Matthews v. Skinker

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
• Writing for the Court: WAGNER
• Citation: 62 Mo. 329
• Parties: ELIZABETH A. MATTHEWS, Defendant in Error, v. THOMAS K. SKINKER, et al., Plaintiffs in Error.
• Decision Date: 31 January 1876

62 Mo. 329

ELIZABETH A. MATTHEWS, Defendant in Error,
v.
THOMAS K. SKINKER, et al., Plaintiffs in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

January Term, 1876.

Error to St. Louis Circuit Court.

Britton A. Hill, for Plaintiffs in Error, cited Green's Brice's Ultra Vires 39, 40 and notes.

Noble & Orrick, for Defendant in Error cited 2 N. J., 623; 2 Cow., 419; Beaty vs. Knowles, 4 Pet., 152; 15 Ohio St. R., 85; 7 Ga., 221; McMaster vs. Reid, 1 Grant's Case Penn.,

[62 Mo. 330]

36; 15 Johns., 358; 2 Conn., 678; 5 Conn., 560; 2 Comst., 430; Wiley vs. First Nat. Bk. of Brattleboro, 47 Vt., 552; Am. Law Reg., June 1875, p. 342; Wickler vs. First Nat. Bk. of Hagerstown, Am. Law Reg. Oct. 1875, 616; 7 Mo., 585; 18 Wall., 588; Fowler vs. Scully, 72 Penn., 468.

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The error complained of in this case is the action of the court in rendering a perpetual injunction restraining the trustees from selling the plaintiff's property. From the record it appears that the plaintiff executed her note payable to Sterling Price & Co. for $15,000, due two years after date, and to secure payment of the note she made a deed of trust, bearing even date with the same, on certain real estate belonging to her. The note and deed of trust were delivered to Sterling Price & Co., who afterwards transferred them to the Union National Bank of St. Louis, a banking institution organized under the act of congress, to secure a loan for $15,000, advanced to Price & Co. by the bank. Price & Co. having failed to pay the money advanced on the note, and secured by the deed of trust, the trustee, at the request of the bank, advertised the property for sale, and the plaintiff filed her petition to enjoin the trustee and the bank from proceeding with the sale. Whether the deed of trust in the hands of the bank amounted to a valid security, which could be enforced in payment of the money advanced, depends upon the construction of the act of congress providing for the formation of national banking associations [Rev. St. U. S., p. 998]. By § 5136 of the Rev. St., authority is given to the banking associations “to exercise by its board of directors, or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking, by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of debt by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion, by loaning money on personal security,” &c. By § 5137 it is provided that: “A national banking association may purchase

[62 Mo. 331]

hold and convey real estate for the following purposes, and for no other. First, such as shall be necessary for its immediate accommodation in the transaction of its business. Second, such as shall be mortgaged to it in good faith by way of security for debts previously contracted. Third, such as shall be conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts previously contracted in the course of its dealings. Fourth, such as it shall purchase at sales under judgments, decrees or mortgages held by the association, or shall purchase to secure debts due to it.”

The act, as will be thus seen, gives the association power to loan money on personal security, and to purchase, hold and convey real estate in certain specified cases.

The general principles defining the extent and mode of exercise of corporate powers are well settled and have often been passed upon by this court. Corporations have only such powers as are specially given by their charters, or are necessary to carry into effect some specified power. (St. Louis vs. Russell, 9 Mo., 507; Blair vs. Perpetual Ins. Co., 10 Mo., 559; Ruggles vs. Collier, 43 Mo., 353.) They must act strictly within the scope of the powers conferred on them by the act calling them into being; and where a grant of power from the legislature is relied on, the mode prescribed in that grant for doing any particular thing must be pursued according to the law creating them. (Han. & St. Joe R. R. Co. vs. Marion Co., 36 Mo., 294.) The distinction between natural persons and corporations is, that...