Matthis v. Kennedy

• Decision Date: 26 November 1954
• Docket Number: No. 36370,36370
• Citation: 243 Minn. 219,67 N.W.2d 413
• Parties: Gusta MATTHIS, also known as Gusta L. Matthies, Appellant, v. Alois D. KENNEDY, Jr., Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 413

67 N.W.2d 413

243 Minn. 219

Gusta MATTHIS, also known as Gusta L. Matthies, Appellant, v. Alois D. KENNEDY, Jr., Respondent.

No. 36370.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 26, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Defamatory matter published in the course of a judicial proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction by a party or his attorney is absolutely privileged if it is related to the subject matter of the proceeding.

2. The basis of the rule is that public policy requires that parties and their attorneys be free to defend their causes in court in the furtherance of justice and the public welfare without fear of being subjected to suits for slander or libel.

3. The test is not whether the defamatory matter was legally relevant but whether it had some relation to the subject matter of the judicial proceeding. Any doubt on this issue should be resolved in favor of the party claiming the privilege and refined distinctions will not be permitted to defeat the claim of privilege.

4. Defamatory matter spoken by a general guardian acting as his own attorney in the course of a proceeding in the probate court to settle and allow the final account of the preceding guardian is spoken in the course of a judicial proceeding.

5. Where a general guardian was acting as his own attorney in opposing the final account of the preceding guardian (who had been removed by court order and who claimed to be married to the word and entitled to support and maintenance money as his wife, which claim was denied by the general guardian) and the general guardian spoke certain allegedly defamatory words, which in effect said that preceding guardian had been living in adultery, Held that such words were sufficiently connected with and related to the subject matter of the inquiry as to be, as a matter of law, relevant and pertinent, thereby invoking the protection of the rule of absolute privilege, even though the words uttered imputed the violation of a criminal statute.

Harry W. Oehler, St. Paul, for appellant.

Meier, Kennedy & Quinn, St. Paul, for respondent.

E. W. Murnane, R. M. Carlson, R. E. Kyle, St. Paul, for amicus curiae, Ramsey County Bar Ass'n.

NELSON, Justice.

This is an action in defamation for alleged slander brought in the district court of Ramsey county. On the day the complaint was filed defendant moved the court for a summary judgment on the ground that as a matter of law there was no basis for the action, asserting the defense of absolute privilege. The district court held, as a matter of law, that the remarks were absolutely privileged and ordered that a summary judgment be entered in defendant's favor. The plaintiff moved the court for an order amending the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and this motion was denied. She renewed the motion, and it was again denied. A summary judgment was entered in favor of the defendant and plaintiff appeals from the judgment.

While the record is meager, the facts set forth on appeal appear to be as follows: On or about July 30, 1951, the plaintiff was appointed the general guardian of Fred J. Matthies, an incompetent, by the probate court of Ramsey county. The sisters of the ward petitioned the probate court to remove plaintiff as guardian on the ground that she was unsuitable, and an order removing her as guardian was entered March 6, 1952. The plaintiff was ordered to render her final account following the appointment of defendant, an attorney at law in the city of St. Paul, as her successor.

Plaintiff submitted her final account. At the hearing before the court defendant made and entered certain objections to it. The hearing was continued to July 2, 1952, when plaintiff petitioned the probate court to consider and re-examine certain matters set forth by the petition and to make appropriate orders based upon the equities enjoyed by her, namely, that she was entitled to certain adjustments in the final account principally consisting of charges for maintenance and support money. This hearing was again continued, and when it was resumed on July 8, 1952, and while in progress, the alleged slanderous words were uttered by the defendant. Defendant, who was at the time the general guardian of the ward, appeared at the hearing as his own counsel. According to paragraph IV of the complaint, plaintiff was at the time seeking a declaration that she was legally married to Mr. Matthies and therefore entitled to support money as his lawful wife, among other adjustments requested by her. Her attorney, Mr. Oehler, was speaking as follows:

'By Mr. Oehler: (Attorney for Plaintiff) Yes, I think possibly the accounting has not been up to the required standard, but some tolerance could be accorded to a woman who has been the wife--she has been accused of being a--

'The Court: (Judge Devitt) Common law?

