Matthews v. Centrus Energy Corp.

• Decision Date: 06 October 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-3885,20-3885
• Citation: 15 F.4th 714
• Parties: James MATTHEWS and Jennifer Brownfield Clark, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Joanne Ross, parent and natural guardian of Estate of A.R., a deceased minor, and individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CENTRUS ENERGY CORP.; United States Enrichment Corporation; Uranium Disposition Services, LLC; BWXT Conversion Services, LLC ; Mid-America Conversion Services, LLC ; Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC; LATA/Parallax Portsmouth, LLC; Fluor-BWXT Portsmouth, LLC, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

15 F.4th 714

James MATTHEWS and Jennifer Brownfield Clark, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Joanne Ross, parent and natural guardian of Estate of A.R., a deceased minor, and individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.CENTRUS ENERGY CORP.; United States Enrichment Corporation; Uranium Disposition Services, LLC; BWXT Conversion Services, LLC ; Mid-America Conversion Services, LLC ; Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC; LATA/Parallax Portsmouth, LLC; Fluor-BWXT Portsmouth, LLC, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-3885

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: October 6, 2021

ON BRIEF: Kelsey J. Reno, VILLARREAL LAW FIRM, LLC, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellants. Richard D. Schuster, VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE, LLP, Columbus, Ohio, Jacob D. Mahle, Jessica K. Baverman, VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE, LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellees.

Before: STRANCH, BUSH, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs believe they have been exposed to radioactive material released by a nuclear plant in Ohio. In an attempt to recover for harms that exposure allegedly caused, they asserted state law claims in state court against entities involved in the plant's operations. The entities in turn removed the action to federal court and then argued that the Price-Anderson Act, which governs "any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident," 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2), preempts plaintiffs’ claims. The district court agreed and, because plaintiffs disavowed any theory of recovery under the Act, dismissed the case. We now affirm.

BACKGROUND

A. To help frame the issues before us, we begin with a review of the federal regulatory scheme governing American nuclear power production. In the early years of our nation's exploration into nuclear power, the federal government enjoyed a monopoly on nuclear power production. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n , 461 U.S. 190, 206, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983). Through the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Congress ended that monopoly and "provid[ed] for licensing of private construction, ownership, and operation of commercial nuclear power reactors for energy production." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env't Study Grp., Inc. , 438 U.S. 59, 63, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) ; see also Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919. As the nuclear power industry was subjected to market forces, "profits from the private exploitation of atomic energy were uncertain and the accompanying risks substantial." Duke Power Co. , 438 U.S. at 63, 98 S.Ct. 2620. These developments resulted in the adoption of the Price-Anderson Act in 1957. See El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie , 526 U.S. 473, 476, 119 S.Ct. 1430, 143 L.Ed.2d 635 (1999) ; see also Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957). Through the Act, Congress created a system of private insurance, government indemnification, and limited liability for federal licensees. See 71 Stat. at 576–79. The stated rationale behind those safeguards was "to protect the public" while still "encourag[ing] the development of the atomic energy industry." 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i). In practice, they operated to spread potential liability among private insurance, the federal government, and licensees. See Duke Power Co , 438 U.S. at 64–67, 98 S.Ct. 2620.

Congress later amended the Act on multiple occasions. Among those legislative efforts was a 1966 amendment that required indemnified licensees to waive various common-law defenses in actions arising from an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence." See Pub. L. No. 89-645, § 3, 80 Stat. 891, 892 (1966); In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II (TMI II) , 940 F.2d 832, 852 (3d Cir. 1991) ; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (defining "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" as "any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material from its intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels offsite, which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Secretary of Energy ... determines to be substantial, and which the [Commission or Secretary] ... determines has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite"). Congress also added a provision enabling the transfer to federal district court of all claims arising out of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. See 80 Stat. at 892; TMI II , 940 F.2d at 852.

