislodges an established residence.
The purpose of all rules for the interpretation of statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent. There is no invariable rule for the discovery of that intention. United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940); 82 C.J.S., Statutes, Sec. 311. While it may normally be assumed that identical words used in different parts of the same statute are intended to have an identical meaning, this assumption readily yields when the legislative intent requires variant meanings in different contexts.
It is not unusual for the same word to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there is no rule of statutory construction which precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the legislature intended it should have in each instance. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
Words generally have different shades of meaning, and are to be construed if reasonably possible to effectuate the intent of the lawmakers; and this meaning in particular instances is to be arrived at not only by a consideration of the words themselves but by considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which the words were employed, Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 386 (1948).
The exclusion and deportation statutes embodying the term public charge" have been on the statute books for over 80 years in essentially the same form. Act of March 3, 1891, secs. 2, 11; 26 Stat. 1084, 1086; cf. Act of August 3, 1882; 22 Stat. 214. The accepting of a bond promising, in consideration of an alien's admission, that he will not become a public charge apparently had its origin in administrative practice earlier than 1903—Act of March 3, 1903, Sec. 26; 32 Stat. 1220. The...
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