Maul v. State
| Decision Date | 11 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 583S160,583S160 |
| Citation | 467 N.E.2d 1197 |
| Parties | Richard E. MAUL, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Patrick E. Chavis, III, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Amy Good, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
The defendant, Richard E. Maul, was convicted at a bench trial of robbery, a Class C felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1984 Supp.) and of being a habitual offender, Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1984 Supp.). The trial court entered the following incorrect sentence:
This Court has consistently held that the determination of habitual offender status cannot be treated as a separate crime. Rather a finding that a defendant is a habitual offender allows the trial court to enhance the sentence of the underlying felony. The habitual offender statute does not set forth an offense in and of itself. Therefore, this case must be remanded to the trial court for the entry of a proper sentencing order with the appropriate enhancement of the sentence on the underlying felony.
In this direct appeal, defendant raises only one reviewable issue and argues that there was not sufficient evidence to show that the taking of property was accomplished by the use of force or by putting the victim in fear.
Any question of the sufficiency of the evidence must be governed by our applicable standard of review. On appeal the reviewing court does not weigh the evidence or judge credibility. We are constrained to consider only that evidence most favorable to the state, together with all reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn therefrom. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, the verdict will not be overturned. Greenlee v. State, (1984) Ind., 463 N.E.2d 1096; Tunstall v. State, (1983) Ind., 451 N.E.2d 1077.
A brief summary of the facts from the record most favorable to the state shows that the victim, a sixty-five year old woman, Marie Lauck, was entering the door of her office building in Indianapolis on July 21, 1981, when she felt her purse being pulled from her arm and her arm wrenched backwards. Lauck turned around and saw a young man later identified as defendant, running back out into the street. She started yelling and chasing the man. Three other men in the area also chased him and eventually caught and held him as he ran into a parking garage. The police arrested defendant when they arrived and Lauck made an on-the-scene identification. Defendant was committed to a mental hospital for a period of three months after his arrest but was subsequently found to be competent by two court-appointed psychiatrists.
Defendant was charged with robbery as a Class C felony so the state was required to prove each element of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The applicable statute reads in pertinent part:
Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1984 Supp.). Defendant now contends that the sudden snatching of the victim's purse was not done with sufficient force to show that the victim was put in fear. He further argues that the taking did not involve sufficient force to qualify his offense as robbery and that the crime the state had proved was theft. We do not...
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Coates v. State
...of the victim's property if no resistance was offered and that there must be enough force to constitute violence." Maul v. State (1984), Ind., 467 N.E.2d 1197, 1199. Here, the defendant was able to take the purses after demonstrating his ability to control the victim's own person. His use o......
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United States v. Ramsey
...the victim's resistance." Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 550 (2019). Indiana robbery meets that criterion. Maul v. State, 467 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ind. 1984). In short, Duncan and Stokeling together preclude any argument that a conviction under Indiana's robbery statute does not ......
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