Matthews v. Com.
| Decision Date | 19 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 2003-SC-00378-MR.,2003-SC-00378-MR. |
| Citation | 163 S.W.3d 11 |
| Parties | William Vernon MATTHEWS, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Patrick Graney, Appeals Branch, Department of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, Counsel for Appellant.
Gregory D. Stumbo, Attorney General, John R. Tarter, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Appellate Division, Frankfort, Counsel for Appellee.
Appellant William Vernon Matthews was convicted of First-Degree Rape, found to be a Second-Degree Persistent Felony Offender ("PFO"), and sentenced to life in prison. He claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it (1) refused to grant a mistrial after a witness referred to his prior incarceration, (2) admitted evidence of a prior misdemeanor charge, and (3) admitted the victim's hospital records into evidence. We hold that the trial court did not commit reversible error in any of these instances, and we affirm the final judgment of the Rowan Circuit Court.
Steve Anderson and his wife, Montana Anderson, were Appellant's neighbors. Mr. Anderson and Appellant were "drinking buddies." In August 2002, Appellant and Mr. Anderson got into an argument after which Mr. Anderson swore out a complaint against Appellant for terroristic threatening. Appellant was arrested, and though ultimately the charge was dismissed,1 it was still pending in November 2002.
On November 14, 2002, Mr. Anderson became intoxicated, said he thought he was going into "DTs," and threatened to choke his wife. He called an ambulance and was taken to a hospital in Morehead, Kentucky, then to one in Chillicothe, Ohio. While in the hospital, Mr. Anderson called his wife and threatened to "whip" her. Two days later, Appellant drove Mrs. Anderson to the Kentucky State Police post in Morehead so that she could obtain an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) against Mr. Anderson. When Mrs. Anderson completed the paperwork, Appellant drove her home.
According to Mrs. Anderson's testimony, she was alone in her trailer later that night when Appellant entered without an invitation. Appellant was carrying a six-pack of beer. Mrs. Anderson repeatedly told Appellant to leave, but he refused. He drank beer and smoked marijuana. When Mrs. Anderson asked Appellant why he was there, Appellant told her that he was going to get revenge on her husband for putting him in jail. Mrs. Anderson went to the bathroom. When she came out of the bathroom, Appellant grabbed her by the arm and put a knife to her neck. Appellant then pulled her into the master bedroom and onto the bed. Mrs. Anderson claims that Appellant then raped her and threatened to kill her if she told anyone. She lost consciousness after the attack.
The next morning, Rowan County Sheriff's Deputy James Damron came to the Andersons' trailer. Mr. Anderson had asked him to retrieve some clothes and medicine that he could not retrieve himself because of the EPO. Unbeknownst to the Deputy, Mrs. Anderson placed a small notebook among Anderson's clothes. On the first page of the notebook, she had written:
Mr. Anderson received his wife's note on November 18, 2002, and he called her from a truck stop in Mt. Sterling, Kentucky. Mrs. Anderson begged him to come home, but she would not tell him why. He explained that he could not return home because of the EPO. Instead, Mrs. Anderson drove to Mt. Sterling to meet her husband. She explained to him that Appellant had raped her. Because Mr. Anderson feared he would be arrested for violating the EPO if he took his wife to a hospital in Kentucky, they traveled to West Virginia. Mr. Anderson took his wife to the Cabell-Huntington Hospital, which is located in Huntington, West Virginia. On the way to the hospital, they made a brief stop to call the Kentucky State Police to report the rape. At the hospital, a doctor examined Mrs. Anderson and administered a rape kit. Kentucky State Police Trooper Keith Carter later came to the hospital and took possession of the medical records containing the results from this kit.
