Matthews v. Arkla Lubricants Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. 32,121-CA.,32,121-CA.
• Citation: 740 So.2d 787
• Parties: Johnny Ray MATTHEWS, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARKLA LUBRICANTS INC., Federated Mutual Ins. Co., Steven Robert Rogers, Manpower, and ABC Insurance Co., Defendants-appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

740 So.2d 787

Johnny Ray MATTHEWS, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARKLA LUBRICANTS INC., Federated Mutual Ins. Co., Steven Robert Rogers, Manpower, and ABC Insurance Co., Defendants-appellees.

No. 32,121-CA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

August 18, 1999.

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Peter R. Flowers, Shreveport, McQuaig & Stelly by Scott McQuaig, Metairie, Counsel for Appellants.

Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway by Sidney E. Cook, Jr., Shreveport, Counsel for Appellees.

Before NORRIS, BROWN and KOSTELKA, JJ.

BROWN, J.

Plaintiffs, Johnny Ray Matthews, Dominic Restivo, Wanda Jean Rowell, Kenneth Eugene Watkins, and Mary Joan Owen, filed the instant action seeking wrongful death damages arising out of a two vehicle accident in which several of their family members were fatally injured. The jury rejected plaintiffs' demands, finding that the accident was caused solely by the fault of Ruth Restivo, the driver of the car in which plaintiffs' decedents were passengers. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's adverse verdict. Following denial of motions for JNOV/new trial, plaintiffs appealed. Finding no error, however, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural Background

On May 27, 1994, Ruth Restivo was returning to Shreveport after visiting her daughter Wanda at her home on Bledsoe Road in Keithville. Passengers in Mrs. Restivo's gray 1986 Oldsmobile Cutlass Cierra were her pregnant granddaughter-in-law Shirley Denise Matthews, her infant great-grandson Kristian Marshal Matthews, and family friend Para Lee Cook. The accident, which resulted in the death of all four occupants of the Restivo vehicle, occurred when Mrs. Restivo, attempting to turn left onto Mansfield Road (also known as La. Highway 171) from Bledsoe Road, was struck by a 1991 Chevrolet pickup truck owned by defendant, Arkla Lubricants, Inc., and driven by defendant, Stephen Robert Rogers, a temporary warehouse employee provided by Manpower Temporary Services, Inc. Rogers was on his way to Zwolle to make a delivery. Hwy. 171 is four lanes with a grassy median separating the south and northbound lanes. Rogers was traveling south in the lefthand or inside lane when the accident occurred.

Thereafter, on December 19, 1994, plaintiffs filed the instant wrongful death action, naming as defendants Stephen Rogers, Arkla Lubricants, its insurer, Federated Mutual Insurance Company, Collier Investments, Inc. d/b/a Manpower Temporary Services, and its insurer, Federal Insurance Company. A jury was empaneled and trial was begun on March 9, 1998. At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, Manpower and its insurer moved for a directed verdict, which was granted by the trial court. Following presentation of the remaining defendants' case, the jury determined that the accident was caused solely by the fault of Mrs. Restivo. Judgment in favor of defendants dismissing plaintiffs' claims was signed on March 27, 1998.

Plaintiffs filed motions for JNOV and new trial. The trial court denied both motions, finding that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence. The trial court's denial of these post-trial motions is the primary error asserted by plaintiffs on appeal.

Discussion

Denial of Motion for JNOV

Plaintiffs first contend that the jury verdict in favor of defendants is unsupported by sufficient evidence and that the trial court improperly denied their motion for JNOV. According to plaintiffs, it is undisputed that Rogers was speeding and inattentive at the time of the accident and that this negligent behavior was a cause of the accident. Furthermore, because no reasonable jury could have arrived at such a verdict, the trial court should have granted JNOV. Plaintiffs also assert as error the jury's failure to find Arkla Lubricants liable for their injuries under a theory of negligent entrustment.

A JNOV is the procedural device authorized by La.C.C.P. art. 1811 whereby the trial court may correct a legally erroneous verdict by modifying fault or damages, or both, that the jury may have assessed. Jackson v. A.L. & W. Moore Trucking, 609 So.2d 1064 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1992). JNOV is a question of whether the jury verdict, as a matter of law, is supported by any legitimate or substantial evidence. To determine that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law requires a finding that no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could possibly lead rational persons to the conclusions reached by the jury. Scott v. Hospital Service District No. 1, 496 So.2d 270 (La.1986); Morehead v. Ford Motor Company, 29,399 (La.App.2d Cir.05/21/97), 694 So.2d 650, writ denied, 97-1865 (La.11/07/97), 703 So.2d 1265; Gibson v. Bossier City General Hospital, 594 So.2d 1332 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991).