'By Mr. Oehler: (Attorney for Plaintiff) Well, even a common law wife. And they were married--

'By Mr. Kennedy: (Defendant) The word is adulteress.'

The complaint alleges that plaintiff and Fred J. Matthies are husband and wife; that they were married on December 22, 1941, at Blair, Nebraska; and that they have resided and cohabited in St. Paul, Minnesota, as husband and wife, since their marriage. In the answer defendant denies that plaintiff is the legal wife of Fred J. Matthies and alleges that Mr. Matthies has a former wife still living, that that marriage was never dissolved, and that, therefore, the marriage referred to in the complaint is null and void.

Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that he was absolutely privileged to speak the words in issue, because, the words spoken were not relevant and pertinent to the issues before the court.

Defendant contends that the alleged slanderous words were relevant and pertinent to the matter before the court for the reason that the issues of the alleged marriage to the ward and the right to maintenance and support money from his estate were before the court for determination in a judicial proceeding at the time.

The record indicates that, at the time the alleged slanderous words were spoken, the probate court was faced with the question of whether plaintiff, the former guardian of Fred J. Matthies, was entitled to have her final account adjudged in the light of her claim that she was married to the ward and his legal wife as alleged in her complaint. Since she had made a specific request for such consideration in the proceeding before the probate court, the question of the validity of her alleged marriage to the ward was, we believe, incidentally involved in the hearing as an important issue in the adjustment of the final account. No question can arise as to the jurisdiction of probate courts in this state over persons under guardianship for this is controlled by Minn.Const. art. 6, § 7, M.S.A., and the legislature has said that for all matters over which it has jurisdiction it is a court of record. See, M.S.A. § 525.01.

We then come to the question: Were the alleged slanderous words, spoken by defendant while acting as a court-appointed guardian and as his own lawyer at a hearing in a court of record having jurisdiction of the guardianship proceeding, absolutely privileged so that no action for slander can be based thereon? Were the alleged slanderous words, when spoken at a proceeding where the issue of whether or not the appellant was the legal wife of the ward was before the probate court as one of the issues determinative of the right to receive maintenance and support money, relevant and pertinent to the issues presented and thus absolutely privileged?

We are concerned here with the law of defamation, the fundamental basis of which is that one is liable for an unprivileged communication or publication of false and defamatory matter which injures the reputation of another. Privileged defamatory matter is divided into two general classes: (1) That which is absolutely privileged, and (2) that which is qualifiedly and conditionally privileged. Absolute privilege means that immunity is given even for intentionally false statements, coupled with malice, while a qualified or conditional privilege grants immunity only if the privilege is not abused and defamatory statements are publicized in good faith and without malice.

A privileged communication has been defined generally in 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 87a, as follows:

'Privilege is a recognized defense to a civil action for libel or slander, but in order to be shielded from liability for the publication of defamatory words on this ground, the communication must be a privileged one uttered on a privileged occasion by a privileged person to one within the privilege.'

The doctrine of privileged communication rests in that of public policy. It is peculiarly so in the case of absolute privilege, for in the case of a communication recognized as absolutely privileged even the presence of express malice does not destroy the privilege. The absolute privilege rule is confined within narrow limits, and the courts of this country as a rule have steadily refused to enlarge those limits confining the cases to situations in which the public service or the administration of justice requires complete immunity from being called to account for language used. It has been clearly expressed by the authorities that it is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the service as it is for the promotion of the public welfare. It is therefore the occasion on which the communication of the defamatory words was made which determines the privilege. The recognized class of occasions where the publication of defamatory matter is absolutely privileged is confined within narrow limits, and the courts have held that whoever asserts the right to take advantage of the privileged occasion or instance must, in character, appear as party or pleader. Any publication made, whether oral or in...