Mattis v. Schnarr

• Citation: 502 F.2d 588
• Decision Date: 08 October 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-1511,73-1511
• Parties: Robert Dean MATTIS, M.D., Appellant, v. Patrolman Richard R. SCHNARR et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 588

502 F.2d 588

Robert Dean MATTIS, M.D., Appellant, v. Patrolman Richard R. SCHNARR et al., Appellees.

No. 73-1511.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 16, 1973.

Decided Aug. 23, 1974, Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Denied Oct. 8, 1974.

Eugene H. Buder, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.

Eugene K. Buckley, and F. Douglas O'Leary, St. Louis, Mo., for appellees.

Before GIBSON, LAY and HEANEY, Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff appeals an order entered in this civil rights action by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denying his prayer for damages ¹ and declaratory judgment.

The case was tried below upon stipulated facts. The plaintiff's minor son, Michael, age eighteen, was shot and killed by defendant Marek, a police officer, while attempting to escape arrest. Michael and another youth, Thomas Rolf, age seventeen, had entered the office of a golf driving range at night for the purpose of taking money by opening an unlocked window. Marek and another officer attempted to arrest the two youths who ran in different directions. Marek ran into Mattis, Mattis broke away and Marek pursued. Marek was losing the race and shouted, 'Stop or I'll shoot.' Mattis failed to stop and Marek fired one shot (he believed he fired well above Mattis) which struck Mattis in the head. Marek and the other officer would:

* * * testify that their use of their guns in the manner described was reasonably necessary under the circumstances and was authorized by the statutes of the State of Missouri and that such statutes were valid and lawful.

Mattis v. Kissling, et al., Civil No. 72-Civ. (3) (E.D.Mo., filed January 16, 1973).

The trial court initially held that the plaintiff had standing to bring this action under Title 42 U.S.C. 1983. It reasoned that the section did not create a new cause of action in favor of a person for the wrongful death of another, but that 1988 of the same title authorizes resort to state law to determine whether a cause of action survives for the wrongful death of another. Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961). It further reasoned that since Missouri law (V.A.M.S. 537.080) permits a father to bring a wrongful death action for the death of an unmarried minor son, ² the father had standing to bring this action. ³ The court went on to hold, however, that the defense of good faith was available to the defendants as they had acted in reliance on Missouri statutes ⁴ which permit a law enforcement official to use deadly force in apprehending a person who has committed a felony. The court reasoned that the defense of good faith was available even if the statute was unconstitutional as the defendants had acted on the reasonable belief that it was constitutional. It concluded that no justiciable issue was present which permitted declaratory relief.

The plaintiff then moved for a new trial and entry of a new judgment. The trial court modified its position with respect to the plaintiff's standing in its order denying that motion. It stated:

Plaintiffs * * * claim for the wrongful death of Michael C. Mattis is derivative. None of their own civil rights are alleged to have been violated. 'While a party may vindicate his own constitutional rights, he may not seek vindication for rights of others.'

The trial court also advanced an alternative reason for denying relief:

* * * Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and not injunctive relief. Only a three-judge court could enjoin the enforcement of a state law. 28 U.S.C. 2281. It seems to this court particularly inappropriate to be asked to make a declaration that a statute is unconstitutional, without the power to enforce that holding and without that holding having any binding effect upon any other court. Plaintiffs presumably could have asked for injunctive relief and sought a three-judge court for that purpose, but they did not elect to do so. 'In light of this fundamental conception of the Framers as to the proper place of the Federal courts in the governmental process of passing and enforcing laws, it can seldom be appropriate for these courts to exercise any such power of prior approval or veto over the legislative process.' Younger v. Harris, (401 U.S. 37) at 53, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1970).

