Mattera v. Mattera

• Decision Date: 22 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 93-91-A,93-91-A
• Citation: 669 A.2d 538
• Parties: Jo-Ann MATTERA v. Steven A. MATTERA et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 538

669 A.2d 538

Jo-Ann MATTERA v. Steven A. MATTERA et al.

No. 93-91-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 22, 1996.

Carolyn Barone and Lauri S. Medin, for Plaintiff.

Jerry McIntyre and David J. Strachman, for Intervenor.

Donald R. Lembo, for Defendant.

OPINION

LEDERBERG, Justice.

This matter came before the Supreme Court on the appeals of Steven A. Mattera (defendant), Nancy L. Mattera and Pilgrim Motors, Inc. (intervenors), and Jo-Ann Mattera (plaintiff) from various decisions and orders entered in the Family Court in a divorce action between the plaintiff and the defendant. On appeal, the defendant challenged the following: the award of sole custody of the parties' only child to the plaintiff, the amount of child support he was directed to pay, the assignment of marital property between the parties, and the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff. The intervenors contended that the general master erred in determining the ownership interest of two corporate entities that he assigned as marital property. The plaintiff cross-appealed the amount of attorney's fees awarded to her counsel. We affirm the judgment in part and modify it in part as follows: (1) we sustain the granting of the divorce, the award of the marital domicile to the plaintiff, the award of sole custody of the child to the plaintiff, the trial court's order that the defendant pay $45,000 in child-support arrearages, and the provision of health care coverage for plaintiff and child in accordance with the Family Court order, (2) we remand the case to the Family Court for a retrial on the assignment of all marital property involving the alleged interests of Nancy Mattera, and (3) we order that the Family Court reduce the amount of future child support to a level consistent with the child support guidelines. Further, because sufficient uncertainty exists regarding the general master's impartiality in this case, we direct that the retrial be held before a different judicial officer. The issue of counsel fees shall also be reconsidered at the retrial, where any changes in the assignment of marital property can be taken into account. A brief summary of the facts pertaining to the issues raised in these appeals follows; other relevant facts will be added during our discussion of the issues.

Facts and Procedural History

The plaintiff and defendant were married on December 6, 1976; their child, Stephanie Ann Mattera (Stephanie), was born on November 6, 1979. On March 17, 1986, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking an absolute divorce on the statutory grounds of irreconcilable differences. On April 8, 1986, defendant filed a counterclaim for divorce, which he withdrew at trial. In accordance with an order arising out of a hearing before the Family Court on March 20, 1987, Pilgrim Motors, Inc., was made a party defendant in the divorce action.

The case was heard in a lengthy trial scheduled on various hearing days from March 19, 1990, to January 14, 1992. On June 16, 1990, Nancy Mattera was allowed to intervene, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(3) of the Rules of Procedure for Domestic Relations, on the grounds that she had an ownership interest in certain corporate entities to which plaintiff had laid claim.

In a bench decision rendered on April 24, 1992, plaintiff was awarded an absolute divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The trial court also awarded plaintiff sole custody of Stephanie, with defendant entitled to "any and all reasonable rights of visitation." The general master further ordered that defendant pay child support in the amount of $399 per week, pay $45,000 in past-due child support, provide health-care coverage for plaintiff for life or until she remarried, and provide health-care coverage for Stephanie until "at the very least" the age of nineteen. The general master then determined which assets constituted marital property for the purpose of equitable distribution, and after considering the length of marriage, the conduct of the parties, and the contribution of plaintiff to the accumulation of assets, he awarded 75 percent of the marital estate, including the marital domicile, to plaintiff and the remaining 25 percent to defendant.

By agreement of the parties, the question of attorney's fees was reserved, pending hearings and the presentation of expert testimony. After hearings on the matter of counsel fees, no decision was reached on this issue and on September 16, 1992, the general master entered his decision pending entry of final judgment. On October 1, 1992, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from that decision, pursuant to G.L.1956 (1994 Reenactment) § 14-1-52.