Kentucky State Police Detective Anthony Anderson interviewed Mrs. Anderson two days later. She showed him a bruise on her arm, and a subsequent search of her trailer revealed "biological material" on the bed in the master bedroom. Detective Anderson then asked Mrs. Anderson to try to tape a telephone conversation with Appellant in order to obtain more evidence, but the attempt failed because Appellant was unwilling to discuss the matter on the phone. Appellant did ask the Andersons to meet with him face-to-face, and the two agreed. Mr. Anderson brought a hidden tape recorder to the meeting. During the course of the conversation, Appellant apologized, promised never to hurt Mrs. Anderson again, and asked them not to involve the law. Mr. Anderson turned the tape over to Detective Anderson.
Appellant was indicted for First-Degree Rape and charged with being a Second-Degree PFO. At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony as to the facts described above and also played the tape that Mr. Anderson made of his conversation with Appellant. And over Appellant's objection, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to introduce Mrs. Anderson's medical records from the West Virginia hospital into evidence.
Appellant did not testify and presented only the testimony of Deputy Damron, who testified about traveling to the Andersons' trailer to get clothes and medication for Mr. Anderson after the EPO went into effect. Deputy Damron testified that Mrs. Anderson did not appear to be under any stress at the time. Appellant's attorney argued that Appellant and Mrs. Anderson had been having an affair, and that she had consented to intercourse with him on the night in question.2
The jury convicted Appellant of First-Degree Rape and found that he was a Second-Degree PFO. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of twelve years on the Rape charge and enhanced his sentence as a persistent felon to life in prison. Appellant now appeals to this court as a matter of right.3
Appellant's first allegation of error stems from a statement made during Mrs Anderson's testimony. On direct examination, the prosecutor asked Mrs. Anderson how long she and her husband had known Appellant. She responded: Appellant's lawyer immediately objected and a bench conference ensued.
The trial court began the conference by acknowledging that the statement was inadmissible and asking Appellant's lawyer whether he wanted an admonition. Appellant's lawyer told the court that he wanted an admonition that would not identify the inadmissible portion of the statement. The trial court told him that it would be difficult to craft such an admonition because the rest of Mrs. Anderson's statement was admissible. Appellant's lawyer then requested a mistrial, but the trial court denied the motion and asked again whether Appellant wanted an admonition. Appellant's lawyer responded: "I don't think I want an admonition." The trial court then asked the prosecutor to instruct Mrs. Anderson not to say anything further about Appellant's prior incarceration. The prosecutor did so and the trial continued.
Appellant now claims that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial. Mrs. Anderson's statement was evidence that Appellant had previously been arrested for a crime different from the one for which he was standing trial. Evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible,4 though such evidence is admissible (1) if offered for a purpose other than proving a person's character in order to show action in conformity therewith, e.g., to prove motive, intent, opportunity, et cetera,5 or (2) if the evidence is "so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case. . . ."6 Mrs. Anderson's statement was not offered pursuant to nor does it fall under either exception, and, as such, the statement was inadmissible.
Although we find that Mrs. Anderson's statement was inadmissible, we disagree with Appellant's suggested conclusion and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We have long held that an admonition is usually sufficient to cure an erroneous admission of evidence,7 and there is a presumption that the jury will heed such an admonition.8 A trial court only declares a mistrial if a harmful event is of such magnitude that a litigant would be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect could be removed in no other way.9 Stated differently, the court must find a manifest, urgent, or real necessity for a mistrial.10 The trial court has broad discretion in determining when such a necessity exists because the trial judge is "best situated intelligently to make such a decision."11 The trial court's decision to deny a motion for a mistrial should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.12
First we note that Mrs. Anderson's statement was, in part, non-responsive to the prosecutor's question. We noted in Phillips v. Commonwealth13 that "[w]here evidence of other crimes is introduced into evidence through the non-responsive answer of a witness, this court must look at all of the evidence and determine whether the defendant has been unduly prejudiced by that isolated statement."14 In Phillips, a First-Degree Rape trial, the victim gave unsolicited testimony that informed the jury that Phillips had previously escaped from prison.15 Phillips objected and moved for a mistrial, and although the trial court found the statement inadmissible, it refused to declare a mistrial.16 On appeal, we affirmed the order of the trial court because we did not believe, "in view of all of the evidence...
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