Mauke v. Town of Dune Acres
| Decision Date | 06 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 2:93-CV-57-RL. |
| Citation | 835 F. Supp. 468 |
| Parties | Arnold G. MAUKE, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF DUNE ACRES, Dune Acres Town Council, and James Bapst, in his Capacity as Police Commissioner, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
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Hugo Martz, Valparaiso, IN, John M. Vouga, Portage, IN, for plaintiff.
William W. Kurnik, Kurnik Cipolla Stephenson and Barasha, Arlington Heights, IL, for defendants.
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed on July 1, 1993, by the Defendants, Town of Dune Acres, Dune Acres Town Council, and James A. Bapst ("Defendants"). By their Motion, Defendants request this Court to dismiss with prejudice all of the federal and state law claims pled in Plaintiff, Arnold J. Mauke's ("Plaintiff") Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages, filed June 18, 1993. Being advised in the premises, this Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with prejudice, and Plaintiff's state claims without prejudice.
This case involves claims arising from Plaintiff's discharge from employment as the Town Marshal of the town of Dune Acres, Indiana ("Dune Acres"). Plaintiff had been continuously employed by Dune Acres since September 6, 1965, until his dismissal on September 1, 1992. Plaintiff was first Deputy Town Marshal, and then, since 1983, Town Marshal. The Plaintiff, who never attended the Indiana Law Enforcement Training School, was notified of his termination on August 12, 1992, to become effective September 1, 1992. Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order from the Porter Superior Court and worked from September 3, 1992, until September 8, 1992, at which time that court vacated the restraining order. Plaintiff claims that Defendants terminated his employment without notice or a hearing, in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Indiana law.
Plaintiff filed his four count Amended Complaint in this Court on June 18, 1992. Counts I and II are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I alleges that Plaintiff's termination deprived him of equal protection under the law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Count II alleges that Plaintiff's dismissal was without notice and an opportunity to be heard and thus deprived him of his property and liberty without due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Counts III and IV, the Plaintiff alleges that his termination was in violation of Indiana law.
The Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not been denied due process of law, as he has no property interest in his continued employment because he has not completed the necessary training which would afford him the protection of the Indiana statute which grants a property interest in continued employment. In response, Plaintiff contends that he has achieved a property interest in his continued employment by virtue of his work experience, and therefore is exempt from the formal training requirement. Plaintiff also argues that an alleged termination agreement which Defendants attempted to induce Plaintiff to sign created a bilateral expectation of employment, thus confirming Plaintiff's property interest in his employment.
Defendants further argue in support of their Motion to Dismiss that termination of Plaintiff's employment without a name clearing hearing did not deprive him of due process of law by infringing upon any protected liberty interest. Plaintiff counters that because Defendants published and caused to be published minutes and newspaper articles concerning his "incapacity", "poor health" and "poor eyesight", which created a stigma and foreclosed opportunities for future employment, his discharge without a name clearing hearing infringed upon his liberty to pursue a chosen occupation in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In order to prevail on their Motion, Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the Defendants to show that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When deciding a motion to dismiss, this Court must assume the truth of a plaintiff's well pleaded factual allegations, making all possible inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Prince v. Rescorp Realty, 940 F.2d 1104, 1106 (7th Cir. 1991); Janowsky v. United States, 913 F.2d 393, 395 (7th Cir.1990). This Court may not dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). See also Barnhart v. United States, 884 F.2d 295, 296 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 957, 110 S.Ct. 2561, 109 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990). In order to prevail, the Defendants must demonstrate that "the plaintiff's claim, as set forth by the complaint, is without legal consequence." Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir.1987). The Court will address each of Plaintiff's claims separately.
Count I of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff brings this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, section 1983 provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privilege, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws of the United States by one acting "under the color of state law." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 923-24, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2746, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). The Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause guarantees citizens the right to be free from invidious discrimination. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2691, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980); see also O'Donnell v. Village of Downers Grove, 656 F.Supp. 562, 567 (N.D.Ill.1987). The equal protection clause requires the state to treat alike all persons who are similarly situated, in absence of sufficient justification for different treatment. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1307, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1972).
"A person bringing an action under the equal protection clause must show intentional discrimination against him because of his membership in a particular class, not merely that he was treated unfairly as an individual." Nunn v. City of Chicago, 603 F.Supp. 1193, 1196 (N.D.Ill.1985); see also Huebschen v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir.1983); Minority Police Officers Ass'n of South Bend v. City of South Bend, 617 F.Supp. 1330, 1348 (N.D.Ind.1985). Additionally, to be a member of a particular class, the Plaintiff must show that he is a member of a group identified apart from the alleged unfair treatment. Nunn, 603 F.Supp. at 1196. In the present case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged no "particular class" other than himself and others who have been treated unfairly by virtue of the operation of Indiana Code section 36-5-7-3. Therefore, he has not alleged that he is a member of a particular class apart from those subject to the statute. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted for his first claim alleging a violation of the equal protection clause.
Plaintiff next asserts that he had property interest in continued employment of which he was deprived without due process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Thus, in order to state a cause of action under section 1983 for deprivation of a property interest without due process, Plaintiff must allege facts which would demonstrate that he has a right in continued employment amounting to a property interest. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-09, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Property interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. A property interest can be created by statute, ordinance, or by contract. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Gansert v. Meeks, 179 Ind.App. 209, 384 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (1979); Morris v. City of Kokomo, 178 Ind. App. 56, 381 N.E.2d 510, 514 (1978). Consequently, this Court must determine whether, under Indiana law, Plaintiff alleges facts supporting his right to continued employment such as would constitute a property interest.
As a general rule, under Indiana law, employment relationships are terminable at the will of either party. Speckman v. City of Indianapolis, 540 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (Ind.1989); McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 390, 392 (Ind. 1988); Phegley v. Indiana Dept. of Highways, 564 N.E.2d 291, 295 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). Under the employment-at-will...
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