Mauldin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Decision Date | 16 May 1946 |
Docket Number | No. 5453.,5453. |
Citation | 155 F.2d 666 |
Parties | MAULDIN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Richard E. Thigpen, of Charlotte, N. C., for petitioner.
Harry Baum, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen. (Sewall Key, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., and Helen R. Carloss, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen., on brief), for respondent.
Before SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges, and TIMMERMAN, District Judge.
W. M. Mauldin, sometimes hereinafter referred to as petitioner, petitioned the Tax Court of the United States for a redetermination of the deficiency in his 1940 income tax liability found by the Commissioner in the amount of $5,520. This deficiency was determined by allocating to petitioner three-fourths of the income of a partnership, the Rock Hill Coca Cola Bottling Company, rather than the one-half share reported by him. The additional one-fourth share added by the Commissioner represented the profits accruing to petitioner's wife under the terms of the partnership agreement and was duly reported for taxation by her. The Commissioner determined that she "was not, in fact, a member of the partnership for profit purposes" and hence the share of profits reported by her was properly taxable to petitioner. The Tax Court of the United States with five judges dissenting, upheld this determination and the matter has been brought here on petition to review that decision.
Reduced to essentials, the record disclosed the following facts. In December, 1936, Mr. Mauldin, admittedly with the purpose of reducing his tax liability, executed a deed of gift, transferring an undivided one-fourth interest in the Rock Hill Coca Cola Bottling Company, until then operated as a sole proprietorship, to his wife. Shortly thereafter she entered into a partnership agreement with her husband, providing for the continuation of the business as a partnership under petitioner's management, with profits and losses to be divided in accordance with the capital contributed (three-fourths and one-fourth) and with a definite provision that she was under no obligation to devote time or services to the business. The company's books of account seem to have been somewhat rudimentary, without formal capital accounts or a complete record of assets. Accordingly, no entry to record this transfer of ownership was made on the books, but a so-called "Investment" account was set up for Mrs. Mauldin and it was regularly credited with her distributive share of the profits and charged with her withdrawals.
It is not disputed that she had complete independence of action with respect to these profits, was entitled to withdraw them at will and spend her withdrawals as she pleased. Further, she maintained her own investments and handled them herself. During the four years, 1937 through 1940, she withdrew approximately three-fourths of the profits credited to her account. Although there is some evidence in the record that she devoted a limited amount of time to the business, petitioner's counsel stated that no claim was made that she rendered any service to the business and that her participation in the partnership was only that of a contributor of capital.
These arrangements continued through 1939 and apparently their validity was not challenged by the Internal Revenue authorities. In October, 1939, Mr. Mauldin executed another deed of gift, transferring another one-fourth interest to his son, who had been an employee of the business for several years prior thereto. A new partnership was then formed, taking the son in, and the company's franchise was formally reconveyed to this new organization. In these proceedings, the Commissioner did not challenge the validity of this new partnership with respect to the son but contended that, since Mrs. Mauldin had provided neither new capital nor services, she did not become a partner for tax purposes.
In this state of the facts, the law is clear and unequivocal. The function of this Court is limited to determining that the findings of fact by the Tax Court are supported by evidence and have warrant in the record. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239, 88 L.Ed. 248. As stated by Mr. Justice Black in a very recent case involving quite similar facts: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tower, February 25, 1946, 66 S.Ct. 532, 535. See, also, Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 66 S.Ct. 539, decided the same day.
From the same opinion in the Tower case, we adopt the concluding paragraph as an entirely apposite statement of the governing law by which the Tax Court was guided. It is applicable, without change, to the instant case, excepting only the single phrase with reference to the restricted use of the wife's income. This we hold not to constitute a significant distinguishing feature of the present case: Commissioner v. Tower, supra, 66 S.Ct. at page 538.
In summary, this case merely represents another in the stream of cases now coming before the courts wherein taxpayers have sought by various types of reallocation of income within the family group to retain the enjoyment of a large income without the normally incident tax consequences. This Court recently passed upon another such device which we found to be equally unavailing. Hash v. Commissioner, 4 Cir., 152 F.2d 722. We do not mean that all reallocations of income within a family group are to be set aside for tax purposes. But such arrangements, to be recognized, must have a reality and substance which is not found in the instant case. The decision of the Tax Court of the United States is accordingly affirmed.
Affirmed.
Finding myself unable to agree with the majority opinion in this case, I shall state my reasons for disagreeing.
For the purposes hereof it should be kept in mind that we are dealing with facts that relate to two distinct partnerships, which for convenience will be referred to respectively as the 1937 partnership and the 1940 partnership. It should also be kept in mind that no question is raised in this case concerning the annual incomes from the 1937 partnership for the years 1937, 1938 and 1939; and that the primary issue before the Court relates to the profits of the 1940 partnership for the year 1940. The facts concerning the formation of the 1937 partnership and its operation for three years, the full period of its existence, are important as forming a background against which the facts attending the formation and operation of the 1940 partnership must be viewed.
In 1936 petitioner was the sole owner of the Rock Hill Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Rock Hill, S. C., a business which he had operated for a number of years. The character of this business may be inferred from its name. In December, 1936, the petitioner executed a written deed of gift wherein and whereby he conveyed to his wife, in...
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