Hearings on the issue of counsel fees resumed, and on March 11, 1993, an order was entered denying plaintiff's motion to assess counsel fees against intervenors. After further hearings, the general master, on March 23, 1993, entered an order awarding plaintiff's counsel an attorney's fee in the sum of $20,294.50 plus $10,436.18 in "reimbursement of out-of-pocket costs solely attributable to defendant."

The next day plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the orders regarding counsel fees. On March 26, 1993, intervenors filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision of September 16, 1992, and from the trial court's order of March 23, 1993. On April 8, 1993, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the March 23, 1993 order.

On September 28, 1994, this Court docketed the appeals for full briefing and oral argument, and on October 14, 1994, this Court granted plaintiff's motion to strike intervenors' appeal from the September 16, 1992 decision pending entry of final judgment, on the grounds that the appeal was not timely filed. On October 27, 1994, however, we granted intervenors' motion for reconsideration and reinstated their appeal, subject to plaintiff's right to raise the timeliness issue in her brief and at oral argument.

Custody Award

On appeal, defendant challenged the award of sole custody of the parties' minor child to plaintiff. Our review of this issue is limited to considering whether the general master abused his discretion in granting sole custody of Stephanie to plaintiff. Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 914 (R.I.1990). It is well settled that this Court's "lode-star principle requires that any custody determination be based on the best interests of the child." Sammataro v. Sammataro, 620 A.2d 1253, 1254 (R.I.1993) (citing Burrows v. Brady, 605 A.2d 1312 (R.I.1992)). "Provided that the trial court considers the best interests of the child, this court will not disturb the discretionary award of child custody." Maroney v. Maroney, 644 A.2d 827, 827-28 (R.I.1994) (citing Cok v. Cok, 479 A.2d 1184, 1189 (R.I.1984)). In Pettinato, we noted that "the best interests of the child standard remains amorphous and its implementation has been left to the sound discretion of the trial justices," 582 A.2d at 913. Nonetheless, in setting forth a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered when determining the best interests of the child, id. at 913-14, we have held that "[t]he trial justice must consider a combination of and interaction among all the relevant factors that affect the child's best interest." Id. at 914.

In the case before us, the trial court found "both parents to be fit and proper, i.e., as to the love for said child and ability to care and provide for said child" but awarded sole custody to plaintiff, with defendant entitled to "any and all reasonable rights of visitation." The defendant contended that given the finding that both parents were "fit and proper" and in the absence of any specific finding that joint custody was not in the best interests of the child, the general master abused his discretion when he awarded sole custody to plaintiff. This Court has held that even in the event that "a trial justice fails to expressly articulate findings of fact we shall not refuse to accord the decision the persuasive force usually accorded such decisions on review, for the reason that implicit in a decision are such findings of fact necessary to support it." Duke v. Duke, 510 A.2d 430, 432 (R.I.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 864, 107 S.Ct. 219, 93 L.Ed.2d 147 (1986) (citing Kenney v. Hickey, 486 A.2d 1079, 1082-83 (R.I.1985)).

Our careful review of the extensive record reveals that the general master weighed the relevant factors set forth in Pettinato and that his decision is replete with findings of fact to support his award of sole custody. For instance, in his decision pending entry of final judgment, the general master implicitly considered the moral fitness of the parties and found that plaintiff had been a "good and faithful wife" whose marital conduct was impeccable but also found that defendant's marital conduct included the abuse of alcohol and "a bigamous relationship with another female during the course of the within divorce proceedings." According to plaintiff's testimony, defendant visited Stephanie only sporadically. The trial court also found that defendant's marital conduct was "nothing less than horrendous" and that the parties are "unable to maintain an amicable relationship for the sake of the [child], and therefore, an order of joint custody would be detrimental to the well-being of the [child]." Duke, 510 A.2d at 432. We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining that joint custody was not in Stephanie's best interest and in awarding sole custody of the child to plaintiff.

Child Support

General Laws 1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 15-5-16.2(a) provides that the Family Court "may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child to pay an amount based upon a formula and guidelines adopted by an administrative order of the family court." The general master awarded child support in the amount of $399 per week. The master arrived at this figure after first determining that application of the standard formula for computation of child support...