Matthews v. Zane

• Decision Date: 01 March 1822
• Citation: 20 U.S. 164,7 Wheat. 164,5 L.Ed. 425
• Parties: MATTHEWS v. ZANE and Others
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

20 U.S. 164

5 L.Ed. 425

7 Wheat. 164

MATTHEWS v. ZANE and Others.

March 1, 1822

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio, being the highest Court of equity of that State, under the 25th sec. of the judiciary act of 1789, c. 20.

The bill filed by the plaintiff, Matthews, in the State Court, was brought for the purpose of obtaining from the defendants, Zane and others, a conveyance of a tract of land to which the plaintiff alleged that he had the equitable title, under an entry, prior to that on which a grant had been issued to the defendants. The validity of his entry descended on the construction of the act of Congress of May 19th, 1800, c. 209., the 6th section of the act of March 3d, 1803, c. 343., and the act of the 26th of March, 1804, c. 388., all relating to the sale of the public lands in the territory northwest of the river Ohio. The case stated, that on the 7th of February, 1814, the plaintiff applied to the Register of the Marietta District, and communicated to him his desire to purchase the land in controversy. The office of Receiver being then vacant, no money was paid, and no entry was made; but the Register took a note or memorandum of the application. On the 12th of May, 1804, soon after the Receiver had entered on the duties of his office, the plaintiff paid the sum of money required by law, and made an entry for the land in controversy, with the Register of the Marietta District. In pursuance of the 12th section of the act of the 26th of March, 1804, c. 388., and of instructions from the secretary of the treasury, the sale of the lands in the District of Zanesville, (which had been formed out of the Marietta District, and included the land in controversy,) commenced on the 3d Monday of May, 1804, and on the 21th of that month the defendants became the purchasers of the same land. There were several charges of fraud in the bill, and a contract between the parties was alleged; but as the opinion of this Court turned exclusively on the title of the parties under the act of Congress, it is deemed unnecessary to state these circumstances. The State Court having determined against the validity of the plaintiff's title under the act of Congress, and dismissed his bill, the cause was brought by appeal to this Court.

Feb. 20th.

Mr. Doddridge, for the appellant, stated, that the cause depended upon the construction of three acts of Congress, which he insisted had been misconstrued by the State Court. The first of these acts, that of May 10th, 1800, c. 209, established the present system of selling the public lands in Districts, and by that statute the land in controversy was within the Marietta District. The 6th section of the act of the 3d of March, 1803, c. 343., created an additional District, and provided that the lands within it should be offered for sale, at Zanesville, under the direction of a register and receiver, to be appointed for that purpose, who should reside at that place. The 12th section of the act of the 26th of March, 1804, c. 388. directs the lands in the District of Zanesville to be offered for public sale on the third Monday of May in that year.

On the first view of the case, difficulties present themselves, on the side of the appellant, in the authority of previous decisions, and especially a decision of this Court, between the same parties.^a But that decision resulted from an incorrect and imperfect statement of facts in the former case. Circumstances which are now disclosed did not appear in that case. Upon the present record the following points will be insisted on:

1. That even by a strict technical construction of

^a Matthews v. Zane, 5 Cranch, 92.

the statutes in question, the power of sale did not cease at Marieita, until after the 12th of May, 804, the date of the plaintiffs' purchase. (2.) That such was the practical construction given to those laws by executive officers, which ought in the present case to be conclusive, because it fulfils every object of the law, preserves the private rights of individuals, and if set aside by a mere technical objection, would open a door for the most extensive litigation and disturbance of titles acquired under the land laws of the United States. (3.) That supposing the act of March 30, 1803, had in express terms, or by necessary and inevitable implication, taken away the power of sale at Marietta, yet it could not begin to have that effect, until duly promulgated at that place, it not having in fact been transmitted to the officers at Marietta, until after the plaintiff's entry.

