Matter of Unishops, Inc., 73 B 1208.

Decision Date02 August 1976
Docket NumberNo. 73 B 1208.,73 B 1208.
Citation417 F. Supp. 405
PartiesIn the Matter of UNISHOPS, INC., Debtor.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Levin & Weintraub, by Elias Mann, and Daniel A. Zimmerman, New York City, for debtor.

Aranow, Brodsky, Bohlinger, Benetar & Einhorn, by George Natanson, New York City, for claimant.

GRIESA, District Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of Bankruptcy Judge Babitt allowing the $100,000 claim of Jerome Zelin as an expense of administration of the debtor in possession in a Chapter XI proceeding. The effect of this order is to give this claim priority under 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1), and to permit payment of the claim in full. The debtor in possession concedes the amount of the claim, but contends that it should be treated as a general claim. It appears that, as a general claim, payment of less than 50% would be made.

The order of the Bankruptcy Judge is reversed. I hold that Zelin's claim is not entitled to priority.

I.

The source of the claim in question is a letter agreement dated March 19, 1973, between the debtor, Unishops, Inc., and Zelin. The agreement provided for severance pay in the event that Zelin's employment as "Chief Operating Officer" of Unishops should cease. It was agreed that, in the event Zelin's employment terminated for any reason other than death or voluntary resignation, Unishops would pay Zelin $50,000 per year for a period of two years, or a total of $100,000. It should be noted that this agreement did not deal with any subject relating to Zelin's employment other than severance pay.

On November 30, 1973 Unishops filed a Chapter XI petition in this court. After the filing, Unishops, as debtor in possession, continued Zelin in its employ. On December 5, 1973 an application was made to Judge Babitt for approval of officers' compensation pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule XI-3 of this court. This rule provides:

"Rule XI-3 — Compensation to Debtor
"No compensation shall be paid to the debtor, if an individual, or to the members of a copartnership, if a copartnership, or to an officer, stockholder or director of a corporation, if a corporation, from the time of the filing of the petition until confirmation of the arrangement unless a prior order of the court shall have been obtained approving the employment and fixing the compensation."

Among the materials submitted on the application was a description of Zelin as Vice Chairman of the Board and Chief Operating Officer, and the duties performed by him. Approval was requested for payment of Zelin's salary in the amount of $100,000 per year. No request was made for approval of any severance pay. On December 7, 1973 Judge Babitt entered an order approving officers' salaries, including the $100,000 per year for Zelin. It appears that this was Zelin's salary prior to the filing of the Chapter XI petition. There was no reference in the order to severance pay.

On or about July 16, 1974 the debtor in possession discharged Zelin. This resulted in Zelin's claim for $100,000 severance pay pursuant to the letter agreement of March 19, 1973.

II.

Judge Babitt, in holding that the $100,000 termination benefit should be classified as an administration expense, relied upon Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3, 386 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967). In that case, certain employees were discharged by a debtor in possession shortly after the filing of the Chapter XI petition. A union collective bargaining agreement, entered into prior to the filing of the Chapter XI petition, provided for severance pay. The Court of Appeals held that the severance pay was an administration expense, stating (386 F.2d at 651):

"Since severance pay is compensation for termination of employment and since the employment of these claimants was terminated as an incident of the administration of the bankrupt's estate, severance pay was an expense of administration and is entitled to priority as such an expense."

Judge Babitt also held that Local Rule XI-3 did not require court approval of Zelin's severance pay, because such pay was not "compensation" within the meaning of that rule.

III.

The relevant definition of debts entitled to priority is contained in 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) as follows:

"§ 104. Debts which have priority
"(A) The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment, shall be (1) the costs and expenses of administration, including the actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition; . . ."

Where a debtor has an executory contract dealing with compensation of employees, and where that contract continues in effect after the commencement of Chapter XI proceedings, compensation due for services performed during such proceedings is considered an expense of administration within the meaning of the statute. Where such a contract continues in effect, and provides for severance pay, and where discharge of employees occurs during the pendency of Chapter XI proceedings, severance pay is considered an administration expense. Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3, 386 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967).

However, an executory contract, made by a debtor prior to the filing of a ...

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1 cases
  • Unishops, Inc., Matter of, 528
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • 31 Mayo 1977
    ...104(a)(1), and permitting payment of the claim in full. The District Court held that Zelin's claim is not entitled to priority. 417 F.Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y.1976). The claim in issue arises from the following letter agreement entered into by Unishops and Zelin on March 19, Dear Mr. Zelin: We re......

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