Matthews v. Port of New York Authority

• Citation: 394 A.2d 172,163 N.J.Super. 83
• Parties: Antoinette MATTHEWS, Plaintiff, v. PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 26 September 1978
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 83

163 N.J.Super. 83

394 A.2d 172

Antoinette MATTHEWS, Plaintiff, v. PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division.

Sept. 26, 1978.

Albert A. Sann, Jersey City, for plaintiff.

Herbert Ouida, Jersey City, for defendant (Francis A. Mulhern, Jersey City, attorney).

BILDER, J. S. C.

This is a motion by defendant Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) to dismiss a personal injury action on the ground plaintiff has failed to commence the action within one year from the accrual of the cause of action, as required by N.J.S.A. 32:1-163.

Plaintiff alleges she was injured on August 3, 1976 when she fell on an escalator located in a Port Authority facility the Journal Square PATH station. Suit was instituted on July 7, 1978, almost two years after the accident.

N.J.S.A. 32:1-163 provides as follows:

The foregoing consent is granted upon the condition that any suit, action or proceeding prosecuted or maintained under this act shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action therefor shall have accrued, and upon the further condition that in the case of any suit, action or proceeding for the recovery or payment of money, prosecuted or maintained under this act, a notice of claim shall have been served upon the Port Authority by or on behalf of the plaintiff or plaintiffs at least sixty days before such suit, action or proceeding is commenced. The provisions of this section shall not apply to claims arising out of provisions of any workmen's compensation law of either State.

By this statute New York and New Jersey have, within the limits set forth, waived the sovereign immunity with which the Port Authority would otherwise be cloaked. As an act in derogation of the common law, these requirements must be strictly construed as conditions precedent to the bringing of suit. See Wood v. Dic/Underhill, 136 N.J.Super. 249, 252, 345 A.2d 382 (Law Div.1975) aff'd O. b. 144 N.J.Super. 364, 365 A.2d 723 (App.Div.1976), certif. den. 73 N.J. 65, 372 A.2d 330 (1977). Unlike a statute of limitations, the requirements are jurisdictional. See Pinckney v. Jersey City, 140 N.J.Super. 96, 100-103, 355 A.2d 214 (Law Div.1976).

The action in the instant case accrued at the time of the accident August 3, 1976. Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 65, 77 A.2d 240 (1950). Plaintiff's failure to commence the action within the time limitations of the legislatively mandated condition would act as a bar to the action.

Plaintiff admits that the suit was not instituted within one year after the accrual of the cause of action but contends that her infancy saves the claim by virtue of the provisions of N.J.S.A. 32:1-164.

N.J.S.A. 32:1-164 insofar as relevant reads as follows:

" * * * Where the claimant is an infant or is mentally or physically incapacitated and by reason of such disability no notice of claim is filed or suit, action or proceeding commenced within the time specified in section seven hereof (N.J.S.A. 32:1-163) * * * then any court in which such suit, action or proceeding may be brought may in its discretion grant leave to serve the notice of claim and to commence the suit, action or proceeding within a reasonable time but in any event within three years after the cause of action accrued. Application for such leave...