Maughon v. City of Covington, 12-12561

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Decision Date: 28 January 2013
• Docket Number: D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-00521-CAP,No. 12-12561,12-12561
• Citation: Maughon v. City of Covington, D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-00521-CAP, No. 12-12561 (11th Cir. Jan 28, 2013)
• Parties: AMBER C. MAUGHON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY OF COVINGTON, OFFICER KEVIN FULLER, in his individual capacity, Defendants - Appellees.

AMBER C. MAUGHON, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CITY OF COVINGTON, OFFICER KEVIN FULLER,in his individual capacity, Defendants - Appellees.

No. 12-12561

D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-00521-CAP

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

January 28, 2013

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

Non-Argument Calendar

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

Before MARCUS, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Amber Maughon appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Covington and Officer Kevin Fuller in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Maughon's allegations stem from her arrest for simple battery at her home and a later incident involving the deletion of a photograph from her cell phone. On appeal, Maughon argues that: (1) the district court erroneously concluded that Officer Fuller was entitled to qualified immunity for making a warrantless arrest outside his jurisdiction; (2) the district court erroneously concluded that Officer Fuller was entitled to qualified immunity for seizing Maughon's camera; and (3) on remand, the district court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Maughon's state law claims. After careful review, we affirm.

We review de novo the district court's disposition of a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir.2002). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), a court shall grant summary judgment as to a claim when a "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." To show that there is a genuine issue for trial, a nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts. See Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

Moreover, where the plaintiffs version of the facts is blatantly contradicted by the record such that no reasonable jury could believe it, the court should not adoptthat version of facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). This is particularly true where, as here, the relevant facts were preserved by in-car video or audio recording. See id. at 380-81. In such a case, we adopt the version of facts as depicted in the video and audio for purposes of reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Id.

The relevant events began on May 29, 2010, when Maughon got into an altercation at her son's baseball game in Covington, Georgia with Crystal Densmore, the girlfriend of Maughon's ex-husband, Matthew West. Following the incident, Densmore called the Covington Police Department (in Newton County), and Officer Kevin Fuller went to the baseball field. Densmore told Officer Fuller that Maughon had threatened to kill her, pushed her, and scratched her. Officer Fuller took statements from Densmore, West, and West's mother, and observed scratch marks on Densmore's shoulder. Maughon had already returned to her home in Walton County.

Fuller intended to obtain an arrest warrant for Maughon the day after the incident. Later on the evening of the 29th, however, Georgia State Trooper Cal Burton, with Post 46 in Monroe, Georgia (in Walton County), called Officer Fuller to relay that he had information concerning the case and asked what Fuller was doing about Maughon's arrest. Burton is a friend of Densmore's. That same evening, a Newton County dispatcher informed Fuller that the Walton County Sheriff's Officehad contact with Maughon. Fuller then told a Walton County dispatcher that he was "gonna take a warrant out on her," and said he would ask his sergeant if he could meet the Walton County Lieutenant to pick up Maughon. The dispatcher said that Maughon lived right near the county line, and Fuller's sergeant gave Fuller permission to go to Maughon's house to take custody of her.

When Officer Fuller arrived at Maughon's house, Maughon was standing in the threshold of her front door wearing only a t-shirt and her underwear. Officer Fuller told Maughon he had a warrant for her arrest and asked her for identification, whereupon Maughon led Officer Fuller to her vehicle. At that point, Walton County Sheriff's Deputy Joseph Broccoli arrived and observed what he believed was Maughon trying to get away from Fuller.

When Maughon was opening her vehicle, Fuller attempted to arrest her, but Maughon physically resisted the arrest. Officer Fuller then wrestled with Maughon and told her to cooperate or she would be pepper sprayed. Broccoli told her to calm down and comply with Fuller's instructions after which she began to cooperate. Fuller took Maughon to the Newton County Jail and she was charged with simple battery for the incident at the baseball game. Later, she was also charged with making terroristic threats. A grand jury returned an indictment with both charges, and a criminal prosecution is currently underway.

In a related incident, on September 26, 2010, Officer Fuller and another officer, Grant Satterfield, were dining at the Longhorn Restaurant in Covington, Georgia (the "Longhorn incident"). Maughon is employed as a server there. Upon seeing the officers, Maughon asked an off-duty employee to take a picture of Fuller using Maughon's cell phone. The officers observed this, and Satterfield asked for the Longhorn manager, who then deleted the photo at the direction of the police.

Maughon later filed this action concerning both her arrest and the interaction at Longhorn. The district court granted summary judgment to Fuller and the City of Covington. This timely appeal -- only as to the allegations against Fuller -- follows.

First, we disagree with Maughon's argument that Officer Fuller was not entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest claim. "As we have often observed, [q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity allows officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the "plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law." Id. (quotation omitted).

"[T]o receive qualified immunity, an official must first establish that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." Id. at 1205 (quotation omitted). A government official acts within her discretionary authority if the actions were (1) "undertaken pursuant to the performance of [his] duties" and (2) "within the scope of [his] authority." Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988). "In applying each prong of this test, we look to the general nature of the defendant's action, temporarily putting aside the fact that it may have been committed for an unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional manner, to an unconstitutional extent, or under constitutionally inappropriate circumstances." Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004). In other words, when determining the scope of discretionary authority, a court looks to the general nature of a defendant's action, not the specific unconstitutional conduct. See Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998) (providing that "[t]he inquiry is not whether it was within the defendant's authority to commit the allegedly illegal act"). "Instead, a court must ask whether the act complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within, or reasonably related to, the outer perimeter of an official's discretionary duties. The scope of immunity should be determined by the relation of the [injury] complained of to the duties entrusted to the officer." Id. (quotation omitted). "Of course, we must be surenot to characterize and assess the defendant's act at too high a level of generality" but instead "we consider a government official's actions at the minimum level of generality necessary to remove the constitutional taint." Harland, 370 F.3d at 1266.

If a government official was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, "the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the grant of qualified immunity is inappropriate." McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1205. To do so, the plaintiff must demonstrate: first, that the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff establish a constitutional violation by the officers, and, second, that it was clearly established at the time of the incident that the actions of the defendant were unconstitutional. Id.. We need not conduct this qualified immunity analysis in any specific order; rather, we are permitted to exercise our sound discretion in deciding which prong of this inquiry to address first. Id. In assessing the clearly-established prong, we ask "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). Thus, in order for a plaintiff to show that a constitutional violation was clearly established, she must show (1) "that a materially similar case has already been decided, giving notice to the police"; (2) "that a broader, clearly established principle should control the novel facts in this situation"; or (3) "this case fits within the exception of conduct which so obviously violates [the]constitution that prior case law is unnecessary." Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 766 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).

The Fourth Amendment guarantees that all individuals are "secure in their persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Detaining someone on the basis of a false arrest creates a cognizable claim under § 1983. Ortega v....