Matyascik v. Arctic Slope Native Ass'n
| Decision Date | 05 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:19-cv-0002-HRH,2:19-cv-0002-HRH |
| Parties | JASON MATYASCIK, Plaintiff, v. ARCTIC SLOPE NATIVE ASS'N, LTD., d/b/a SAMUEL SIMMONDS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's complaint.1 This motion is opposed.2 Oral argument was not requested and is not deemed necessary.
Plaintiff is Jason Matyascik. Defendant is Arctic Slope Native Association, Ltd., d/b/a Samuel Simmonds Memorial Hospital. Defendant is "the P.L. 93-638 regional health organization for the Arctic Slope Region of Alaska."3
Plaintiff alleges that "[o]n or about May 14, 2018," he "contracted with" defendant "to renew his employment contract" at defendant's "hospital as a physician."4 Plaintiff alleges that defendant "refused to honor the contract, terminating [his] employment without providing him" the three-month notice called for in the contract for early termination.5 Plaintiff also alleges that "[d]uring the 2017-2018 term of [his] employment, [defendant] promised to reimburse several unpaid sums to him, yet failed to fulfill those promises."6 Plaintiff also alleges that he rented housing from defendant and that defendant overcharged him rent, "ousted [him] from the property without providing him notice to quit[,]" and "failed to return [his] security deposit within the statutory timeframe set forth under AS 34.03.070."7 Plaintiff further alleges that "[f]ollowing the termination of [his] tenancy," defendant "converted his personal property in violation of AS 34.03.260."8 Finally, plaintiff alleges that after defendant terminated his contract, defendant "failed to provide notice of an election for COBRA . . . insurance and failed to assist [him] in obtaining COBRA insurance."9
Plaintiff commenced this action on April 1, 2019. In his complaint, plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: 1) breach of contract, 2) violation of Alaska's Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act, 3) conversion, 4) intentional violation of COBRA, and 5) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant now moves to dismiss plaintiff's claims, arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because it is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity and because plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
"'[T]he issue of tribal sovereign immunity is [quasi-]jurisdictional.'" Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pan Am. Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1989)). "Although sovereign immunity is only quasi-jurisdictional in nature, Rule 12(b)(1) is still a proper vehicle for invoking sovereign immunity from suit." Id. at 1111. "In the context of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity, 'the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving its existence,' i.e. that immunity does not bar the suit." Id. (quoting Miller v. Wright, 705 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2013)). "When a district court is presented with a challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction, '[n]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to [a] plaintiff's allegations.'" Id. (quoting Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009)). "In resolving such a motion, '[a] district court may hear evidence regardingjurisdiction and resolv[e] factual disputes where necessary.'" Id. (quoting Robinson, 586 F.3d at 685).
"Tribal sovereign immunity not only protects tribes themselves, but also extends to arms of the tribe acting on behalf of the tribe." White v. Univ. of Calif., 765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014). Defendant argues that it is an arm of its member tribes.
In determining whether an entity is entitled to sovereign immunity as an "arm of the tribe," [the court] examine[s] several factors including: "(1) the method of creation of the economic entities; (2) their purpose; (3) their structure, ownership, and management, including the amount of control the tribe has over the entities; (4) the tribe's intent with respect to the sharing of its sovereign immunity; and (5) the financial relationship between the tribe and the entities."
Id. (quoting Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1187 (10th Cir. 2010)).
