Mattson v. Abate
| Decision Date | 16 February 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 40619,40619 |
| Citation | 279 Minn. 287,156 N.W.2d 738 |
| Parties | Jacob M. MATTSON, by his General Guardian, Anna Mattson, Respondent, v. Thomas ABATE, dba Tab Construction Co., et al., Relators. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Where the Industrial Commission had approved a stipulation and made an award in a situation involving no issue of liability or disputed medical evidence, with reluctance and in reliance upon a mistaken medical conclusion that the employee was not permanently and totally disabled and the mistaken assumption of the business representative of the employee's labor union that he would be able to return to some kind of gainful employment, Held, the order of the Industrial Commission vacating its award and granting a rehearing was not an abuse of discretion.
Robb, Robb & Van Eps, Minneapolis, for relators.
Robins, Davis & Lyons, and Arnold Bellis, St. Paul, for respondent.
The issue for decision is whether the Industrial Commission abused its discretion in granting respondent employee's petition to vacate a settlement award and granting a rehearing. The facts of the case, somewhat abbreviated for the purpose of this opinion, are not in dispute. The employee, Jacob M. Mattson, was severely injured on February 13, 1958, while employed by relator Tab Construction Company. The employer's liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act is admitted. The nature of the employee's injury has never been disputed, although the present issue arises out of mistaken assumptions that the injury would be less disabling than it has proved to be.
The employee's injury occurred in a fall from scaffolding on a construction project. He sustained a severe compound, comminuted, and depressed skull fracture in the right parietal area, with cerebral concussion, considerable laceration of the brain substance, and marked tearing of the coverings of the brain. He was treated by Dr. R. L. Merrick, a neurosurgeon selected by relator, who performed immediate surgery. The lacerated brain tissue was debrided, the torn brain coverings were repaired, the skull fracture was reduced, and, at a later date, a metal plate was inserted over the skull defect. The employee's speech was adversely affected by the injury, and he underwent 2 months of special training at the St. Paul Rehabilitation Center, where he was under the care of Dr. W. H. Hollinshead.
A stipulation of settlement 1 was entered into between the parties on July 28, 1960, and was approved by the Industrial Commission on September 9, 1960. The commission's approval was undoubtedly influenced by two opinions then before it. First, Dr. Merrick had reported on July 5, 1960, the result of his most recent examination of the employee on June 23, 1960, at which time he concluded:
(Italics supplied.) 2
Second, Victor Lapakko, secretary and business representative of the Building Laborers & Hod Carriers union Local No. 132, the labor union of which the employee was a member, expressed his opinion that the employee would shortly be able to get employment in the industry in which he had been employed. This opinion appears to have been based on Dr. Merrick's stated prognosis. The approval of the settlement by the Industrial Commission was, as it stated in an accompanying memorandum, influenced by the vocational outlook expressed by Lapakko:
(Italics supplied.)
The vocational and medical expectations proved unduly optimistic. Although placed in an employment situation in September 1960, the employee was unable to perform his duties. He attempted to perform other work also, but was unable to do so. Except for these brief attempts, he has been continuously unemployed and unemployable. Dr. Merrick concluded in a report of November 4, 1964, that the employee 'is permanently and totally disabled.' 3
Petitioner filed his petition to vacate the award and for rehearing on August 8, 1966. The petition was granted on October 13, 1966, on the ground that 'the settlement was improvident and should not have been approved.' 4 The memorandum accompanying the order stated:
1. The commission has the statutory authority to set aside an award for cause, 5 including an award based upon stipulation of the parties. 6 The commission exercises discretion both in approving a settlement stipulation 7 and in subsequently determining whether an award based on the stipulation should be set aside. 8 The the facts of this case arguably do not clearly establish a Mutual mistake of fact in the strict sense of including relators, we think the record strongly suggests that all the parties did labor under the same mistaken assumptions of fact, if only because there was little reason for either party to submit the proposed settlement for the approval of the commission unless they expected that the employee would be returned to gainful employment. Elements basic statutory objective for which this discretion is invested is 'to assure a compensation proportionate to the degree and duration of disability.' Elsenpeter v. Potvin, 213 Minn. 129, 132, 5 N.W.2d 499, 501. Although the commission's discretion is not without limit, it is instinct with considerable latitude.
2. Relator's main point of contention is that the commission's stated ground for setting aside the award was that it was 'improvident,' and that mere improvidence is not 'cause' within the meaning of the statute. There is more to the instant case, however, than a mere after-the-fact determination that the employee would have received more money if he had not stipulated for settlement. Any award set aside on petition of the employee does, of course, have that element of improvidence in settling for inadequate compensation. There is more to the case, too, than the settling of a claim for less than the potential maximum as a compromise of contested issues, the resolution of which after hearing could be adverse to the employee.
We think that a finding of cause was implicit, if not expressed, in the commission's order and memorandum. This is plainly a case of a grave mistake based on mistaken assumptions of fact. Although of changed conditions, also cause for vacating an award, are perhaps present as well, even though they would relate to facts existent at the time the settlement was...
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...information. Minnesota appears to provide statutory machinery for setting aside a redemption agreement for cause. See Mattson v. Abate, 279 Minn. 287, 156 N.W.2d 738 (1968). I would recommend that the Legislature consider granting the bureau statutory authority to set aside a redemption agr......
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...of medical science? Larson & Larson, supra, § 131.05(2)(b). Professor Larson believes the sounder approach is that in Mattson v. Abate, 279 Minn. 287, 156 N.W.2d 738 (1968), a case in which the parties to the settlement had, on the basis of an erroneous medical opinion, anticipated that the......
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...of industrial accidents receive the protection they need. The sounder approach is that in the Minnesota case of Mattson v. Abate, (279 Minn. 287, 156 N.W.2d 738 (1968)) where the court did not hesitate to set aside a settlement based on the mistaken assumption by everyone on both sides that......