In 1988, Congress amended the Act again in response to the Three Mile Island accident and the wave of litigation it prompted. See Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (1988) ; Neztsosie , 526 U.S. at 477, 119 S.Ct. 1430. Because the accident did not fit within the Act's definition of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence," there was no mechanism to consolidate cases in federal court. Neztsosie , 526 U.S. at 477, 119 S.Ct. 1430 (citing S. Rep. 100-218, at 13 (1987)). Congress therefore provided federal district courts with original and removal jurisdiction over not just "extraordinary nuclear occurrences" but also "any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident." See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) ; Neztsosie , 526 U.S. at 477, 119 S.Ct. 1430. To spell out the contours of that latter category of cases, the Act, as amended, defined "public liability" as "any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w). The term "nuclear incident," in turn, was defined as:

any occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, within the United States causing ... bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material.

Id. § 2014(q). Finally, for purposes of jurisdiction over public liability actions, "any suit asserting public liability" would be "deemed to be an action arising under [ 42 U.S.C. §] 2210," with the "substantive rules for decision ... derived" from state law, "unless such law is inconsistent" with § 2210. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh).

B. With the regulatory table set, we turn to the dispute before us, one centered in Pike County, located in Ohio's Appalachian region. Pike County is home to the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The plant has a long history of nuclear power generation. From the early 1950s until 2001, the plant enriched uranium, initially to support the United States’ nuclear-weapons program and later to fuel commercial nuclear reactors. Since 2002, the plant has been used as a facility to convert depleted uranium hexafluoride (a coproduct of uranium enrichment) into uranium oxide, a more stable compound that can be reused, stored, transported, or discarded. Until 2016, the plant also served as the site of operations for the American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Facility, which processed uranium in a closed loop to show the effectiveness of the centrifuge design and equipment.

Plaintiffs are four individuals who lived near the plant, one of whom is now deceased and is represented here by his estate. Defendants are entities that have been involved in various activities at the plant since 1993, including uranium enrichment, depleted uranium hexafluoride conversion, and environmental remediation. Plaintiffs claim that defendants have misleadingly portrayed the plant as safe when, in reality, it discharged radioactive material that caused (and continues to cause) them to suffer harm. Plaintiffs allege that their exposure to that radioactive material caused them bodily injuries (including death) as well as property losses. Plaintiffs also seek to represent a class of "[a]ll individuals and minor children who were exposed to the toxic and radioactive material expelled by the [plant]" and have allegedly suffered physical injury.

In 2019, plaintiffs filed suit in Ohio state court asserting seven claims under Ohio law. Defendants removed the case on the grounds that the complaint, although it did not assert a federal claim, nonetheless raised a federal question under the Price-Anderson Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(hh), 2210(n)(2). Defendants then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Act preempted plaintiffs’ state law claims and, because plaintiffs did not assert a claim under the Act, the complaint should be dismissed. Plaintiffs both opposed the motion and filed a motion to remand, contending that their claims did not arise from a "nuclear incident" and thus fell outside the Act's scope.

The district court granted defendants’ motion. Invoking our decision in Nieman v. NLO, Inc. , 108 F.3d 1546, 1552–53 (6th Cir. 1997), the court concluded that "[p]laintiffs’ state law claims fit squarely within" the Price-Anderson Act's definition of "nuclear incident," meaning the claims were preempted. And because plaintiffs did not otherwise opt "to proceed under the Price-Anderson Act," they failed to state a cognizable claim. The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ motion to remand as moot. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's holdings that the Price-Anderson Act preempts their state law claims and that plaintiffs otherwise failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. They also challenge the district court's denial of their motion to remand. We review each installment of that legal trilogy de novo. Torres v. Precision Indus., Inc. , 995 F.3d 485, 491 (6th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (federal preemption); Doe v. Mich. State Univ. , 989 F.3d 418, 425 (6th Cir. 2021) (dismissal for failure to state a claim); City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Secs., Inc. , 615 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2010) (denial of motion to remand).

A. As its name suggests, the Supremacy Clause of the United...