Matter of Lomax

Decision Date20 December 1976
Docket NumberNo. 10311.,10311.
PartiesIn the Matter of Elmos R. LOMAX, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Alexia Morrison, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry and John C. Martin, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant Superintendent, Saint Elizabeths Hospital.

Silas J. Wasserstrom, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., with whom Frederick H. Weisberg, Public Defender brief, for appellee.

Before FICKLING, HARRIS and MACK, Associate Judges.

HARRIS, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing a petition for appellee's judicial hospitalization and releasing appellee from Saint Elizabeths Hospital, after a jury found that appellee, although mentally ill, was not likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty. See D.C.Code 1973, § 21-545(b). Appellant, the Superintendent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital, contends that a prejudicial opening statement by appellee's trial counsel tainted the verdict and requires a remand for a new trial. Appellee argues that the government may not appeal from a jury verdict in favor of a patient under the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act (D.C.Code 1973, § 21-501 et seq.), and that we accordingly should dismiss the appeal. He further argues that if the trial court's order is appealable, no reversible error occurred. We hold that the government has the right to appeal from an order releasing an allegedly mentally ill person from custody, and that certain opening remarks by appellee's trial counsel irreparably prejudiced the jury. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying the government's motion for a mistrial, and reverse.

I

For the purpose of the proceedings which are the subject of this appeal, Mr. Lomax was admitted to Saint Elizabeths Hospital on August 25, 1975, pursuant to the emergency hospitalization provision of D.C.Code 1973, § 21-521.1 The Superintendent then petitioned the court for appellee's judicial hospitalization. Id. § 21-541. In accordance with § 21-542, the Mental Health Commission held several hearings to determine whether appellee should be hospitalized. Its report recommended either his detention at Saint Elizabeths for an indeterminate period or his placement in a foster care home. Appellee, through counsel, demanded a jury trial.2 See D.C. Code 1973, § 21-544.

The Superintendent's proof at the civil commitment trial was directed towards showing appellee's alleged dangerousness and his inability to care for himself without supervision. Appellee's wife testified that he had been hospitalized repeatedly in recent years, and that his March 1975 hospitalization was a direct result of his starting to attack her with a can opener. That stopped short of harm when appellee lapsed into a catatonic state. Police officers arrived to find him still in that condition, also having lost control of his bowels. Unable to draw appellee into conversation, they finally used Mace (so as to avoid injuring a man whom they recognized to be ill) in order to take away the can opener. Mrs. Lomax further testified that appellee often frightened her, and that he seriously neglected his physical appearance, slept clothed, stood and stared vacantly for long intervals, and persisted in eating foods which would endanger his health. He also chewed tobacco extensively, permitting the juice thereof to soil his person, clothing, and bedding.

Dr. Smothers, a clinical psychologist at Saint Elizabeths, gave expert testimony describing appellee's mental illness as catatonic schizophrenia and expressing his opinion that Lomax would be dangerous to himself if he were not committed. A physician from the hospital testified as to appellee's physical ailments, and gave his prognosis for appellee's deteriorating health should certain of his self-destructive habits continue unchecked. Lay witnesses also testified as to their observations of appellee's peculiar behavior.

Appellee's trial counsel attempted to prove on cross-examination that both Mrs. Lomax and Dr. Smothers were biased in their beliefs as to the need for hospitalization. In addition, a social worker from the hospital testified concerning her impression — gained from visiting the Lomax household — that Mrs. Lomax encouraged her husband's dependency and treated him like a child. She also testified to appellee's ability to care for himself in the hospital.

The jury concluded that appellee should not be involuntarily committed because he was not dangerous to himself or others. The trial court then ordered appellee's release, D.C.Code 1973, § 21-545(b), but stayed the effectiveness of that order for 24 hours. A motions division of this court granted an interim stay pending this appeal, and later extended the stay after considering written submissions by the parties.3

II

Appellant maintains that our jurisdiction over this appeal is established by D.C.Code 1973, § 11-721(a) (1), which makes reviewable all final orders of the Superior Court. Appellant further contends that as a "party aggrieved" by the final order, he may appeal as a matter of right pursuant to § 11-721(b). Appellee challenges these assertions, contending that they are inconsistent with the legislative purpose of the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, violative of the patient's constitutional rights, and contrary to common sense. We do not find appellee's arguments persuasive.

The Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act contains no provision concerning the right to appeal from either the grant or denial of a petition for judicial hospitalization.4 Moreover, as this is not an appeal taken by the United States or the District of Columbia from an order entered in a criminal trial, it is not governed by D.C.Code 1973, § 23-104. Unless the very nature of the civil commitment provisions dictates that proceedings under them somehow are exempt from the broad scope of the review provisions of § 11-721, there is no statutory basis for concluding that this appeal is not permissible.

