MATTER OF MARRIAGE OF ADAMS

• Decision Date: 28 March 2001
• Citation: 173 Or. App. 242,21 P.3d 171
• Parties: In the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF Sonia Marlene ADAMS, Respondent, and Stanley L. Adams, Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

21 P.3d 171

173 Or. App. 242

In the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF Sonia Marlene ADAMS, Respondent and

Stanley L. Adams, Appellant.

(16-98-14506; CA A106096)

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted March 2, 2000.

Decided March 28, 2001.

Stacey Smith, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief was Charles S. Spinner.

Marc D. Perrin, Eugene, filed the brief for respondent. Before HASELTON, Presiding Judge, and DEITS,¹ Chief Judge, and WOLLHEIM, Judge.

WOLLHEIM, J.

Husband appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment. Wife obtained a default judgment that (1) dissolved the parties' marriage; (2) adjudicated husband's personal property rights and obligations to wife and their children; and (3) awarded wife attorney fees. We affirm.

The parties were married in 1984 and have two children. The record is unclear regarding when the parties moved to Oregon, but by the early 1990s they had established Oregon residency. In 1995, husband moved to California to pursue employment opportunities and has lived and worked there since. Wife and children remained in Oregon. Husband frequently returned to Oregon to visit the family until mid 1998 when the frequency of his visits declined dramatically. Wife was a homemaker and the family relied solely upon husband's income to meet living expenses. The parties continuously shared joint checking and savings accounts at an Oregon bank. The record indicates that the parties filed California nonresident tax forms for 1995 and 1996. They listed the Oregon residence as their address. The parties also filed a 1996 Oregon tax form as full-year residents. That same year, husband purchased and registered a motorcycle in Oregon. Throughout the time period between 1995 and 1998, husband drove an automobile that was registered and insured in Oregon. Husband also continuously maintained his Oregon driver's license. In January 1998, husband and wife borrowed over $33,000 from an Oregon bank using the Oregon residence as collateral. Both husband and wife listed the Oregon residence as their address on the loan materials.

In August 1998, wife filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. Wife did not attempt personal service on husband. Instead, wife attempted substituted service at what she believed was husband's work place. Several days before wife made substituted service at that place of employment, husband's employment there terminated.

In January 1999, the trial court granted wife's motion for entry of a default judgment of dissolution of marriage. The trial court also granted wife custody of the children, adjudged husband's child support and spousal support obligations, determined husband's property rights and obligations, and awarded wife attorney fees. In March 1999, husband filed a motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to ORCP 69 C and ORCP 71 C. Husband requested that the court set aside and delete those portions of the judgment that determined his personal and monetary obligations and rights. He did not challenge the dissolution and child custody portions of the judgment. The trial court denied husband's motion. Husband appeals, arguing on several different grounds that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter an order affecting his monetary obligations or rights.

A trial court may dissolve a marriage and may determine custody of the parties' minor children in an ex parte proceeding against a nonresident spouse. Oberoi and Oberoi, 145 Or.App. 51, 54, 928 P.2d 1007 (1996). However, without personal jurisdiction, a court is precluded from entering an order affecting a party's monetary obligations or rights. O'Connor and Lerner, 70 Or.App. 658, 661, 690 P.2d 1095 (1984). The burden of alleging and proving facts that establish personal jurisdiction in Oregon falls upon the party initiating the dissolution proceeding—here, wife. Horn and Horn, 97 Or.App. 177, 180, 775 P.2d 338, rev. den., 308 Or. 465, 781 P.2d 1214 (1989). Jurisdiction is a question of law that we review accordingly. Hackett v. Alco Standard Corp., 71 Or.App. 24, 33 n. 7, 691 P.2d 142 (1984), rev den 298 Or. 822, 698 P.2d 963 (1985). Wife contends that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over husband pursuant to ORCP 4 K(2) or ORCP 4 L and that husband had proper notice of the dissolution action.

