Matthew V. ex rel. Craig V. v. Dekalb County School, CIV.A. 1:02-CV-456-R.

• Decision Date: 11 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 1:02-CV-456-R.,CIV.A. 1:02-CV-456-R.
• Citation: 244 F.Supp.2d 1331
• Parties: MATTHEW V., by his Father and Next Friend, CRAIG V.; Craig V.; and Chris Vance, Plaintiffs, v. DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM; Dekalb County School District; and Dekalb County Board of Education Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

244 F.Supp.2d 1331

MATTHEW V., by his Father and Next Friend, CRAIG V.; Craig V.; and Chris Vance, Plaintiffs, v. DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM; Dekalb County School District; and Dekalb County Board of Education Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 1:02-CV-456-R.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

February 11, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Chris E. Vance, Office of Chris E. Vance, Decatur, Counsel for Plaintiffs.

J. Stanley Hawkins, Weeks & Candler, Atlanta, Wayne E. Brooks, Office of William Tinkler, Jr., Decatur, Counsel for Defendants.

ORDER

STORY, District Judge.

Now before the Court for consideration are Defendants' Motion for Summa Judgment [9-1] and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [11-1]. After reviewing the entire record, the Court enters the following Order.

1. Background

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff Matthew V. is a disabled elementary student who receives special education and related services. He has had an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") with Defendant De-Kalb County School System pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., since 1997. In the summer of 2000, Matthew's IEP team recognized the need for an assistive technology ("AT") evaluation, which the school provided in September 2000.

Matthew's parents were not satisfied with the AT evaluation and requested an independent AT evaluation. However, in October 2000, they offered to pay for the AT evaluation if the school system would pay for a less expensive test conducted by a Ms. Dillard, an occupational therapist "who specializes in handwriting" and would conduct an evaluation of Matthew's handwriting ability.¹ (Banks Aff. Ex. 1.²) The school system responded with a letter dated November 7, 2000, indicating that it would consider paying for Ms. Dillard's evaluation, but would make that determination after receiving a copy of her bill and evaluation. (Banks Aff. Ex. 2.) Indeed, the school system emphasized its view that it was not required to pay for an independent evaluation prior to its performance. (Id.) Matthew's parents responded by a letter dated November 9, 2000, stating their position that the school must either request a due process hearing or provide an independent evaluation at school expense. (Banks Aff. Ex. 3.) "Under the circumstances," the Vances requested an independent AT evaluation at public expense. (Id.) On November 17, 2000, the school replied that the Vances could request a due process hearing, and it reiterated that it would consider paying for Ms. Dillard's evaluation only after it was performed. (Banks Aff. Ex. 4.) However, the school noted that it would pay for the evaluation as long as it was not performed "in an obviously inappropriate manner." (Id.) The Vances replied by a letter dated November 24, 2000, asking the school system to either provide an independent AT evaluation or request a due process hearing. (Banks Aff. Ex. 5.) The school system responded on November 27, 2000 that "as long as Ms. Dillard's evaluation is not obviously defective, the school system will pay for it." (Banks Aff. Ex. 6.)

On November 29, 2000, the Vances again asked for information from the school about where an independent educational evaluation could be obtained. (Banks Aff. Ex. 7.) Finally, the Vances requested a mediation, and ultimately, they sought a due process hearing in January 2001. (Banks Aff. Ex. 10.) A Notice of Hearing was filed by the state administrative law judge ("ALJ") on January 25, 2001.

In the meantime, Matthew's parents obtained an independent AT evaluation at their own expense on December 7, 2000. The school system received a copy of the AT evaluation on January 26, 2001, and gave Ms. Vance a check for the cost of the evaluation, $491, on February 5, 2001, just prior to a hearing before the ALJ on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Determination.

