Matter of Irvin
Decision Date | 13 February 1989 |
Docket Number | Adv. No. 88-0686-3.,Bankruptcy No. 82-02594-3 |
Citation | 95 BR 1014 |
Parties | In the Matter of William F. IRVIN and Nancy K. Irvin, Debtors. William F. IRVIN and Nancy K. Irvin, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, on Behalf of the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Western District of Missouri |
Stephen B. Strayer, Liberty, Mo., for plaintiffs.
Charles S. Kennedy, Trial Atty., Tax Div., Office of Sp. Litigation, Washington, D.C., for defendant.
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL DECREE AND JUDGMENT DECLARING PLAINTIFF TO HAVE NO LIABILITY FOR POSTPETITION INTEREST AND PENALTIES ON NONDISCHARGEABLE TAX OBLIGATION
This is an action brought by the plaintiff debtors for a declaration by this court that the debtors are not obligated to pay postpetition interest and penalties on a prepetition tax liability which has been or will be wholly paid from the bankruptcy estate. The court, by means of its prior orders in this action, set the hearing of the merits of the action for December 28, 1988. At that time, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts, which is incorporated herein by reference so as to constitute the findings of fact required by Bankruptcy Rule 7052:
There can be little question that the virtually-undisturbed course of the existing law holds that postpetition interest is chargeable to debtors on nondischargeable tax obligations. The law which has governed the issue of postpetition interest on nondischargeable tax obligations has arisen in an era of bankruptcy administration in which the process of closing a case sometimes consumed years from and after the date on which estate collection and administration had been completed. In several notable instances, this has resulted in an extremely large tax liability, attributable solely to postpetition interest, for which the debtor has been liable despite the fact that there has been, nearly throughout the bankruptcy process, a sufficient sum in the bankruptcy estate to pay the entire tax liability until the interest ultimately, while the frequently tortuous procedure of case closing took place, outdistanced the sum in the estate.1 The case at bar is, according both to the parties' stipulation of facts and the files and records before the court,2 one such case — one in which the trustee simply failed timely to pay out the monies attributable to the Internal Revenue Service claim and on which interest has now accumulated in a sum which the debtors may not be able to pay and which has made their electing to avail themselves of the bankruptcy process a lasting source of liability rather than the granting of the fresh economic start which it was intended by Congress to be.3 And it is certain that the delay in payment to which the interest sub judice is attributable is not due to any fault of the debtors, but rather to the bankruptcy process itself, a process which this court has constantly striven to improve, but which must nevertheless remain dependent upon the satisfactory functioning of the administrators who must implement it.
It was in this historical context that this court made its initial decision on the issue which is now again before it in this adversary proceeding. See Matter of Benson, 64 B.R. 128 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1986), on motion for reconsideration, 65 B.R. 148 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1986). In that decision, it was observed that virtually none of the reported decisions as of that date had ruled precisely on the issue of whether postpetition interest was chargeable to the debtor, under current laws, where the entire tax obligation, as it existed as of the date of bankruptcy, was paid from the bankruptcy estate. Otherwise, however, it was uniformly held that postpetition interest had to be paid until the date of actual payment of the tax liability to the Internal Revenue Service, without respect to whether it was the debtor or those who administered the bankruptcy estate or others who were responsible for the delay.4
In the absence of a ruling directly on the issue before it, this court found the provisions of the new Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 instructive in Matter of Benson, supra. Although the Benson case was one which was required to be decided under the pre-1979 Bankruptcy At5, before the Bankruptcy Tax Act was applicable, it is appropriate for a court to resolve an ambiguity in the pre-existing state of the law by reference to a later expression of the Congress clarifying the issue.6 Thus, in Matter of Benson, supra, at 151, this court pertinently reasoned as follows by reference to the new Bankruptcy Tax Act provisions with respect to penalties:
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