The land laws must certainly be considered as forming a part of the contract between the Government, and each individual who wishes to become a purchaser of the public domain. If contracts between the public and individuals are to be considered in the same light as contracts between individuals, then the principle applies that a bona fide and innocent purchaser, from an agent who has not received due notice that his authority is superceded, shall not be injured by the negligence of the principal, in not giving notice.^b The rules of interpretation applicable to the present case, are laid down by the elementary

^b 4 Hall's Laws Journal, 16. 2 Dall. 320.

writers on the construction of statutes, and will be found in the common abridgments of the law.^c All these rules necessarily resolve themselves into the intention of the law maker, which is sometimes to be collected from the cause or necessity of making the statute, and at other times from other circumstances of equal weight.^d Sir William Jones has asserted the true principles on this subject.^e 'Such is the imperfection of human language,' says he, 'that few written laws are free from ambiguity; and it rarely happens that many minds are united in the same interpretation of them.' And then, after relating an anecdote of Lord Coke, adds: 'I will here only set down a few rules of interpretation, which the wisdom of ages has established, when the sense of the words is at all ambiguous—1st. The intention of the writer must be sought, and prevail over the literal sense of terms; but penal laws must be strictly expounded against offenders, and liberally against the offense.

'2. All clauses, preceding or subsequent, must be taken together to explain any one doubtful clause.

'3. When a case is expressed to remove any doubt whether it was included or not, the extent of the clause, with regard to cases not so expressed, is by no means restrained.

'4. The conclusion of a phrase is not confined to

^c 6 Bac. Abr. tit. Statute. (I.)(C.)

^d Vere v. Thonipson, Hardr. 208.

^eLd. Teignmouth's Life of Sir W. Jones, 267 the words immediately preceding, but usually extended to the whole antecedent phrase.

'These are copious maxims, and, with half a dozen more, are the stars by which we steer, in the construction of all public and private writings.'^f

So, also, this Court has laid it down as 'a well established principle in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be considered, and the intention of the legislature to be extracted from the whole. It is also true, that when great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoided, unless the meaning of the legislature be plain, in which case it must be obeyed.'^g

1. In enforcing the construction we contend for, the further considerations which present themselves under the first point are That all the land laws passed previous to the act of May 10th, 1800, merged in that act; and by it, the system of selling the public lands in districts, through agents called registers and receivers, was settled: so that at the passage of the act of March 3, 1803, that system, in all its relations, was the law; and to all the provisions of the act of May 10th, 1800, and the rights established thereby, that of March 3, 1803, expressly refers, and for its operative capacity necessarily depends.

The whole system is laid in two important objects—public policy, and the rights of the community generally and individually; both terminating in

^f Letter to J. Macpherson, Esq. Governor-General of Bengal, Sir W. Jones' Life, 267.

^g U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 286 the sale of the public lands. The public policy is two-fold—first, revenue; second, national growth and prosperity, by the extension of population and improvement. The right of every individual is, to appropriate to himself any tract of land within the provisions of the system. Words are not necessary to show the importance of the public policy in both its branches; and the interest felt by the community, in the right to appropriate, is of equal extent, and as strong—as distinctly marked, too, as the policy itself; and, though a right peculiar to the American people, is, nevertheless, a general right; requiring, indeed, to be regulated by law; but none will say that the government might, or could wholly repress its exercise, any more than wholly to repress the exercise of the general right to carry on trade and commerce.

The second branch of the public policy—also the right to acquire and improve new lands—did not commence with the land laws of the United States; both existed under, and the latter was exercised through, the regulations of colonial and State government, are coeval with the settlement of America; and when the same policy and right fell within the jurisdiction of the national government, laws were immediately passed to regulate them, and have been continued from time to time, until they all merged in the act of May 10th, 1800; so that the right of every individual in the community to purchase and settle any part of the lands within the provisions of that act, may emphatically be called an existing right.

The first branch of the public policy, revenue, engaged the attention of the national government immediately after the termination of the revolutionary war, and has been pursued by it ever since, with an undeviating aim; and it may be here observed, that one...