The ALJ granted Plaintiffs motion in a decision dated February 28, 2001. In the Initial Decision, the judge concluded that the Vances' November 9 letter contained a request for an independent educational evaluation at public expense. Thus, "Respondent should have requested a due process hearing or provided the evaluation at public expense." (Initial Decision, Conclusions of Law 112.) However, the ALJ did not consider Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees because she determined that she did not have authority to grant such fees. Matthew's mother, Chris Vance, is an attorney and member of the Georgia Bar Association. During the due process procedure, Ms. Vance represented Matthew.

Plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), seeking attorney's fees and costs incurred in the state proceedings. They also request an award of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, associated with this litigation. Both parties have moved for summary judgment.

II. Discussion

A. IDEA Framework

Congress promulgated the IDEA with the purpose of ensuring "that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Cory D. ex rel. Diane D. v. Burke County Sch. Dist, 285 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir.2002) ("The fundamental objective of the IDEA is to empower disabled children to reach their fullest potential by providing a free education tailored to meet their individual needs."). To receive federal funds pursuant to the IDEA, states must comply with the statute's requirements. Id. § 1412(a). For example, schools must provide an IEP for each child with a disability. Id. § 1412(a)(4). As part of formulating an IEP, schools must conduct an initial evaluation (and reevaluations, when necessary) of the child. Id. § 1414(a). Further, parents who disagree with the school's evaluation may request "an independent educational evaluation of the child" at public expense Id. § 1415(b); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (setting forth criteria). The IDEA also establishes numerous procedural safeguards for "children with disabilities and their parents." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). Among these safeguards are the availability of a due process hearing before a state agency, id. § 1415(f), and the right of a party aggrieved by the state agency to bring a civil action in a U.S. district court. Id. § 1415(I)(2).

The IDEA further gives district courts discretion to "award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party." Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Thus, parents may bring an independent claim for attorney's fees in a district court after their child prevails before a state ALJ. Mitten v. Muscogee County Sch. Dist, 877 F.2d 932, 935 (11th Cir.1989). Whereas substantive administrative law claims are reviewed by the district court "as a quasi-appellate court," an independent claim for attorneys' fees places the district court in its more usual trial court role. Ga. State Dep't of Educ. v. Derrick C, 314 F.3d 545, 550 (11th Cir.2002). Finally, "[although the awarding of fees is termed `discretionary,' . . . the discretion is narrow and the reasons given in support of the discretion are subject to appellate review." Mitten, 877 F.2d at 936.

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court should view the evidence and any inferences that may be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to showthat a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Here, Defendants base their motion on three independent arguments: (1) Matthew's attorney is also his mother; (2) Plaintiffs were not prevailing parties before the ALJ; and (3) Plaintiffs unreasonably refused settlement offers and failed to obtain more favorable results. Plaintiffs dispute these arguments and contend that Matthew was the prevailing party in the administrative hearing. While the Court holds that an attorney-parent may recover fees pursuant to the IDEA, it nevertheless holds that Plaintiffs did not prevail; thus, the Court does not consider whether Plaintiffs unreasonably refused settlement offers.

1. Recovery of fees for attorney-parent's representation

Matthew's mother, Ms. Vance, represented Matthew before the ALJ in her capacity as an attorney. Raising an apparent issue of first impression in this circuit, Defendants contend that Matthew and his parents are barred from collecting attorneys' fees for Ms. Vance's representation. Defendants' argument begins with Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991). There, the Supreme Court held that an attorney who had represented himself successfully in a civil rights action could not recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.³ Id. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 1435. The Court wrote, "[although this section was no doubt intended to encourage litigation protecting civil rights, it is also true that its more specific purpose was to enable potential plaintiffs to obtain the assistance of competent counsel in vindicating their rights." Id. at 436, 111 S.Ct. 1435. When a litigant-even a lawyer-represents himself pro se, the Court reasoned, he is at a disadvantage because he is deprived of the judgment of an independent third party. Id. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 1435. Thus, "the statutory policy of furthering the successful prose...