Maui Lani Neighbors v. State

• Docket Number: CAAP-16-0000444
• Decision Date: 28 December 2023
• Citation: 542 P.3d 1222
• Parties: MAUI LANI NEIGHBORS, a Hawai‘i Nonprofit Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Hawai‘i; State of Hawai'i Department of Land and Natural Resources; Suzanne D. Case, in her official capacity as chair of the State of Hawai'i Board of Land and Natural Resources; County of Maui; County of Maui Planning Commission; County of Maui Department of Planning; William Spence, in his official capacity as County of Maui Planning Director, Defendants-Appellees, and John Does 1-10, Jane Does 1-10, and Doe Partnerships, Corporations, Governmental Units or Other Entities 1-10, Defendants
• Court: Hawaii Court of Appeals

542 P.3d 1222

MAUI LANI NEIGHBORS, a Hawai‘i Nonprofit Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.STATE of Hawai‘i; State of Hawai'i Department of Land and Natural Resources; Suzanne D. Case, in her official capacity as chair of the State of Hawai'i Board of Land and Natural Resources; County of Maui; County of Maui Planning Commission; County of Maui Department of Planning; William Spence, in his official capacity as County of MauiPlanning Director, Defendants-Appellees,andJohn Does 1-10, Jane Does 1-10, and Doe Partnerships, Corporations, Governmental Units or Other Entities 1-10, Defendants

NO. CAAP-16-0000444

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i.

December 28, 2023

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT(CIVILNO. 14-1-0501)

On the briefs:

Tom Pierce, (Tom Pierce, Attorney at Law, LLLC) and Peter N. Martin, (Peter N. Martin, Attorney at Law, LLLC) for Plaintiff–Appellant

William J. Wynhoff, Amanda J. Weston, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant-Appellee

Calvert G. Chipchase, Christopher T. Goodin, Honolulu, for Intervenor-Appellee

GINOZA, CHIEF JUDGE, HIRAOKA AND NAKASONE, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY GINOZA, CHIEF JUDGE

In this land use dispute, Plaintiff-AppellantMaui Lani Neighbors, Inc.(MLN), appeals from the "Final Judgment" entered by the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (Circuit Court),¹ which entered judgment against MLN and in favor of Defendants State of Hawai'i, State of Hawai'i Department of Land and Natural Resources(DLNR), State of Hawai'i Board of Land and Natural Resources(BLNR), and Dawn N.S. Chang,² in her official capacity as Chair of BLNR (collectively, the State), DefendantsCounty of Maui, County of Maui Planning Commission(Planning Commission), County of Maui Department of Planning, and Kathleen Aoki,³ in her official capacity as County of Maui Planning Director(collectively, the County), and IntervenorAlexander & Baldwin, LLC(A&B).

In this action, MLN asserts claims related to a county special use permit (CUP)⁴ to develop a Central Maui Regional Sports Complex (Sports Park) on land acquired from A&B.The property at issue is sixty-five acres and is owned by DLNR.Individuals who are members of MLN participated in a Planning Commission hearing regarding the CUP, held in March 2014, but did not intervene in that proceeding and did not appeal from the Planning Commission’s issuance of the CUP.⁵Instead, approximately six months after the CUP was issued, MLN filed this lawsuit.

In its First Amended Verified Complaint (First Amended Complaint), MLN asserts nine counts: Count I, violation of zoning under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 46-4(2012);Count II, declaratory relief that the CUP is void;Count III, the Special Use Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous; Count IV, declaratory relief as to interpretation of the PK-3 regional park district; Count V, violations of the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act (HEPA);Count VI, violation of article XI, section 9 of the Hawai'i Constitution;Count VII, public nuisance; Count VIII, violation of due process; and Count IX, declaratory and other relief that notice to surrounding neighbors was inadequate.

Except for Count VII (public nuisance),⁶the Circuit Court dismissed all counts in the First Amended Complaint on grounds that MLN failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not intervening in the CUP approval process and thereafter filing an HRS § 91-14(2012) appeal for judicial review of the Planning Commission’s decision.The Circuit Court also ruled that MLN failed to prove that exhausting administrative remedies would have been futile.The Circuit Court thus determined that, except for Count VII, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over MLN’s claims.

On appeal, MLN asserts three points of error: (1)the Circuit Court erred by applying the doctrine of exhaustion because the Planning Commission did not have exclusive original jurisdiction over MLN’s claims; (2) even if the doctrine of exhaustion applied, the Circuit Court erred in ruling the futility exception was not met; and (3)the Circuit Court erred by staying the entire case under the primary jurisdiction doctrine where only one discrete claim, Count1(F), was within the Land Use Commission’s (LUC) jurisdiction.