In applying this standard, the trial court may not substitute its judgment of the facts for that of the jury and must consider all the evidence in the light most advantageous to the party in whose favor the jury verdict was rendered, giving this party the benefit of every legitimate and reasonable inference that could have been drawn from the evidence. Scott, supra; Gibson, supra. The trial court does not have the discretion to weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Anderson v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 583 So.2d 829 (La.1991); Morehead, supra. All reasonable inferences or factual questions should be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, supra; Chambers v. Graybiel, 25,840 (La.App.2d Cir.06/22/94), 639 So.2d 361, writ denied, 94-1948 (La.10/28/94), 644 So.2d 377.

As noted by this court in Gibson, supra at 1336, the scales are clearly tilted in favor of the survival of the jury's verdict, but the trial court is left with a breadth of discretion which varies with the facts and events of each case. What the appellate court reviews is the decision of the trial judge, who has attempted to balance the great deference afforded to the jury's verdict against his obligation to insure that substantial justice was accomplished. Appellate review is limited to whether the trial court committed manifest error or was clearly wrong in denying JNOV. Chambers, supra; Gibson, supra.

Fault in a vehicular collision case is determined by judging the conduct of each motorist under the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Crump v. Ritter, 583 So.2d 47 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991), writ denied, 588 So.2d 1113 (La.1991); Soniat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 340 So.2d 1097 (La.App. 4^th Cir.1976).

A motorist may be negligent if he drives his vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the existing conditions and for the potential hazards, having due regard for considerations such as the traffic on the roadway, its surface and width, and the conditions of the weather. Coley v. Dept. of Transportation and Development, 621 So.2d 41 (La. App. 2d Cir.1993); Loveday v. Travelers Insurance Co., 585 So.2d 597 (La.App. 3d Cir.1991), writ denied, 590 So.2d 65 (La. 1991). However, the fact that a motorist involved in an accident was speeding does not in and of itself require a finding of liability. Loveday, supra; Bennett v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 373 So.2d 1362 (La.App. 1^st Cir.1979), writ denied, 376 So.2d 1269 (La.1979); Bland v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 311 So.2d 480 (La. App. 4^th Cir.1975). Instead, as noted by the court in Bland, supra, speed does not directly cause accidents, but rather influences behavior and results in acts or omissions which cause accidents.

It is undisputed that Stephen Rogers was traveling along Hwy. 171 at a speed just over the posted speed limit. A driver on a favored highway has the duty of ordinary care toward drivers entering from side streets. Coleman v. Rabon, 561 So.2d 897 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990), writ denied, 567 So.2d 617 (La.1990); Tatum v. Old Republic Insurance Co., 94-157 (La. App. 3d Cir.10/05/94), 643 So.2d 419, writ denied, 94-2722 (La.01/06/95), 648 So.2d 929. A motorist driving at a reasonable rate on a right-of-way street has a right to assume or presume that a driver approaching from a less favored street will stop for the intersection and yield the right-of-way. Alexander v. Rivers, 560 So.2d 999 (La.App. 4^th Cir.1990).

It is also uncontroverted that Ruth Restivo was attempting to proceed across the favored thoroughfare, Hwy. 171, from Bledsoe Road. Traffic on Bledsoe Road was controlled by a stop sign. When a driver is confronted with a stop sign at an intersection, it is her duty to come to a complete stop, to appraise traffic and to make certain that the way is clear before proceeding. Kessler v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 573 So.2d 476 (La.1991); Coleman, supra; Vallery v. Dept. of Transportation and Development, 480 So.2d 818 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985), writ denied, 481 So.2d 1350 (La.1986). When a motorist stops her vehicle before entering a right-of-way street, she has performed only half of the duty which the law has imposed upon her. The duty to proceed safely from a stop sign mandates that the driver see what she should have seen with the exercise of due diligence. Eaglin v. State Farm Insurance Co., 489 So.2d 464 (La.App. 3d Cir.1986). She is required to see a vehicle which is traveling on a favored roadway as it approaches her position. Id. To stop and then proceed in the immediate path of an oncoming vehicle constitutes gross negligence. Coleman, supra.

Generally, an owner of a vehicle is not personally liable for damages which occur when another is operating the vehicle. Riser v. Acadiana Limousine Service, Inc., 96-1687 (La.App. 3d Cir.04/30/97), 693 So.2d 330, writ denied, 97-1420 (La.09/19/97), 701 So.2d 173; Jones v. Western Preferred Casualty Co., 633 So.2d 667 (La.App. 1^st Cir.1993), writ denied, 94-0273 (La.04/04/94), 635 So.2d 1123; Harris v. Hamilton, 569 So.2d 1 (La.App. 4^th Cir.1990); Friday v. Mutz, 483 So.2d...