Matthew v. State, 3-973A123
| Decision Date | 12 November 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-973A123,3-973A123 |
| Citation | 318 N.E.2d 594 |
| Parties | Charles L. MATTHEW, Defendant-Appellant, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
John M. Lyons, Valparaiso, for defendant-appellant; Lyons, Aungst & Guastella, Valparaiso, of counsel.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., John H. Meyers, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant-appellant Charles L. Matthew was charged by indictment in two counts with I) reckless homicide and II) reckless homicide while driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. On motion of the defendant, Count I alleging the offense of reckless homicide was later dismissed following the close of the State's case in chief. Following trial before a jury, a verdict of guilty was returned as to Count II, reckless homicide while driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The trial court thereafter ordered that the defendant be imprisoned in the Indiana State Prison for an indeterminate period of not less than one year nor more than two years and that he be fined in the penal sum of $250, plus costs. Appellant's motion to correct errors was subsequently overruled and this appeal was then perfected.
It is to be noted that following a previous trial appellant-Matthew was convicted of both reckless homicide and reckless homicide while driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Such conviction was reversed, however, by this court in Matthew v. State (1972), Ind.App., 289 N.E.2d 336, 33 Ind.Dec. 571. The present appeal stems from appellant's conviction following a second trial.
An examination of the evidence reveals that during the early evening of July 29, 1970, Alberta Olson and her mother, Bertha Olson, had gone for a drive. At approximately 8:00 P.M., the Olsons were involved in a collision with another automobile driven by the appellant, Charles Matthew. Appellant's wife was a passenger in his automobile. The accident occurred during daylight at the intersection of County Roads 25 North and 700 East in Starke County, Indiana. At the time of collision, the automobile driven by Alberta Olson was proceeding west on County Road 25 North. No traffic signal controlled her lane of traffic at the intersection of Road 700 East. The Matthew automobile was traveling north on County Road 700 East. A stop sign regulated the flow of traffic across Road 25 North. Alberta Olson testified that she saw the other car approaching but she thought it would stop. Bertha Olson later died from injuries sustained in the accident.
Testimony during trial further established that appellant-Matthew had consumed several drinks during a period of time preceding the accident on the evening in question.
The sole issue which will be considered on review is whether the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of certain grand jury testimony over defendant's objection.
State's Exhibit No. 19 consisted of a portion of the defendant's testimony before the grand jury which returned the indictment charging him with the above stated offenses. A portion of Matthew's testimony contained in the exhibit was to the effect that prior to the accident in which he was involved, both he and his wife had had dinner at the home of one Donna Rogers, an employee of Matthew, and that appellant had nothing to drink while there. The prosecution was permitted to introduce this testimony at trial over Matthew's objection. Following the introduction of State's Exhibit No. 19, the prosecution called as its witness Donna Rogers who testified that the defendant and his wife had not had dinner with her on the evening in question and that her testimony before the grand jury which corroborated that of Matthew in this particular was false. It is to be noted that at this point during the trial no one had yet testified on behalf of Matthew and that Matthew himself never did testify and was not, therefore, subject to impeachment.
The State has sought to justify the introduction of State's Exhibit No. 19 as substantive evidence on the ground that Matthew's false testimony constituted proof of guilty consciousness and was, therefore, material and admissible. In this assertion, the State places reliance upon the principle stated in Wilson v. United States (1896), 162 U.S. 613, at 620-621, 16 S.Ct. 895, at 898-899, 40 L.Ed. 1090, at 1095:
'Nor can there be any question that if the jury were satisfied from the evidence, that false statements in the case were made by defendant, or on his behalf, at his instigation, they had the right, not only to take such statements into consideration, in connection with all the other circumstances of the case, in determining whether or not defendant's conduct had been satisfactorily explained by him upon the theory of his innocence, but also to regard false statements in explanation or defence made or procured to be made, as in themselves tending to show guilt.' See: Perfect v. State (1923), 197 Ind. 401, 141 N.E. 52; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.), § 278, at 120; 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 596, at 375. See Generally: 31A C.J.S., Evidence, §§ 151-155, at 388.
The rule which permits the introduction of evidence relating to possible criminal conduct on the part of an accused who has actively endeavored to obstruct justice or avoid punishment for the crime charged is widely recognized, for such acts perpetrated by a defendant are considered as admissions by conduct.
We do not, however, agree with the State that this principle can serve as justification for the admission of State's Exhibit No. 19 in the instant case. If Matthew's testimony before the grand jury was false, this fact, in and of itself, is not necessarily material nor relevant. The fact remains that the State did not succeed in establishing the truth as to the antithesis of Matthew's allegedly false testimony. We are urged to draw the inference, as indeed the jury must have done, that Matthew was engaged in the consumption of alcoholic beverages during the time in which he testified that he was having dinner at the home of Donna Rogers. We do not believe, however, that proof as to the falsity of a statement which is of undetermined materiality can, in itself, serve as proof of a hypothesis which is not otherwise supported by any substantial evidence. Stated in other terms, the materiality of a statement must be established before any significance or probative value may attach to the fact of its alleged falsification. This can only be accomplished by supplying proof of hard facts. Applying this rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that before the State could introduce evidence of a purported falsification on the part of appellant as to his whereabouts and activities prior to the accident (facts which, in view of the offenses with which Matthew was charged, may or may not be material) it was required to establish to a substantial degree where, in fact Matthew was or what, in fact, Matthew did there. If, and only if, these facts are established and are in themselves material to the offenses charged may the inference of guilty consciousness be drawn. Where, as in the present case, neither proof of these facts nor a showing of their materiality was indicated, any probative value which may have attached to the proof of the alleged falsification was by far outweighed by the prejudice to Matthew's case attending its introduction. Such evidence must be deemed to have focused the attention of the jury upon the character of the accused rather than upon the facts of the alleged crime, thereby contributing to the verdict rendered. See: Price v. State (1967), 37 Wis.2d 117, 154 N.W.2d 222.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court is reversed.
Reversed.
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Matthew v. State
...Court of Appeals because of the admission into evidence of certain portions of grand jury testimony by the Appellant. Matthew v. State, (1974) Ind.App., 318 N.E.2d 594. In reversing the Court of Appeals and affirming the Appellant's conviction, we look at both the sufficiency of the evidenc......