ORCP 4 K(2) provides that a trial court having subject matter jurisdiction also has personal jurisdiction in marital dissolution proceedings

"if the parties to a marriage have concurrently maintained the same or separate residences or domiciles within this state for a period of six months, notwithstanding departure from this state and acquisition of a residence or domicile in another state or country before filing of such action; but if an action to enforce personal obligations * * * is not commenced within one year following the date upon which the party who left the state acquired a residence or domicile in another state or country, no jurisdiction is conferred by this subsection in any such action."

From the record before us, we cannot conclusively determine whether wife commenced the dissolution of marriage action within one year after husband "left the state [and] acquired a residence or domicile" in California. Consequently, the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction under ORCP 4 K(2) to enter an order affecting husband's monetary rights.

ORCP 4 L provides that a trial court has personal jurisdiction

"[n]otwithstanding a failure to satisfy the requirement of sections B through K of this rule, in any action where prosecution of the action against a defendant in this state is not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States."

Thus, determining whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over husband pursuant to ORCP 4 L requires applying principles established by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State ex rel. Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope, 317 Or. 151, 156, 854 P.2d 461 (1993).

The initial inquiry under the Due Process Clause is whether husband has established "minimum contacts" in Oregon. Sutherland v. Brennan, 321 Or. 520, 529, 901 P.2d 240 (1995). To establish minimum contacts, husband must have created connections with Oregon sufficient to receive the benefits and protections of Oregon's laws to the extent that a presumption is established that it is reasonable for the state to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation here as well. Id. Consequently, the focus of the minimum contacts inquiry is upon the relationship among husband, Oregon, and the litigation. State ex rel. Michelin v. Wells, 294 Or. 296, 303, 657 P.2d 207 (1982). If we conclude that husband has sufficient minimum contacts with Oregon, the inquiry continues by examining whether the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in this instance was reasonable, in light of several factors, and then by examining whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with recognized notions of "fair play and substantial justice." State ex rel. Circus Circus Reno, Inc., 317 Or. at 159-60, 854 P.2d 461.

We conclude that husband had minimum contacts with Oregon. Husband and his family came to Oregon and established residency here. Husband and wife purchased property in Oregon and continue to own that property. When husband moved to California to pursue employment opportunities, wife and their children remained in Oregon. Husband and wife continuously shared joint bank accounts at an Oregon institution. His frequent visits over the years to Oregon were to see his family. For at least two years after leaving Oregon, husband continued to file personal income tax returns as an Oregon resident. During the time period at issue, husband maintained his Oregon driver's license and registered and insured a motor vehicle in Oregon. As recently as 1998, husband applied for and received a loan from an Oregon bank, using Oregon property owned by him and wife as collateral and listing the Oregon home as his residence. Those contacts were meaningful and significant. Importantly, they were established and maintained by husband so that he and his family would receive the benefits and protections of Oregon's laws.

Husband contends that his family visits to Oregon are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over him. He likens the facts here to those of Oberoi and Horn and urges us similarly to conclude that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over husband because of insufficient contacts. We decline to do so. In Oberoi, the husband, a resident of India, had never resided in Oregon, had visited the state on only four occasions to visit his children, and had stored a vehicle in the state for use during those visits. 145 Or.App. at 56, 928 P.2d 1007. In Horn, the husband and family had once lived in Oregon, but subsequently moved to California. Several years later, the parties separated and the wife returned to Oregon and eventually filed for divorce. The husband owned no real or personal property in Oregon, and had virtually no contacts with the state. 97 Or.App. at 180, 775 P.2d 338. Here, husband has had prolonged, continuous and frequent contacts with Oregon that rise well above "occasional family visits." Oberoi, 145 Or.App. at 56, 928 P.2d 1007. Husband's substantial contacts are not comparable to the rare contacts that existed in Oberoi or Horn and, in this instance, rise to the level of minimum contacts.

Husband argues that the present litigation does not "relate to" or "arise out of" the contacts described above. See State ex rel. Michelin, 294 Or. at 301-03, 657 P.2d 207. We disagree. Husband purposefully established his family's residence in Oregon. Many of his contacts subsequent to his move to California were in furtherance of his role as...