We agree with the trial court's initial conclusions that the plaintiff had standing, and that the defenses of good faith and probable cause were available to the officers insofar as the action for damages was concerned. We cannot agree, however, that good faith is a defense to the action insofar as declaratory relief is concerned. Nor can we agree with declaratory relief is otherwise inappropriate. ⁵

The plaintiff's right to declaratory relief is not dependent upon a showing that he is entitled to injunctive or monetary relief. $07* * * Where there is * * * a concrete case admitting of an immediate and definite determination of the legal rights of the parties in an adversary proceeding upon the facts alleged, the judicial function may be appropriately exercised although the adjudication of the rights of the litigants may not require the award of process or the payment of damages. * * * And as it is not essential to the exercise of the judicial power that an injunction be sought, allegations that irreparable injury is threatened are not required.

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937).

Declaratory and injunctive relief, while similar in some respects, are distinct remedies. One testing the constitutionality of a state statute in federal court may ask for declaratory relief only. He need not ask for injunctive relief; and if he does not do so, a single judge can hear the case and give declaratory relief as appropriate.

In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517-518, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1962, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), the Supreme Court stated:

We need express no opinion about the appropriateness of coercive relief (mandamus or injunction) in this case, for petitioners sought a declaratory judgment, a form of relief the District Court could have issued. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201, provides that a district court may 'declare the rights . . . of any interested party . . . whether or not further relief is or could be sought.' The availability of declaratory relief depends on whether there is a live dispute between the parties * * * and a request for declaratory relief may be considered independently of whether other forms of relief are appropriate. * * *

See also, Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 94 S.Ct. 1694, 40 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974); Mitchell v. Conovan, 398 U.S. 427, 90 S.Ct. 1763, 26 L.Ed.2d 378 (1970); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 544, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947).

Moreover, the defense of good faith is only what its name implies. It is a defense which shields a public official from being required to respond in damages. ⁶ It is intended to avoid penalizing an official who acts in the good faith belief that he is acting in accordance with a valid law. The defense cannot be permitted to serve as a reason for denying equitable ⁷ or declaratory relief ⁸ in appropriate situations.

We also find unpersuasive the trial court's other alternative ground for dismissing the case. A declaratory judgment would not, as the trial court suggests, be totally ineffectual. Such a judgment has '* * * the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and is (reviewable as such) * * *.' 28 U.S.C. 2201. The judgment is res judicata and the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 2771. The judgment is precedential as to the matters declared by it. Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 782, 785 (1950). Most importantly, if the statute is declared unconstitutional, a defense based on a good faith belief of the statute's validity would no longer be available.

Moreover, no considerations of comity, federalism or abstention justifying the court in refusing to proceed are present here. Compare, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971).

The critical issue then is whether the plaintiff had standing. We believe the trial court's initial views on this matter were the correct ones. There are two aspects to this question: (1) the party seeking relief must show that he is sufficiently affected by the action he is challenging to justify consideration by the court of the validity of the action; and (2) the action violates the rights of the particular party who is attacking it and not of some third party. Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 Yale L.J. 599, 599-600 (1962).

We believe the plaintiff showed that he would be sufficiently affected by the killing of his son to justify the courts considering the matter. The Missouri Wrongful Death Act (V.A.M.S. 537.080) creates a vested right in the plaintiff to bring suit for the death of his minor son. Spencer v. Bradley,351 S.W.2d 202, 207 (Mo.1961). The right of action is not derivative. The Missouri Supreme Court has said:

It is now (well) settled that the causes of action provided by these statutes are not either derivative, transmissible, or survival causes of action, but are new causes of action springing into being and accruing on and by reason of the death of the party injured in favor of the persons named in the statute.

Jordan v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., 335 Mo. 319, 73 S.W.2d 205, 211 (1934).

Further, the Missouri Supreme Court has declared:

* * * The true ground of recovery by a parent in such cases arises from the reciprocal duty of the child to render to its parent such services or earnings as the latter may reasonably expect of it. * * *

We hold that the right of a parent to a minor's services is in the nature of a personal right arising out...