With regard to Counts I, II, III, IV, VIII, and IX, we conclude they were properly dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but for reasons different than the Circuit Court.

With respect to Count V, to the extent Count V seeks to invalidate the CUP, dismissal was warranted.However, to the extent Count V seeks relief other than to invalidate the CUP, dismissal based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies was not proper.

With respect to Count VI, we conclude that the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine and the primary jurisdiction doctrine do not apply to claims brought under article XI, section 9, because those doctrines are not legislatively-created limitations to such claims.However, the legislature has limited declaratory judgment actions under HRS § 632-1(2016), such that the Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction over MLN’s article XI, section 9 claims defined by HRS Chapters 46 and 205, because those claims challenge the validity of the CUP.To the extent MLN’s article XI, section 9 claims as defined by HRS Chapter 343 seek to invalidate the CUP, the Circuit Court lacks jurisdiction; but to the extent these claims seek other relief, they are not precluded by HRS § 632-1.

We therefore affirm in part and vacate in part.We remand to the Circuit Court to address Count V (HEPA) and Count VI (the article XI, section 9 claim defined by HRS Chapter 343), to the extent those claims seek relief other than to invalidate the CUP.

I.FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Circuit Court made extensive findings of fact (FOF) after an evidentiary hearing.MLN does not challenge most of the Circuit Court’s findings, and although it briefly asserts the Circuit Court erred in FOFs 35-69 (regarding the futility exception to the doctrine of exhaustion), it does not provide any argument as to why those findings are erroneous.Thus, the Circuit Court’s unchallenged findings are binding upon this court and MLN has waived any purported challenge to FOFs 35-69.SeeOkada Trucking Co. v. Bd. of Water Supply, 97 Hawai‘i 450, 458, 40 P.3d 73, 81(2002);HRAP Rule 28(b)(7)("Points not argued may be deemed waived.").

A.Procedural History in Circuit Court

The relevant procedural history from the Circuit Court’s "Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order"(FOFs/COLs and Order), entered on February 23, 2015, are as follows:

1.On September 2, 2014, PlaintiffMaui Lani Neighbors, Inc. filed its Verified Complaint.⁷

2.On September 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Preliminary Injunction.The motion was set for hearing on October 15, 2014.

3.On September 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed the [First Amended Complaint].

4.On September 22, 2014, the County Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss in Part Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.

5.On October 15, 2014, the Court held a hearing on the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in Part.The Court denied the motion as to Count I.F of the First Amended Complaint.The Court stayed the remainder of the motion, discovery, and all other proceedings, pending resolution of Plaintiff's already-filed Petition for Declaratory Order("Petition") to the State of Hawai'i Land Use Commission(the "LUC").

6.On October 29, 2014, the Court entered its Order Denying in Part the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in Part, Staying All Further Proceedings in this Matter, and Deferring to LUC.The order stated that the Court would "defer to the [LUC] for determination as to any potential violation by any person or party of the Decision and Order entered by the LUC in Docket No. A-10-789 dated June 21, 2012[(‘LUC D&O’)]."

7.On November 25, 2014, the Court held a status conference.The parties advised the Court that on November 20, 2014, the LUC denied Plaintiff's Petition.The Court scheduled further hearing on the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss In Part on December 10, 2014, and ordered that the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction would start on December 22, 2014 and that all parties should be prepared to proceed with witnesses, evidence, and testimony.

8.On December 5, 2014, the StateDefendants filed their Motion and an Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on the Motion.

9.The StateDefendants’ contended that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and failed to bring its challenge under [HRS]chapter 343 within the time provided by statute.

….

11.At the hearing held on December 10, 2014, for the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in Part, the Court denied the County Defendants’ motion in its entirety.The same day, the Court also granted the StateDefendants’ Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on the Motion for Partial Dismissal and orally informed the parties it would be heard on December 22, 2014.The Court also requested supplemental briefing from all parties on two issues: 1) Did the Court have subject matter jurisdiction given the issues raised in the motion filed by the State; and 2) was Plaintiff collaterally estopped from pursuing its claims.

….

19.On December 22, 2014, the Court held a hearing on the Motion for Partial Dismissal.After hearing argument from the parties, the Court determined that a question of fact existed as to whether the futility doctrine excused Plaintiff from having to exhaust its administrative remedies.Accordingly, the Court immediately began an evidentiary hearing, took testimony and received evidence.

20.On December 22, 2014, Plaintiff called Mary Spencer, Ph.D.("Dr. Spencer"), Paul Fasi("Mr. Fasi"), Senior Planner of the Planning Department, and Harley Manner, Ph.D. ("Dr. Manner") ….

21.On December 23, 2014, the Court held a further evidentiary hearing on the Motion.Plaintiff called Dr. Manner, Carty...