Matter of Welwood Corp.
Decision Date | 02 May 1986 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 85-2794. |
Citation | 60 BR 319 |
Parties | In the Matter of WELWOOD CORPORATION, Debtor. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Middle District of Florida |
Gregory Mierzwinski, Tampa, Fla., for Palmers and Tampa Hotel Venture.
Jeffrey Warren, Tampa, Fla., for debtor.
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE came on for consideration upon a Motion to Dismiss the above-captioned Chapter 11 case. The Motion was filed by Tampa Airport Hotel Ventures and Alexander Palmer (Palmer). It appears that the following facts relevant to the motion are without dispute and are as follows:
Prior to the commencement of this case, a suit was filed in the United States District Court by Palmer naming Mr. Woods (Woods) and Mr. Welty (Welty) as defendants, alleging security violations by them and seeking money damages. Welwood Corporation, Debtor, also filed a suit against Metropolitan Life and Palmer in the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County and sought money damages for an alleged breach of contract by Palmer and Metropolitan. Palmer and Metropolitan filed a counterclaim in that suit and sought to enforce a claimed security interest in the management contract, the very same contract which, according to the Debtor, was breached by Palmer and Metropolitan. This contract was previously held by the Debtor under which the Debtor was to manage the Hilton Hotel, a hotel which was owned by a joint venture composed of Metropolitan Life and a partnership composed of Woods, Welty and Palmer.
In the state court action, the Debtor sought injunctive relief prohibiting the enforcement of the security agreement by Palmer, without success. Having been faced with the possibility of losing the very basis of its lawsuit against Palmer and Metropolitan, the Debtor filed its Chapter 11 petition in order to use the protection of the automatic stay imposed by § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code and litigate its claim in this Court against Palmer and Metropolitan.
It is further without dispute that the Debtor Welwood is no longer operating any business, has no employees, no unsecured debts of any consequence, and no assets of any sort except its money damage claim pending in the Circuit Court against Metropolitan Life and Palmer, the validity of which is yet to be established. Its only creditor of any substance is the money allegedly owed to an affiliate corporation, and its chances to ever obtain confirmation of any plan would hinge on the ability of the Debtor to show feasibility of any plan, if one is submitted, which in this case would be a hope to fund a plan from the possible recovery against Metropolitan or Palmer.
In sum, this case involves nothing more than a two-party dispute in which only the Debtor and its antagonists, Metropolitan and Palmer, are interested, and there is neither a need nor an ability to reorganize the financial affairs of the Debtor. This controversy is already subject to pending litigation in a non-bankruptcy forum.
The motion under consideration seeks a dismissal under § 1112(b)(1) for "cause," the cause being alleged bad faith of the Debtor in seeking relief in this Court. In opposition to the motion, the Debtor contends that Palmer has no standing, simply because he is not a creditor. The contention of the Debtor is obviously without merit for the following reasons. Palmer was scheduled as a creditor, albeit as a disputed one. Be that as it may, it is clear that by virtue of the definition of the Bankruptcy Code, § 101(9), the term "creditor" is defined to mean:
In turn, the term "claim" is defined in § 101(4) to mean:
Based on the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that Palmer is a creditor and has standing to raise the issue of bad faith.
As indicated earlier, the dismissal sought of this Chapter 11 case is based on § 1112(b) and seeks a dismissal for "cause." The term "cause" as used in this section is not defined and it was obviously intended to be a flexible concept. This is evident from the legislative history of this section which includes the following statement discussing the concept of "cause" as used in this section:
The court will be able to consider other equitable powers to reach an appropriate result in individual cases. H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. 406 (1977); U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 6362.
Considering a dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 11 case for "cause," some courts adopted the view that an individual debtor who is not engaged in business in an orthodox sense should not be permitted to seek relief under this chapter. In re Albany Partners Limited, 749 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Gregory, 39 B.R. 405 (M.D. Tenn.1984); In re William Joseph Wamsganz, 13 B.C.D. 973, 54 B.R. 759 (E.D.Miss. 1985); In re Gilbert Broadcasting Corp., 54 B.R. 2 (Bkrtcy.N.J.1984). This proposition has been flatly rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in the case of In Re Zelda Moog, 774 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir.1985). The Court, in Moog, refused to accept the holding of Ponn Realty Trust, 4 B.R. 226 (D.Mass.1980), relied on by the Bankruptcy Court in Moog, and held that a consumer debtor whose only asset is a single-family debtor-occupied dwelling may not seek relief under Chapter 11. The Court of Appeals in so doing stated that the fact that the Debtor is not engaged in business by itself cannot form a ground for a dismissal of a Chapter 11 case, and more importantly, also held that the Court may not dismiss a Chapter 11 case sua sponte for administrative as distinguished from judicial reasons. While this Court agrees, as it must, with the view expressed by the Court of Appeals, it is still satisfied that this is a factor which still may be considered by the Court when passing on the challenge of a debtor's right by a party of interest to maintain a Chapter 11 case. The Fifth Circuit in Little Creek Development Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 779 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir.1986), Judge Jones, speaking for the Court, noted the following conditions which usually exist in a Chapter 11 case where the motion is filed to dismiss it for bad faith filing and which is proper for consideration:
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