Matthews v. Wash. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 21 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:15-CV-05795-BHS-JRC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
| Parties | BRIAN DAVID MATTHEWS, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants. |
This 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636 (b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Magistrate Judge Rules MJR 1, MJR 3, and MJR 4. Before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss. Dkt. 15.
Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at Stafford Creek Corrections Center ("SCCC") defendants returned his incoming mail to the sender. See Dkt. 11. Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to state a claim and move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dkt. 15.
The return of improperly addressed mail to the sender does not constitute a rejection of incoming mail that entitles plaintiff to procedural due process safeguards. Thus, the Courtrecommends granting defendants' motion but allowing plaintiff leave to amend his complaint with respect to his due process claim and any alleged facts supporting personal participation of the named defendants. The remainder of plaintiff's claims should be dismissed without leave to amend.
A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1990)). Mere conclusory statements in a complaint and "formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action" are not sufficient. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2012). "Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Ballistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
On a motion to dismiss, material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted and the complaint is to be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969), reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977). When a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations must be viewed under a less stringent standard than allegations of plaintiffs represented by counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519 (1972), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir.1985) (en banc) ().
While the court can liberally construe a plaintiff's complaint, it cannot supply an essential fact an inmate has failed to plead. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotingIvey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). The court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
When resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court may not consider materials outside the complaint and the pleadings. See Gumataotao v. Dir. of Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 236 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2001); Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989) (). The court may, however, consider materials properly submitted as part of the complaint, see Gumataotao, 236 F.3d at 1083; Cooper, 137 F.3d at 622-23, as well as "document[s] the authenticity of which [are] not contested, and upon which the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies," even if they are not attached to the complaint, Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1204 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010); Dent v. Cox Communications Las Vegas, Inc., 502 F.3d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2007); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001).
Because plaintiff's complaint relies on DOC Policies 450.100, see Dkt. 11, the Court will consider defendants' submission of these materials for purposes of ruling on this motion. Dkt. 8 at Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2 because it is a "document the authenticity of which is not contested, and upon which the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies," Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d at 706. The Court notes that while plaintiff stated in his response that he had not been provided with acopy of DOC Policy 450.100 that was attached to defendants' motion, see Dkt. 17 at 2, he acknowledges that he received a copy of the policy on December 30, 2015. Dkt. 20 at 1.
This case was removed from Thurston County Superior Court on November 3, 2015. Dkt. 1. Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on December 8, 2015. Dkt. 15. Plaintiff filed a response, Dkt. 17, defendants filed a reply, Dkt. 18, and plaintiff filed a surreply, Dkt. 19, Dkt. 20. The Court notes that Dkt. 20 appears to be a duplicate of Dkt. 19, but that the text is easier to read in Dkt. 20. Thus the Court will refer to Dkt. 20 in this report and recommendation.
Plaintiff Brian David Matthews is a Washington state prisoner in the custody of the Department of Corrections ("DOC") and is currently housed at SCCC. Dkt. 11 at 2.
According to plaintiff's complaint, on August 23, 2012, April 12, 2013, May 31, 2013, March 13, 2015, and August 6, 2015, unidentified SCCC mailroom personnel, defendants John Does, opened and returned to sender mail that was addressed to plaintiff. Dkt. 11 at 6-7. Plaintiff alleges that he was never issued a rejection notice or other notification related to the returned mail. Id. at 7. Plaintiff alleges that the mail was not marked or identified as "legal mail." Id. Plaintiff alleges that the returned mail had a sticker or stamp affixed to the envelope which stated that the mail was returned to the sender for not having a DOC inmate number on the envelope. Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges that the mail received on August 6, 2015 contained his DOC inmate number but that the DOC inmate number was listed as part of the street address and was not clearly labeled. Id. at 25.
Plaintiff alleges that on September 21, 2012, he filed a formal complaint with defendant Glebe regarding the lack of notification of withholding mail. Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges thatdefendant Glebe refused to take action. Id. Plaintiff alleges that on October 10, 2012 and June 18, 2013, plaintiff complained to defendant Warner, who also refused to take action. Id.
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, an order enjoining defendants from any further violations, an order compelling defendants to issue written notice of withholding delivery of incoming prisoner mail, punitive damages, compensatory damages, nominal damages, and statutory attorney's fees. Dkt. 11 at 16-17.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, at least two elements must be met: (1) the defendant must be a person acting under color of state law and (2) his conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). A third element of causation is implicit in the second element. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. Of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1977); Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1390-91 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980).
Defendants do not contend that plaintiff has failed to allege that defendants were acting under color of state law at the time of the alleged incident. See Dkt. 15. Thus, the Court proceeds to consider whether plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that defendants have deprived plaintiff of his constitutional rights.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that defendants do not directly address plaintiff's First Amendment claim in their motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 15. In their reply, defendants contend that plaintiff's First Amendment claim and his claim that defendants have a pattern andpractice of violating freedom of speech, Dkt. 11 at 10-13, is captured by defendants' response to plaintiff's due process claim.
The Court agrees and finds that plaintiff has not pled any facts showing that his speech or freedom of expression was restricted in any way. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 417-19 (1974); Krug v. Lutz, 329 F.3d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, the Court discusses plaintiff's allegations of First Amendment violations in relation to his due process claim.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his due process rights when his five pieces of incoming mail were returned to the sender and plaintiff did not receive a mail rejection notice. Dkt. 11 at 9-10. Defendants argue that plaintiff's claim fails because his mail was not rejected, but instead, it was returned to the sender and plaintiff was not prevented from receiving the mail. Dkt. 15 at 5-6.
"It is well-established that '[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.'" Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)). "Under Sandin, a prisoner possesses a liberty interest under the federal constitution when a change occurs in confinement that imposes an 'atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to...
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