MATTER OF THEROUX v. Reilly

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Citation: 771 N.Y.S.2d 43,803 N.E.2d 364,1 N.Y.3d 232
• Parties: In the Matter of DENISE M. THEROUX et al., Appellants, v. EDWARD REILLY, as Nassau County Sheriff, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of DAVID WAGMAN, Appellant, v. JOHN A. KAPICA, as Chief of the Town of Greenburgh Police Department, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of LOREN S. JAMES, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF YATES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT et al., Respondents.
• Decision Date: 02 December 2003

1 N.Y.3d 232
803 N.E.2d 364
771 N.Y.S.2d 43

In the Matter of DENISE M. THEROUX et al., Appellants,
v.
EDWARD REILLY, as Nassau County Sheriff, et al., Respondents.
In the Matter of DAVID WAGMAN, Appellant,
v.
JOHN A. KAPICA, as Chief of the Town of Greenburgh Police Department, et al., Respondents.
In the Matter of LOREN S. JAMES, Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF YATES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT et al., Respondents

Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

Argued October 22, 2003.

Decided December 2, 2003.

1 N.Y.3d 233

Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, East Meadow (Wayne J. Schaefer of counsel), for appellants in the first above-entitled

1 N.Y.3d 234

proceeding

Lorna B. Goodman, County Attorney, Mineola (Dennis J. Saffran and David B. Goldin of counsel), for respondents in the first above-entitled proceeding.

1 N.Y.3d 235

Donna M.C. Giliberto, Albany, for New York State Conference of Mayors and Municipal Officials, amicus curiae, in the first above-entitled proceeding

Richard A. Glickel, West Nyack, for Town of Clarkstown and others, amici curiae, in the first above-entitled proceeding.

1 N.Y.3d 236

Freedman, Wagner, Tabakman & Weiss, New City (David MacRae Wagner of counsel), for appellant in the second above-entitled proceeding

Law Office of Vincent Toomey, Lake Success (Vincent Toomey and Christine A. Gaeta of counsel), for respondents in the second above-entitled proceeding.

1 N.Y.3d 237

Trevett, Lenweaver & Salzer, P.C., Rochester (Katherine Piccola and Lawrence J. Andolina of counsel), for appellant in the third above-entitled proceeding.

Hancock & Estabrook, LLP, Syracuse (Janet D. Callahan and John F. Corcoran of counsel), for respondents in the third above-entitled proceeding.

1 N.Y.3d 238

Law Office of James B. Tuttle, Albany (James B. Tuttle of counsel), for Police Conference of New York, Inc., amicus curiae, in the three above-entitled proceedings.

Gleason, Dunn, Walsh & O'Shea, Albany (Ronald G. Dunn and Michael K. Barrett of counsel), for New York State Deputies Association, Inc., amicus curiae, in the three above-entitled proceedings.

Chief Judge KAYE and Judges G.B. SMITH, CIPARICK, ROSENBLATT and GRAFFEO concur.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

READ, J.

At issue in this appeal is whether eligibility for benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-c is contingent upon the municipal employee's demonstrating an injury sustained in the performance of special work related to the heightened risks and duties inherent in law enforcement. We conclude that section 207-c does not require such a "heightened risk" standard.

I.

Originally enacted in 1961, General Municipal Law § 207-c provides for the payment of the full amount of regular salary or wages to a police officer or other covered municipal employee who is injured "in the performance of his duties" or is taken ill "as a result of the performance of his duties" (§ 207-c [1]). These payments continue until the disability has ceased, or the disabled employee is granted a disability retirement. The payments stop if the employee either performs, or refuses to perform, light-duty work. The municipality is also liable for all medical treatment and hospital care necessitated by the injury or illness. Payments for these medical expenses continue after the employee's retirement, and are bestowed in addition to any retirement allowance or pension.

When interpreting a statute, we turn first to the text as the best evidence of the Legislature's intent. "As a general rule, unambiguous language of a statute is alone determinative" (Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463 [2000] [citation omitted]). Here, the text does not suggest any legislative intent to

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create a "heightened risk" standard. Section 207-c affords eligibility to those covered municipal employees who are "injured in the performance of [their] duties," not to those who are "injured in the performance of duties entailing the heightened risk of law enforcement," or words to similar effect. If the Legislature had intended to restrict section 207-c eligibility to employees injured when performing specialized tasks, it easily could have and surely would have written the statute to say so. We may not create a limitation that the Legislature did not enact. Further, a statute's plain meaning must be discerned "without resort to forced or unnatural interpretations" (Castro v United Container Mach. Group, 96 NY2d 398, 401 [2001], citing McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 232). Reading section 207-c in an unforced and natural manner, we conclude that the word "duties" encompasses the full range of a covered municipal employee's job duties.

Our interpretation is consistent not only with the statute's words, but also with legislative history. While repeatedly amending section 207-c to extend its benefits to additional classes of municipal employees,¹ the Legislature routinely referred to the important, often dangerous and stressful, work these employees perform day in and day out.² The Legislature thus pointed to "heightened risk" as the rationale for selecting additional classes of municipal employees for inclusion within section

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207-c, not as the standard for determining eligibility for section 207-c benefits.

Finally, the Legislature enacted section 207-c to create parity between police officers and firefighters, who had been eligible for the same benefits since 1938 under General Municipal Law § 207-a and its predecessor (see L 1961, ch 920; L 1938, ch 562, § 1). While section 207-a served as...