Matulis v. Gans

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HAINES, J.
• Citation: Matulis v. Gans, 107 Conn. 562, 141 A. 870 (Conn. 1928)
• Decision Date: 04 May 1928
• Parties: MATULIS v. GANS.

141 A. 870

107 Conn. 562

MATULIS v. GANS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 4, 1928

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Alfred C. Baldwin Judge.

Action by William Matulis against George Gans to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant's agent. Verdict and judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. No error.

Jacob Schwolsky, Herbert Older, and Harry Schwolsky, all of Hartford, for appellant.

Joseph F. Berry, David R. Woodhouse, and Cyril Coleman, all of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.

HAINES, J.

The plaintiff alleged that on the afternoon of December 20, 1925 while he was walking on Farmington avenue, New Britain, in the exercise of due care, one Inturisi negligently drove an automobile against him, causing him serious bodily injury; that Inturisi was at the time the agent and servant of the defendant, Gans, and acting within the scope of his agency and service. The defendant made a general denial, a jury found the issues for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed for claimed errors and omissions in the charge to the jury.

One of the important questions before the jury was whether Inturisi was the agent of the defendant, Gans, so that the latter would be legally responsible to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff offered evidence to prove, and claimed he had proved, that at the time of the accident the car belonged to the defendant and that Inturisi was driving it as the agent and servant of the defendant; and further, that immediately after the accident he stated at police headquarters that the defendant was the owner, and two days later repeated the statement under oath in a report to the motor vehicle commissioner. He further claimed to have proved that he was himself ignorant of the English language and had placed his claim for damages in the hands of a relative, Adolph Matulis, who met the defendant on the street after the return of the latter from Europe, and, after stating the plaintiff's claim, was told by the defendant that he would assume full responsibility and pay all claims for damages. The plaintiff further claimed to have proved that a bill of sale of the car, given in evidence and dated October 20, 1925, was not in fact drawn and executed until several days after this action was begun.

The defendant offered evidence to prove, and claimed he had proved, that the car was owned by him prior to October 20, 1925, and was registered in his name; that some days previous he had allowed Inturisi to take it to his own garage and to drive it to decide whether he wished to buy it, and on October 20th he sold the car to Inturisi, and on that date executed and delivered to him the conditional bill of sale in evidence, and received from Inturisi an initial payment and notes payable from time to time for the balance of the purchase price; that the registration certificate was not signed by the defendant because it was at Inturisi's house at the time, and thereafter, in order to save the registration fee for the balance of the year, Inturisi continued to drive the car under the old registration and was doing so at the time of the plaintiff's injury; that from and after October 20, 1925, the defendant had no further possession, control, or use of the car and on November 27, 1925, he went to Europe and did not return till January 29, 1926; and further that at the time of the accident, Inturisi was driving with two young ladies for his own and their convenience and pleasure and in no way acting on behalf of the defendant, who was then in Europe, and was not his agent or servant in any capacity.

The jury by a general verdict found all the issues for the defendant.

The appellant assigns as error the court's statement to the jury that a pedestrian traveling upon that portion of the highway used by vehicles should exercise a greater degree of care than is required of one traveling upon a sidewalk, and that, while it was not negligence as matter of law to walk upon such traveled part of the highway, it was a circumstance to be considered in determining the degree of care required under the existing conditions. This is a correct statement of the law, and its assignment as error is without merit. The standard of care is unvarying--that of the ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances surrounding him--but, as suggested by the court, the degree of care...