Matz v. Klotka

• Decision Date: 06 October 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–1674.,12–1674.
• Citation: 769 F.3d 517
• Parties: Shaun J. MATZ, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Rodney KLOTKA, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

769 F.3d 517

Shaun J. MATZ, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Rodney KLOTKA, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12–1674.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 9, 2013.

Decided Oct. 6, 2014.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov. 26, 2014.

Brian J. Murray, Meghan Sweeney, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Jan A. Smokowics, Milwaukee City Attorney's Office, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before POSNER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

Shaun J. Matz brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a number of current and former Milwaukee Police Department officers. He claims that in September 2003 the officers violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by arresting him without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, failing to make a prompt probable cause determination once he was under arrest, and continuing to question him after he invoked his right to remain silent. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and Matz appeals. We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Matz's § 1983 claims.

I.

Because we are reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment against Matz, we recount the facts in the light most favorable to him, noting discrepancies in the parties' version of events where relevant. See Zepperi–Lomanto v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 751 F.3d 482, 483 (7th Cir.2014). On the evening of September 16, 2003, Matz and several other individuals were on the porch of an apartment located at 1335 South Layton Boulevard in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. That same evening two Milwaukee police officers then assigned to the warrant squad, Rodney Klotka and Karl Zuberbier, were driving through the area on an unrelated matter. Klotka and Zuberbier were both in uniform and were driving an unmarked squad car. As they drove down Layton Boulevard, Zuberbier, who was the passenger, saw an individual named Javier Salazar standing with the others on the porch. Zuberbier recognized Salazar from a warrant squad briefing as a member of the Latin Kings gang who he believed was wanted for armed robbery. Specifically, Zuberbier thought there was a “temporary felony want” for Salazar, who Zuberbier believed was also a suspect in two homicides and several shootings. Zuberbier pointed out Salazar to Klotka, who looked over at the individuals on the porch.

By the time Klotka was able to make a U-turn and approach the apartment, everyone on the porch was leaving. Matz admits having seen the police, but claims that he had already left the porch when their car turned around. He acknowledges having heard someone say “detects” as he was leaving the porch. When Klotka pulled up to the curb, Zuberbier jumped out and ran along the south side of the house where several of the individuals had headed. Klotka followed shortly behind him. As Zuberbier ran into the alley he saw three people starting to run southbound down the alley and two more people in a car starting to drive away. As he ran towards the car, he drew his gun and pointed it at the vehicle while shouting, “Police! Stop!” Matz says that Zuberbier also threatened to blow his “fucking head off” if he did not stop. Klotka, who by that point also had his gun drawn, arrived right behind Zuberbier and ordered Matz and the vehicle occupants to get out and keep their hands visible.¹ Although the parties differ as to the precise order of the events that happened next, it is clear that the following occurred within a short period of time after the stop: (1) Matz was handcuffed and put into a patrol car; (2) it came to light that the car he was driving was stolen; and (3) other officers (at least six squads total) arrived at the scene in response to a call for backup. Klotka then briefly left the scene to ascertain if anyone else from the porch was still in the vicinity. And although there is conflicting testimony as to which officer arrested Salazar, it is undisputed that he was arrested shortly thereafter inside the residence.

According to Matz, while he was in the patrol van Michael Caballero, a detective in the homicide division, grabbed his left arm and stated, “he's one of them” when he saw Matz's tattoos. Matz also alleges that Caballero questioned him about two homicides and continued to do so after Matz said he did not want to talk about it and wanted an attorney. Matz was then taken to the city jail, where he was booked and given a cell. The next morning two more homicide detectives, Shannon Jones and Percy Moore, interviewed Matz about the homicides and an armed robbery. Matz claims that although he told Jones and Moore from the outset that he did not wish to speak to them about the homicides and wanted to go back to his cell, they continued questioning him for over three hours. Later that same evening, Caballero and another defendant, Detective Mark Walton, again interrogated Matz in the face of his insistence that he did not want to talk. Matz says Walton acknowledged Matz's rights but insisted that he give them a statement anyway. After several hours of questioning, Matz, who was sitting in a “defeated” position, provided a statement admitting his involvement in the homicides. Throughout this period Matz was never provided with various medications he had been taking for psychosis

and depression (Olanzapine, Prozac, Klonopin, and Neurontin ). He alleges that being without his medication impaired his thought process, affected his impulsivity, and caused him to make poor decisions. He was also at this time still recovering from pneumonia, for which he had been hospitalized until two days before his arrest on September 16. He later recanted his inculpatory statement and named Salazar as the shooter, although he admitted being present. He said he confessed because he believed it was the only way he could return to his cell. Despite recanting his statement, Matz pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree reckless homicide and one count of felony murder with robbery as the underlying crime. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court sentenced him to a total of sixty years imprisonment and forty-five years extended supervision between the two counts.

Matz was not presented for an initial in person appearance before a court commissioner until seven days after his arrest. To support their claim that Matz received an adequate probable cause determination, the defendants submitted an “arrest-detention report” signed by a Milwaukee County Court Commissioner at 10:58 a.m. on September 18, 2003—less than two days after his initial arrest. The report reflects Commissioner Liska's determination that probable cause existed to believe that Matz committed a crime and her decision setting cash bail at $100,000.00.

Matz initiated this suit under § 1983 in 2010, alleging that Klotka, Zuberbier, Jones, Moore, Walton, and Caballero violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court appointed counsel, who filed a second amended complaint and added an additional Fifth Amendment claim against certain defendants. Ultimately the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of Matz's claims. The court concluded that Matz had failed to establish that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because Klotka and Zuberbier had reasonable suspicion to detain Matz when he attempted to leave the scene and that no reasonable factfinder would conclude that the officers lacked probable cause for his subsequent arrest. Relying on the arrest-detention report submitted by the defendants, the district court also concluded that it was undisputed that Matz had received a timely probable cause determination. Finally, the district court rejected Matz's Fifth Amendment claim based on his allegedly coerced confession, concluding that because both his conviction and sentence depended in part on the confession, Matz's challenge was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

II.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ; e.g., Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 990–91 (7th Cir.2014). We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Matz as the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 826–27 (7th Cir.2014).

A. Reasonable Suspicion for a Terry Stop

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Ordinarily seizures are “reasonable” only when supported by probable cause to believe an individual has committed a crime. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) ; Bailey v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1031, 1037, 185 L.Ed.2d 19 (2013). The longstanding exception to this rule arises under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), which authorizes brief investigatory detentions based on the less demanding standard of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, id. at 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ; United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir.2005). Such a brief detention is permitted when it demands only a limited intrusion into an individual's privacy and rests on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Determining whether such an investigatory detention is constitutional requires balancing the governmental interest in the seizure against the degree to which it intrudes on an individual's personal liberty. See id. at 20–21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. And although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than...