As plaintiff concedes,10 the first four factors weigh in favor of defendant being considered an arm of its member tribes. Defendant "is comprised of the eight federally-recognized Indian tribes in the" Arctic Slope Region and these "member tribes' governing bodies have each passed tribal government resolutions authorizing [defendant] to receive certain federal funds to provide services to their tribal members."11 Defendant was established to provide health care and other services pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA), the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, andthe Alaska Tribal Health Compact.12 "Providing health care is a core governmental function of Alaska tribes[.]"13 Thus, defendant "is not simply a business entity that happens to be run by a tribe or its members, but, rather, occupies a role quintessentially related to self-governance." E.E.O.C. v. Karuk Tribe Housing Authority, 260 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendant is controlled by its Board of Directors, which consists of elected or appointed members from each of the eight tribal members. And in its by-laws, defendant states that it "is an arm of its member Tribes, is organized to carry out its member Tribes' essential governmental programs and goals, and is entitled to and shall in all matters assert and be protected by the sovereign immunity of its member Tribes from suit, judgment or execution in any forum or jurisdiction."14 In addition, in plaintiff's employment agreement with defendant, "[t]he [p]arties agree[d] that[] [n]othing in this Agreement may be construed to limit or in any way prejudice ANSA's protections under the Federal Tort Claims Act and other protections, privileges or immunities applicable to ANSA, including sovereign immunity and all applicable federal and common law protection from suit."15
The dispute here centers on the fifth factor, which is the financial relationship between defendant and its member tribes. Defendant argues that this factor also weighs in favor of finding that it is an arm of its member tribes. Marie Carroll, defendant's president and CEO, avers that defendant's "budget is substantially based on federal funds provided to benefit its member tribes and their tribal members" and that if damages were to be awarded in this case, they "would be paid from [defendant's] member tribes' federal health care funding[.]"16 In other cases, when considering this factor, this court has found that this factor weighs in favor of a tribal consortium being an arm of its member tribes because the tribal consortium was largely funded by federal funds intended to allow tribes to carry out their governmental function of providing health care services to their members. See Barron v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, 373 F. Supp. 3d 1232, 1240 (D. Alaska 2019); Wilson v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, Case No. 3:16-cv-0195-TMB.17
Plaintiff argues, however, that consideration of the financial relationship factor clearly shows that defendant is not entitled to sovereign immunity because its member tribes are not the "real parties in interest." In support of this argument, plaintiff cites to Runyon ex rel. B.R. v. Association of Village Council Presidents, 84 P.3d 437 (Alaska 2004). There, the parents of two children who were allegedly injured while attending a Head Start program ran by the defendant ("AVCP") brought tort claims against AVCP. Id. at 438. AVCP "is anonprofit Alaska corporation consisting of fifty-six Alaska Native villages in the Bethel area, each a federally recognized tribe." Id. Id. In addition, AVCP "operates a wide range of traditionally governmental programs designed to benefit the member tribes, almost exclusively with state and federal funding." Id. (citation omitted). The issue before the Alaska Supreme Court was "whether AVCP may be sued by private parties, or whether the sovereign immunity of its member tribes extends to bar such suits." Id. at 439. The court observed that "[a] subdivision of tribal government or a corporation attached to a tribe may be so closely allied with and dependent upon the tribe that it is effectively an arm of the tribe." Id. at 439 (citations omitted). The court stated that "[w]hether the entity is formed by one tribe or several, it takes on tribal sovereign immunity only if the tribe or tribes, the sources of sovereign authority and privilege, are the real parties in interest." Id. at 440. The court found that the most important factor to consider was "the financial relationship between AVCP and the villages" and based on consideration of that factor, concluded that the villages were not the real parties in interest because "[a]nder Alaska law, the fifty-six villages of AVCP, the members of a nonprofit corporation, 'are not . . . liable . . . on [the corporation's] obligations." Id. at 441 (quoting AS 10.20.051(b)). Because "[a]ny judgment against AVCP will be paid out of the Association's coffers alone[,]" the Alaska Supreme Court held that AVCP "is not protected by tribal sovereign immunity. . . ." Id.
Similarly here, plaintiff argues that because defendant is an Alaska nonprofit corporation, its member tribes would not be liable for any damages that might be awarded. Thus, plaintiff urges the court to conclude that defendant's member tribes are not the real parties in interest and that defendant is not entitled to sovereign immunity.
Plaintiff argues that defendant's reliance on Barron a...
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