Matuscak v. Argentine Twp. Police Dep't

Docket Number22-12621
Decision Date21 June 2023
PartiesDAWN MICHELE MATUSCAK, Plaintiff, v. ARGENTINE TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS (ECF Nos. 24 26, 27)

F. Kay Behm United States District Judge

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Dawn Michele Matuscak, filed a civil rights complaint on November 1, 2022. (ECF No. 1). She amended her complaint as of right on February 14, 2023. (ECF No. 4). Defendants filed motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 16,18, 20). The court allowed Matuscak the opportunity to amend her complaint to address the arguments raised by Defendants and she did so, rendering those motions to dismiss moot. (ECF Nos. 21, 22, 23). Defendants renewed their motions to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (SAC). (ECF Nos. 24, 26, 27). Those motions are fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 34, 36, 36, 37, 38, 39). The court held a hearing on June 14, 2023 via video teleconference. This matter is now ready for decision.

For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS the Genesee County Sheriffs Department's motion to dismiss, GRANTS the Argentine Township Police Department's motion to dismiss, and DENIES Defendant Wilburn's motion to dismiss.

II. THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

On May 5, 2022, Matuscak was at home with her friend, Steven Franklin, having breakfast. (ECF No. 22, PagelD.124, ¶ 3). Argentine Township Police Officer Carlson knocked on the front door, responding to an alleged complaint made by Matuscak's estranged daughter, Caitlyn, and her friend, Taylor Longworth, who accused Matuscak of stealing her mail. Id. According to the SAC, Matuscak's estranged husband advised Caitlyn and Taylor to make this false report of mail theft, in order to strengthen his divorce case against her. Id. at ¶ 4. Matuscak told Carlson that she was not speaking to her daughter and did not have her or Taylor's mail. She also stated that her daughter's father, who had broken into her home several days earlier, took the mail. Id. at ¶ 5. While speaking with Carlson, Matuscak noticed her daughter was waiting out by Carlson's police vehicle. (ECF No. 22, Page ID 125, ¶ 6). Then, "Officer Carlson without provocation and without a warrant or any other order from a court forcefully crashed [through] the Plaintiff's front door shoving her into her home and physically assaulting the Plaintiff while yelling and screaming at her to submit to arrest." Id. at ¶ 7. The SAC also asserts that "[t]he entire wrongful arrest were (SIC) recorded by the Plaintiff's friend Steven Franklin on his mobile phone and is available for review." Id. at ¶ 8.

Allegedly, when Matuscak did not agree to be handcuffed by Officer Carlson, he tackled her to the floor, pulling her arms behind her back. Id. at ¶ 9. Matuscak claims Mr. Franklin can be heard on the video demanding that she be permitted to get dressed or tie her "lingerie," as she was not wearing any clothes underneath her robe. Id. at ¶ 10. The SAC alleges that as Matuscak rose from the floor, Carlson again "forcefully threw the Plaintiff to the floor," jumping on her and pinning her down while putting handcuffs on her. Id. Matuscak claims this arrest was a violation of her 4th Amendment rights. Id. at PagelD.125-126, ¶¶ 10-11.

Matuscak alleges that Officer Carlson was on notice that she was seminude and wearing no underwear. (ECF No. 22, Page ID.126, ¶ 13). According to the SAC, even after she was handcuffed, she was still not permitted to get fully dressed. Id. at PagelD.127, ¶ 14. The SAC suggests Matuscak was paraded by Carlson in front of her daughter and several of her neighbors came out and viewed the scene. Id. at ¶ 15. While being walked to Carlson's police car, Matuscak noticed City of Linden Police Officer Andrew Wilburn was present. Id. at ¶ 16. Matuscak alleges that Wilburn would have been able to hear her screaming and had a duty to inquire if Matuscak was a victim, but he failed to intervene. Id. According to the SAC, he failed to intervene because Wilburn used to work with Carlson at Argentine Township before working at the City of Linden and they went to school together. Id. at PagelD.127-128, ¶¶ 16,17. Matuscak alleges that Wilburn knew that Carlson's actions violated her rights, and he should have intervened. Id.

Matuscak was then transported to Genesee County Jail in the back of Officer Carlson's marked police vehicle, with her breasts and genitals exposed. (ECF No. 22, PagelD.128, ¶ 18). Matuscak alleges that Carlson and Wilburn had a duty to provide her the opportunity to obtain clothes, or at least assist her in tying her lingerie. Id. at ¶ 19. She states both officers "violated their respective duties so that they could see her semi-nude body despite knowing that she was humiliated." Id.

On arriving at the Genesee County Jail, Matuscak requested jail personnel allow her to change clothes or tie her robe, but they refused. (ECF No. 22, PagelD.129, ¶ 20). Genesee County Sheriff Corrections personnel pulled her out of the back of the police car and walked her into the jail "so that everyone there could see her semi-nude body." Id. at ¶ 21. Matuscak claims that parading her in this fashion in front of other inmates and failing to permit her to change clothes "was a violation of jail policy which is to protect inmates' rights and was a violation of the policy to admit inmates appropriately and provide a 'Constitutional, Secure and Humane Environment.'" Id. at 22. She alleges this was a violation of her 4th Amendment rights and the policies and procedures of the Genesee County Sheriff's Department, in violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986. Id.

Matuscak also alleges that jail personnel conducted a strip search in front of other inmates and staff, which was extremely humiliating and was done in violation of Sheriff's Department policies and procedures. (ECF No. 22, PagelD.129, ¶ 23). After her physical examination, Matuscak was allowed to change into jail clothes. Id. at PagelD.130 ¶ 24.

Matuscak then remained at Genesee County Jail for three days without being charged. She was not permitted to contact an attorney, make a phone call, or interview anyone to determine why she was there. (ECF No. 22, PagelD.130, ¶ 25). She argues that these actions by the Genesee County Sheriff's Department Corrections Division was a violation of her 4th Amendment rights. Id. Ultimately, Matuscak was released from Genesee County Jail, wearing only a pair of "old dirty jail pajama bottoms and the loose lingerie she was wearing at the time of her assault and wrongful arrest." Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. According to the SAC, after her arrest, the City of Argentine issued her a misdemeanor ticket for mail theft and resisting arrest, yet the ticket was dismissed at the first pretrial because the "case was baseless." Id. at ¶ 26.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving party]... [and] accept all well-pled factual allegations as true." League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 2003). The complaint must provide "'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Moreover, the complaint must "contain[ ] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009).

A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief, such as "when an affirmative defense ... appears on its face." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has "facial plausibility" when the nonmoving party pleads facts that "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [moving party] is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. However, a claim does not have "facial plausibility" when the "well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at 679. The factual allegations "must do more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to relief." League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 500 F.3d at 527. Showing entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In evaluating the allegations in the Complaint, the court must be mindful of its limited task when presented with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court does not consider whether the factual allegations are probably true; instead a court must accept the factual allegations as true, even when skeptical. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (a court must proceed "on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)"); id. at 556 ("[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable"); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) ("Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations"). Indeed,...

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