Appellee contends that to grant the petitioner the right to challenge the release of the patient and seek a retrial of the issues is meaningless, since a civil commitment proceeding is concerned only with the current mental state of the patient, rather than with his condition at some fixed time in the past. We see no merit in this argument. The principles governing the use of the habeas corpus writ to secure release from involuntary commitment provide a useful analogy. Confinement of the mentally ill does depend upon the current and continuing state of the patient's mental health. Thus, when a patient files a petition for release on habeas corpus, it is his present status, i. e., whether he is currently mentally ill, which is at issue. See Dixon v. Jacobs, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 319, 327, 427 F.2d 589, 595 (1970). Although his mental condition often will be in a state of flux, i. e., either deteriorating or responding to treatment, it cannot be argued that the government would have no right to appeal from an erroneous grant of a habeas corpus petition. If reversal is deemed necessary, additional evidence of the patient's current condition may be offered on remand. See, e. g., Cameron v. Mullen, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 235, 387 F.2d 193 (1967); Overholser v. Russell, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 400, 283 F.2d 195 (1960). Further, if the Superintendent's petition for commitment had been granted in this case and the patient then alleged that prejudicial error had been committed in the trial, the patient could not be denied the right to appeal simply because a retrial would be directed toward a temporally different mental condition than that which was at issue in the first proceeding. To accept such an argument would be in effect to eliminate all appeals from mental health proceedings.

It may well be that the petitioner cannot appeal from an adverse decision in a § 21-542 hearing before the Commission on Mental Health. The directive that the Commission "shall immediately order [respondent's] release," § 21-544, suggests that Congress intended no review of such an administrative decision, as the next step contemplated in the event of a decision against the petitioner is a trial in the Superior Court. See §§ 21-544 and -545. We need not reach this issue, however.

We construe § 11-721 as allowing review of a Superior Court decision after a § 21-545 hearing in which the respondent prevails. In such an event, the statute provides that "the court shall dismiss the petition and order his release." § 21-545(b). Assuredly that action is a final order or judgment of the sort which § 11-721(a) contemplates. Nothing in the commitment statutes indicates an exception to this general rule of reviewability.

We also conclude that the Superintendent is "aggrieved" by an adverse judgment in the trial court, and therefore is a proper party to appeal under § 11-721(a). Our precedents in juvenile cases show a common sense approach to the concept of an aggrieved party. For example, we have held that a child who has been ordered committed is aggrieved. In re Sippy, D.C.Mun.App., 97 A.2d 455, 458-59 (1953). We also have held that the government was aggrieved by the dismissal of a delinquency petition in view of its interest in the proper upbringing of children. In re McDonald, D.C.Mun.App., 153 A.2d 651, 656-57 (1959). [Although Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L. Ed.2d 346 (1975), would now preclude such an appeal, it does not undermine McDonald's interpretation of the concept of an aggrieved party.] In this case, appellant was a party to the suit, lost it when the court dismissed the petition, and is an official of the government which has a significant interest in protecting the...

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5 cases
  • Matter of Nelson
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 4 December 1979
    ...a reexamination of this court's en banc decision in In re Lomax, D.C.App., 386 A.2d 1185 (1978) (vacating a panel decision reported at 367 A.2d 1272 (1976)). The central issue of Lomax was whether the government could appeal an adverse decision in a civil commitment proceeding. The en banc ......
  • Fortson v. U.S., No. 06-CF-577.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 3 September 2009
    ...only to confuse and mislead the [current] jurors into surmising that such a finding had a bearing on their task." In re Lomax, 367 A.2d 1272, 1281-82 (D.C.1976) (reversing and remanding for new trial where attorney improperly commented in a civil commitment proceeding that an earlier jury h......
  • Edwards v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 5 May 1997
    ...dangerous to others."), quoting People v. Superior Court, 233 Cal.App.3d 477, 284 Cal.Rptr. 601, 607 (2 Dist.1991); Matter of Lomax, 367 A.2d 1272, 1279 (D.C.App.1976)("A person alleged to be mentally ill is not on trial for having committed an 'offense,' and we do not view civil commitment......
  • Matter of Samuels
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 2 April 1986
    ...the prior determination is inadmissible at a later commitment hearing and counsel may not mention it to the jury. In re Lomax, 367 A.2d 1272, 1281-82 (D.C. 1976), reversed on other grounds and vacated en banc, 386 A.2d 1185 (D.C. In this case Dr. Virginia Ladendorf, the Saint Elizabeths sta......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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