Matthews v. Pickett County
| Citation | 996 S.W.2d 162 |
| Parties | Mary MATTHEWS, Plaintiff/Petitioner, v. PICKETT COUNTY, Tennessee, Larry Peek and Dana Dowdy, Individually and in their official capacity as employees for the Pickett County Sheriff's Department, Defendants/Respondents. |
| Decision Date | 14 June 1999 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Joseph A. Johnston, Max Mendelsohn, Nashville, for Petitioner.
Robert H. Watson, Jr., John C. Duffy, Knoxville, for Amicus Curiae, Tennessee Municipal League Risk Management Pool.
Theodore R. Kern, Knoxville, for Amicus Curiae, Tennessee Association of Legal Services.
Alan T. Fister, Jeffrey M. Beemer, Nashville, for Respondents.
Christina Norris, Nashville, for Amici Curiae, Tennessee Task Force Against Domestic Violence; Lawyers' Association For Women, Marion Griffin Chapter, and Tennessee Lawyers Association For Women.
This case comes to us on a certified question of law. 1 The petitioner, Mary Matthews, filed this action in the United States District Court against the respondents, Pickett County, Tennessee, Larry Peek, and Dana Dowdy. The district court held that the petitioner's negligence action was barred by the public duty doctrine, which shields public entities and public employees from tort liability for injuries caused by a breach of a duty owed to the public at large. The petitioner appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the following question for our resolution: "May the existence of an order of protection give rise to a 'special duty' to protect, and, if so, does the special duty extend to the protection of property?" We accept certification and hold under the facts of this case that the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine is applicable. Accordingly, the respondents may be held liable for the petitioner's damages under the Governmental Tort Liability Act ("GTLA"), Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-201 et seq. 2
In October of 1993, Ms. Matthews was assaulted, beaten, and sexually violated by her estranged husband, Bill Winningham. She sought and received an order of protection prohibiting Winningham "from coming about the petitioner for any purpose and specifically from abusing, threatening to abuse the petitioner, or committing any acts of violence upon the petitioner." The order further provided that Winningham "shall be arrested by a law enforcement officer without a warrant if that officer has reasonable cause to believe that [Winningham] has violated or is violating this Order."
On November 18, 1993, the eve of the hearing on their pending divorce, Winningham threatened to kill Ms. Matthews and attempted to break into her home. Ms Matthews telephoned the sheriff's department at approximately 9:30 p.m., 10:00 p.m., and 10:30 p.m. On each occasion, the sheriff's department informed Ms. Matthews that they would send someone. During this time, Winningham set off firecrackers under Ms. Matthews' propane tank. Ms. Matthews made no more telephone calls after 10:30 p.m. as Winningham had severed the petitioner's telephone line.
The respondent deputies, Peek and Dowdy, arrived at Ms. Matthews' house at approximately 11:50 p.m. They spoke to Winningham but did not arrest him. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-611 authorized a warrantless arrest of Winningham under these circumstances, but one of the deputies testified that he did not believe he could have arrested Winningham without a warrant. The other deputy testified that there was no probable cause for an arrest because no act of violence was committed in the deputies' presence.
The deputies took Ms. Matthews to the courthouse so that she could swear out a warrant for Winningham's arrest. The deputies were then informed that a warrant was unnecessary. The deputies and Ms. Matthews returned to her house and found that her automobile had been riddled with bullet holes while they were at the courthouse. The deputies then escorted Ms. Matthews out of the county. Deputy Peek's cousin, Mr. Mullins, was left behind to watch Ms. Matthews' house. He testified that Winningham returned to the petitioner's house with a large container and left a few minutes later without the container.
The deputies returned to pick up Mullins and observed Winningham leaving Ms. Matthews' home. Winningham was not stopped and questioned. The deputies did not examine the house at close range. They, however, did shine a spotlight on the home from the road. They testified that they did not notice anything unusual. Ms. Matthews' house burned to the ground after the deputies left.
The district court held that the respondents' actions were operational in nature and not subject to immunity under the GTLA. 3 The district court found that "despite [the] abundance of probable cause to arrest Mr. Winningham for violating the order of protection, the deputies failed to arrest [him]" and "went home and went to bed." We agree with the district court's holding. A negligent act or omission is operational in nature and not subject to immunity when the act or omission: (1) occurs in the absence of a formulated policy guiding the conduct or omission; or (2) when the conduct deviates from an established plan or policy. Chase v. City of Memphis, 971 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Tenn.1998). Both the order of protection in this case and Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-3-611 mandated that the deputies arrest Winningham upon "reasonable cause to believe that [Winningham] ha[d] violated the order of protection." The record supports a finding that the deputies' failure to arrest Winningham was a deviation from a policy as expressed by statutory mandate and was operational in nature. See generally Watts v. Robertson County, 849 S.W.2d 798 (Tenn.App.1992); Doe v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn.App.1992).
Having found that the GTLA did not provide immunity, the district court correctly looked next to the public duty doctrine defense. In Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394 (Tenn.1995), this Court held that the common law doctrine of public duty and its exception, the special duty doctrine, survived the enactment of the GTLA. The public duty doctrine provides immunity to public employees for injuries that are caused by a breach of a duty owed to the public at large. Id. at 397. The public duty doctrine, however, is only viable as a defense to liability when immunity has been removed under the GTLA. Chase, 971 S.W.2d at 385. Accordingly, neither the public duty doctrine nor the special duty exception expands the government's exposure to tort...
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