Matteson v. United States
| Decision Date | 31 December 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 112,Docket 24214.,112 |
| Citation | 240 F.2d 517 |
| Parties | Grace M. MATTESON, as surviving executrix of the Last Will and Testament of Edward M. Markham, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Wilford A. Le Forestier, Troy, N. Y. (Draper & Bartle, Troy, N. Y., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
Charles B. E. Freeman, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson and Harry Baum, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., and Theodore F. Bowes, U. S. Atty., N.D.N.Y., Syracuse, N. Y., on the brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, and FRANK and LUMBARD, Circuit Judges.
Defendant asks us to dismiss as untimely this appeal taken by the plaintiff from the dismissal of her complaint in an action for the refund of estate taxes. Plaintiff's notice of appeal was filed 113 days after the judge had filed a memorandum-decision dismissing the complaint, and 56 days after the entry of a formal judgment to like effect signed by him at defendant's request. Under F.R.C.P., rule 73(a), her appeal must be taken within 60 days from judgment. In accordance with our decisions, reanalyzed and reappraised by the full court in The F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v. United States, 2 Cir., 236 F.2d 889, the appeal is untimely and must be dismissed. We find no support in the record for plaintiff's contention that Judge Foley's failure to append his signature to the memorandum-decision showed his intent to delay judgment; we have no basis for judicial notice of so odd a method of signifying intent and in any event do not feel that the clear provisions of F.R. 58 can be limited or varied by such subjective reactions of the trier.
We would stop here but that a distinguished Court of Appeals has now viewed our Schaefer holding as dependent on a local district court rule and has rendered a decision which it states not to be in accord with the language of our opinion to the extent that the latter may apply even where no such local rule exists. United States v. Higginson, 1 Cir., 238 F.2d 439. Since we viewed the local rule as merely corroborative of the practice actually required by F.R. 58, Judge Hartigan's opinion must be taken as disapproving our reasoning. True, there is room for distinction on the facts so far as disclosed; unlike our present case, which is an outright dismissal of the complaint, the lower court adjudication there was for recovery of a very substantial sum of money with interest which (so far as the slip opinion shows) was not shown in the judge's first direction. Moreover, as we have pointed out, the issue always turns on the trial judge's declared intent as to the judgment; and where he has not made that clear, some interpretation is necessary.1 But what points up our difference of view is that we do not think the trial judge's original statement is subject to reassessment and definition on the basis of his having later signed a formal judgment presented to him by counsel, whereas our brothers of the First Circuit conclude that his later action demonstrates that his first action was not intended to be a final adjudication. We think that this formulation of the governing rule will have untoward results in practice which have apparently not been contemplated so far as appears from the rather summary discussion in United States v. Higginson, supra.
We suggest that if a district judge makes a practice of signing formal judgments later presented to him by counsel there will necessarily result a nullification of the mandate of F.R. 58 that when "the court directs that a party recover only money or costs or that all relief be denied, the clerk shall enter judgment forthwith upon receipt by him of the direction." Nor can we seriously doubt...
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Poleto v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
...v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747, 753 (3d Cir.1965) (delay in entry of judgment held "neither required nor appropriate"); Matteson v. United States, 240 F.2d 517, 519 (2d Cir.1956) (discouraging delay for taking briefs on judgment molding). Because the court did not enter the judgment promptly, but de......
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...for lack of invention. Appropriate judgment shall be submitted accordingly by the attorneys for the defendants. (See Matteson v. United States, 2 Cir., 240 F.2d 517; United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 78 S.Ct. 674, 2 L.Ed.2d The exhibits in evidence under the local......
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United States v. Twin City Power Company of Georgia
...that case and on Milton v. United States, 5 Cir., 1941, 120 F.2d 794; Woods v. Nicholas, 10 Cir., 1947, 163 F.2d 615; Matteson v. United States, 2 Cir., 1956, 240 F.2d 517; Rules 58 and 73 of Federal Rules of Civil 1 The entire paragraph from which this quotation is taken is quoted in the m......
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Oxford Filing Supply Co. v. Globe-Wernicke Co.
...on the merits, with costs. The Clerk is hereby directed to enter judgment forthwith. Fed.Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 58, 28 U.S.C.A. Matteson v. United States, 2 Cir., 1956, 240 F.2d 517. Formal judgment and any additional or supplemental findings or conclusions in accordance with this decision ......
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28 APPENDIX U.S.C. § 58 Entering Judgment
...and effort and promotes delay, except in special cases where counsel's assistance can be of real value. See Matteson v. United States, 240 F.2d 517, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1956). Accordingly, the amended rule provides that attorneys shall not submit forms of judgment unless directed to do so by th......