Matter of Khalik
| Citation | 17 I&N Dec. 518 |
| Decision Date | 28 August 1980 |
| Docket Number | A-30332952,Interim Decision Number 2823 |
| Parties | MATTER OF KHALIK In Deportation Proceedings |
| Court | U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals |
In a decision dated December 7, 1978, the immigration judge found the respondent deportable under section 241(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(4), as an alien who has been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. He further denied the respondent's application for relief pursuant to section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c). The respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed.
The respondent is a 39-year-old native of Jordon. The immigrant visa issued to the respondent indicates that he is a stateless person. The record reflects that the respondent entered the United States on March 18, 1970, as a lawful permanent resident. The respondent's father, three brothers, and a sister are United States citizens, although the record indicates that his father resides in Israel.
The Order to Show Cause charges that the respondent was convicted of issuing a check without sufficient funds under $50 on July 3, 1975, in the Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit, and of issuing a check without sufficient funds over $50 on August 21, 1975, in the Circuit Court for Wayne County, Michigan. Evidence of both convictions is included in the record which reflects that the respondent pleaded guilty to both offenses and that he was represented by counsel, at least on the first offense.
The immigration judge examined the statute which the respondent was found to have violated and concluded that the crime in question was one involving moral turpitude. He, therefore, determined that the respondent was deportable as charged. We agree.
On appeal, the respondent contends that he was not convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. He argues that his conduct was a result of his misunderstanding as to how checking accounts function and that he pleaded guilty without understanding the import of his plea. Thus, he asserts that he was not, in fact, "convicted" of the offenses. He further states that the immigration judge erroneously determined that the crimes in question involved moral turpitude because he made no inquiry into the respondent's intent.
It is well established that, insofar as deportation proceedings are concerned, an immigration judge cannot go behind the judicial record to determine the guilt or innocence of an alien. See Matter of McNaughton, 16 I & N. Dec. 569 (BIA 1978); Matter of Fortis, 14 I & N Dec. 576 (BIA 1974); Matter of Sirhan, 13 I & N. Dec. 592 (BIA 1970). Inasmuch as the records of conviction indicate that the respondent pleaded guilty to both offenses, the immigration judge properly found that the respondent was convicted of the alleged crimes.
The Michigan statute under which the respondent was convicted renders guilty—
Any person who, with intent to defraud, shall make, draw or utter any check, knowing at the time he has not sufficient funds. Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. section 750.131.
We have held that where a statute includes intent to defraud as an essential element of a bad check offense, the crime is one involving moral turpitude. See Matter of McLean, 12 I & N. Dec. 551 (BIA 1967); Matter of Stasinski, 11 I & N. Dec. 202 (BIA 1965); Matter of Bailie, 10 I & N. Dec. 679 (BIA 1964). It is...
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