Matter of William S.
| Decision Date | 27 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 44893.,44893. |
| Citation | 132 P.3d 1015 |
| Parties | In the Matter of WILLIAM S., a Minor. William S., Appellant, v. The State of Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Victor J. Austin and Michael R. Yohay, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County, for Appellant.
George Chanos, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger, District Attorney, and James Tufteland, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.
Before DOUGLAS, BECKER and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.
Nevada's juvenile certification statute allows the juvenile court to certify juvenile offenders to adult court for criminal proceedings. The statute generally gives the juvenile court broad discretion in its certification decisions, except when the offenses involve firearms and forcible sexual assaults. For those serious offenses, the statute sets forth a presumption for certification that may be rebutted if the minor demonstrates that emotional or behavioral problems or substance abuse substantially contributed to the minor's actions and that those problems can be treated in the juvenile court.
In this appeal, we consider whether, after a minor has rebutted the presumptive certification provision, the court retains the power to certify the juvenile under the statute's discretionary prong. We conclude that the juvenile court retains its statutory discretionary power in such instances, and we clarify the factors for the court to consider in exercising that discretion. In this case, as the court misapprehended the factors for discretionary certification, we reverse the certification order and remand for the court to reconsider discretionary certification in light of our clarification.
The State of Nevada filed a petition to certify appellant, fifteen-year-old William S., for criminal proceedings as an adult on eighteen charges arising from a vehicular police pursuit. William took his father's car for a drive one night when his parents were out of town. A police officer observed William at about 3:00 a.m., driving the car without the headlights on, and attempted to stop the car by using red lights and a siren. Rather than stopping, William sped off and ultimately led the police on a high-speed chase involving multiple police officers and vehicles. During the chase, William ran several red traffic lights and stop signs. And he fired a gun out of the driver's side window multiple times. Eventually, the police officers punctured two of the car's tires and apprehended William after chasing him on foot. The police recovered the firearm, which William had thrown from the car. They also found a black ski mask and a large crowbar in the car and extra bullets in William's pocket.
The State requested that William be certified as an adult on four counts of assault on a police officer with a deadly weapon; two counts of discharging a firearm at or into an occupied vehicle or structure; and one count each of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, evading a police officer with a deadly weapon, aiming a firearm at a human being, discharging a firearm that endangers a person, possession of burglary/larceny tools, discharging a firearm in a public place, drawing/exhibiting a deadly weapon in a threatening manner, possession of a firearm, possession of an unregistered firearm, reckless driving, driving without a license, and obstructing an officer.
As part of their respective cases for and against certification, the State and William provided the juvenile court with information concerning William's prior record and personal attributes. William had no delinquency record, as he had neither admitted to nor been adjudicated of any earlier offenses. William did have some notable mental health issues, including a family history of schizophrenia and indications that he had experienced depression and paranoia and might be in the early stages of possible psychological deterioration. Although the psychological evaluations differed in their conclusions and diagnoses, some evidence indicated that William exhibited prodromal signs of schizophrenia.
The State recommended certification based on the nature and seriousness of the charged offenses. William argued against certification because no one was hurt during the incident, he had no prior delinquency record, and he has some mental and emotional problems that contributed to his conduct and could be addressed in the juvenile court. After considering the parties' arguments and evidence at a certification hearing, the juvenile court found that William had rebutted presumptive certification with clear and convincing evidence of emotional problems that could be treated in the juvenile court system.
The juvenile court nevertheless certified William under the certification statute's discretionary prong. At the hearing, the court expressed confusion over the interplay between presumptive and discretionary certification. The court stated that while the minor's amenability to treatment is a factor in rebutting presumptive certification under the statute, amenability to treatment could not be considered, in the court's view, under a discretionary certification analysis. Ultimately, the juvenile court based certification upon William's age and the seriousness of the offense, noting that William's actions demonstrate that he is a clear danger to the community. The order expressly stated that, in the juvenile court's view, it could not consider William's personal attributes. This appeal followed.
The juvenile certification statute, NRS 62B.390, provides two standards for certifying a minor, who is at least fourteen years old at the time of the alleged offense, for criminal proceedings as an adult. The first standard, found in NRS 62B.390(1), is discretionary certification, under which the juvenile court may certify a minor who is charged with any felony offense:
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2 . . ., upon a motion by the district attorney and after a full investigation, the juvenile court may certify a child for proper criminal proceedings as an adult to any court that would have jurisdiction to try the offense if committed by an adult, if the child:
(a) Is charged with an offense that would have been a felony if committed by an adult; and
(b) Was 14 years of age or older at the time the child allegedly committed the offense.
Under this discretionary certification standard, we have articulated a decisional matrix of three factors for the juvenile court to consider: (1) the nature and seriousness of the offense; (2) the seriousness and persistency of past admitted or adjudicated criminal offenses; and (3) personal considerations such as age, maturity, character, personality, and family relationships.1
The second standard, found in NRS 62B.390(2), is presumptive certification for a minor charged with a sexual assault involving the use or threatened use of force or violence or with an offense or attempted offense involving the use or threatened use of a firearm. In these types of cases, the juvenile court shall certify the minor to stand trial as an adult:
2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, upon a motion by the district attorney and after a full investigation, the juvenile court shall certify a child for proper criminal proceedings as an adult to any court that would have jurisdiction to try the offense if committed by an adult, if the child:
(a) Is charged with:
(1) A sexual assault involving the use or threatened use of force or violence against the victim; or
(2) An offense or attempted offense involving the use or threatened use of a firearm; and
(b) Was 14 years of age or older at the time the child allegedly committed the offense.
The burden then shifts to the minor to rebut the presumption under NRS 62B.390(3), which provides that the juvenile court shall not certify a minor under subsection 2 if the minor demonstrates that he or she has certain problems that substantially contributed to the conduct and can be addressed in the juvenile court system:
3. The juvenile court shall not certify a child for criminal proceedings as an adult pursuant to subsection 2 if the juvenile court specifically finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) The child is developmentally or mentally incompetent to understand his situation and the proceedings of the court or to aid his attorney in those proceedings; or
(b) The actions of the child were substantially the result of the substance abuse or emotional or behavioral problems of the child2 and the substance abuse or emotional or behavioral problems may be appropriately treated through the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Application of certification statute
William, contends that the juvenile court misapplied the certification statute when it used the discretionary standard under NRS 62B.390(1) to certify him after determining that he had rebutted presumptive certification under NRS 62B.390(2).3 According to William, allowing discretionary certification after presumptive certification is rebutted would render the exceptions essentially meaningless, as crimes involving forceful sexual assault or the use of firearms would almost always result in discretionary certification. William points to our acknowledgment in Anthony Lee R., A Minor v. State, that "it was clearly not the intention of the legislature that certification should automatically result in all deadly weapons cases; otherwise, no exceptions would exist, and all such cases would be subject to mandatory certification."4
We disagree with William's contention. While we conclude that the certification statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and is therefore ambiguous, it was not the Legislature's intent to limit the juvenile court's discretion in making certification decisions by precluding the court from applying the discretionary certification prong after a minor rebuts...
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