Matter of Williams, Bankruptcy No. 79-04104-P
Decision Date | 21 October 1980 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 79-04104-P,Adversary Proceeding No. 80-0271. |
Citation | 6 BR 789 |
Parties | In the Matter of Dennis Charles WILLIAMS, Debtor. ABD FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Plaintiff, v. Dennis Charles WILLIAMS, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Nora Lee Wright, Detroit, Mich., for defendant.
Kenneth C. Butler, II, East Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.
John C. Dougherty, Standing Chapter 13 Trustee, Detroit, Mich.
This matter is before the Court upon motion of the debtor, Dennis Charles Williams, requesting that ABD Federal Credit Union be ordered to return to him a 1977 Dodge van. The underlying facts are not disputed.
Williams purchased the vehicle in May of 1978, obtaining part of the purchase price from ABD in the form of a loan. ABD was granted a security interest securing the repayment of this loan. Williams subsequently became delinquent in his payments and on November 21, 1979 the vehicle was repossessed by ABD.
On December 6, 1979 Williams filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1301 et seq., and obtained an order restraining ABD from selling the vehicle. Since that time efforts by the attorneys for Williams and ABD to negotiate an acceptable settlement have been unsuccessful, and Williams now requests that the vehicle be ordered returned to him.
It is not disputed that ABD lawfully gained possession of Williams' vehicle by exercising its right to repossession following Williams' default in payment.1 The issue is whether it should be returned and if so, what conditions should be imposed on Williams as a result of such turnover.
Under pre-Code law, determination of whether property in which a debtor asserted rights but which was held by another entity was subject to the jurisdiction and control of a court acting under the bankruptcy statutes was analyzed in terms of whether the party in possession asserted an adverse claim to the property which was "substantial" or merely "colorable." Harrison v. Chamberlain, 271 U.S. 191, 46 S.Ct. 467, 70 L.Ed. 897 (1926); Warder v. Brady, 115 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1940); In the Matter of Greater Pythian Temple Association of New York, 19 F.Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y.1937). See also 6 Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th ed., para. 3.05.
The need for this sort of analysis is eliminated by the broadening of jurisdiction afforded bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.2 Under the jurisdictional provisions of this legislation this court has jurisdiction to hear and determine whether the vehicle is property which should be turned over to Williams,3 and jurisdiction to enforce such a turnover if it is found to be warranted.4
A secured creditor such as ABD, holding property repossessed from a debtor by virtue of its exercise of self-help enforcement of a security interest, is under this definition a custodian. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(10)(C).5 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, 15th ed., para. 101.10.6 Section 543 therefore is applicable to ABD. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 103(a).
Section 543 provides:
It is not disputed that the vehicle was Williams' property prior to its repossession. The repossession effected a transfer of all but certain rights in the property from Williams to ABD.7 These rights are "property of a debtor transferred to a custodian" and still in its "possession, custody, or control," and therefore must be returned to Williams unless this Court excuses ABD from complying with Section 543. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(40); 11 U.S.C. Sec. 543(b)(1); 11 U.S.C. Sec. 543(d).
Permitting ABD to retain custody of the vehicle in this case is neither necessary nor desirable. As will be discussed, infra, any use or disposition Williams makes of the vehicle is subject to this court's control. Allowing ABD to retain possession would create an anomalous situation in which ABD would have possession of the vehicle but not be able to sell or otherwise dispose of it as such disposition would constitute a further enforcement of its security interest in contravention of the automatic stay provisions of Section 362. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a). It is also foreseeable that Williams will be unable to propose or complete a Chapter 13 plan if deprived of the use of the vehicle.8 The economic utility of such a course is not evident to the court. The self-help provisions of the law are designed to allow the secured creditor to enforce his lien without judicial action. The intervention of this Court between the parties terminates this possibility.9 The Code is intended to make Chapter 13 adjustment a more accessible and desirable alternative to liquidation under Chapter 7 than it was under previous law.10 In these circumstances ABD's interests as a creditor are not sufficient to justify its continued possession of the vehicle during the interim between filing and confirmation, conversion or dismissal and it should therefore be turned over to Williams. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 543(a)(1), (c).
The return of the vehicle under Section 543 will make it part of the estate created by Section 541. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 541(a)(3). Williams clearly contemplates that if the vehicle is returned to him he will immediately begin using it. While the Code specifies that property of the estate of a Chapter 13 debtor is to remain in his possession except as provided in a confirmed plan11 its use is subject to the conditions imposed on use of property by Section 363. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1303; 11 U.S.C. Sec. 363(b), (d); 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, 15th ed., para. 1303.01(2)(A). This court is also charged with providing for the payment of "reasonable compensation for . . . costs and expenses incurred" by ABD in its role as custodian. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 543(c)(2).
Under Section 363 an entity having an interest in property which a Chapter 13 debtor proposes using can request that the bankruptcy court provide adequate protection of such interest. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 363(c). Even though the operation of Section 543 divests ABD of its possessory interest in the vehicle it still remains a secured creditor and is therefore entitled to adequate protection under Section 363. The record indicates that the value of the vehicle is far less than the full amount of ABD's claim.12 Since in this situation the amount of the secured claim is limited to the value of the collateral in which ABD has an interest, i.e. the value of the vehicle, the interest which must be protected is confined to that amount.13
Under Section 361 adequate protection may be provided in a variety of ways. Williams' use of the vehicle pursuant to Section 363(b) will presumably cause the value of the vehicle to decline. This Court, if it permits Williams to use the vehicle, must therefore grant relief which will protect ABD from this depreciation and result in its realization of the "indubitable equivalent" of the amount of its allowed secured claim. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 361; In re Murel Holding Co., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). This relief can take the form of periodic cash payments or may take such other forms as the court determines provided they meet this requirement. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 361; 11 U.S.C. Sec. 105.
At the time of the filing of the motion presently before the court Williams filed a plan under which he proposes making semi-monthly $55.00 payments to the trustee to be applied to ABD's claim. The value of the vehicle is $3,550.00.14 The proposed payments will therefore compensate ABD for a decline in this value of approximately three per cent (3%) each month. In these circumstances this will afford ABD adequate relief from any decline in the value of its interest in the vehicle caused by Williams' use in the period between its return to him and the confirmation of a plan...
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