Mauriello v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey

Citation781 F.2d 46
Decision Date14 January 1986
Docket Number84-5720,Nos. 84-5666,s. 84-5666
Parties29 Ed. Law Rep. 589 Diane L. MAURIELLO, Appellant in 84-5720, v. The UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY, the Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences, Giampiero di Mayorca, M.D., individually and as Chairperson of the Department of Microbiology, Rodney Rothstein, Ph.D., individually and as Chairperson of the Graduate Committee of the Department of Microbiology, Vilma K. Jansons, Ph.D., jointly and severally, Appellants in 84- 5666.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Robert S. Ellenport (Argued), Marie P. Simonelli, Perry Feinberg, Ellenport & Holsinger, P.A., Roseland, N.J., for appellant Diane L. Mauriello.

Barbara A. Harned (Argued), Andrea M. Silkowitz, Deputy Attys. Gen., Irwin I. Kimmelman, Atty. Gen., N.J., Newark, N.J., for appellants--The University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Giampiero di Mayorca, and Rodney Rothstein.

Before SEITZ, WEIS and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WEIS, Circuit Judge.

This case presents the issue of due process requirements in the dismissal of a student from a state university's graduate program. After reviewing the record, we conclude that a series of informal academic evaluations by the faculty met constitutional standards and prevents judicial reexamination of the plaintiff's fitness to continue at the University. Accordingly, we will set aside a jury's damage award and a district court decree directing reinstatement pending reevaluation.

The plaintiff's complaint sought damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, as well as Professors Jansons, di Mayorca, and Rothstein. A jury allowed damages against the University, and by way of equitable relief the court directed a reevaluation of the plaintiff's academic work. Defendants have appealed the denial of their post-trial motions. Plaintiff has cross-appealed.

The University is a public institution of higher learning, and it is uncontested that the requisite state action exists.

Plaintiff was admitted to the doctoral program in microbiology at the University in 1975. She withdrew after a few weeks and was readmitted in September 1977. She completed her course requirements in 1979, and selected as her faculty advisor Dr. Vilma Jansons, who had access to a laboratory and was conducting research in an area of interest to plaintiff.

The faculty advisor provides a student with the laboratory facilities, funding, and guidance needed to research a thesis. That professor is also responsible for evaluating a student's progress. After obtaining approval from the advisor, a student must submit a thesis and a dissertation abstract to an evaluation committee for review. If the work is acceptable, the committee will recommend that a doctorate be awarded.

In 1980, plaintiff submitted a thesis proposal to Dr. Jansons and passed a qualifying examination. Plaintiff was required to submit a revision of her thesis proposal but did not do so for some twenty months. She finally obtained approval on July 9, 1982.

Part of the plaintiff's research efforts were incorporated into scientific papers that Dr. Jansons submitted for publication. These articles were rejected because of erroneous data, and this disapproval led Dr. Jansons to reevaluate the plaintiff's work. Deciding that she could no longer sponsor the plaintiff's research, Dr. Jansons, on September 3, 1982, wrote to Dr. di Mayorca, Chairman of the Department of Microbiology, stating that she was withdrawing as the plaintiff's faculty advisor as of December 31, 1982. The letter noted that there had been "less than satisfactory progress in [plaintiff's] research and several demonstrated instances of severe lack of understanding of the most pertinent data in the literature.... Diane's commitment to research is not serious."

Plaintiff then met with Dr. di Mayorca and was told to "go back to the lab to correct the inaccuracies" in the research. On returning to the laboratory and discussing the matter further with Dr. Jansons, plaintiff resumed her research on a probationary basis. However, in November 1982, plaintiff accepted full-time employment with an outside corporation, and limited her work in Dr. Jansons' laboratory to a part-time basis.

Soon thereafter, Dr. Jansons sent a note to plaintiff expressing dissatisfaction with her work. Setting an absolute deadline for certain assignments, Dr. Jansons wrote, "Where is the change that you said took place this autumn in you and according to you made you worthy of defending a Ph.D. thesis? It was, perhaps, different for some weeks after you were put on probation; now it's business as usual--total irresponsibility."

Because of the plaintiff's lack of progress and dedication, on December 15, Dr. Jansons submitted a report to Dr. Rothstein, Chairman of the Graduate Committee, stating that she would not sponsor the plaintiff's research after January 1, 1983. The memo continued, "[Plaintiff had] assured me that her performance would improve and, if not, she would withdraw from the graduate school. There has not been any improvement."

Plaintiff had met with Dr. Rothstein on December 14th and had explained her difficulties with Dr. Jansons. Plaintiff agreed to meet on January 6, 1983 with the graduate committee, an entity that serves as an advisory body to the department chairman on matters pertinent to Ph.D. candidates. In the meantime, plaintiff took no steps to secure another faculty advisor.

There was a dispute at trial over the instructions plaintiff was given as to the material she was to present at the January meeting. In any event, plaintiff arrived with only some of the data she used in the faulty experiments performed for Dr. Jansons. The committee, however, wanted to see the thesis material as well as some other extraneous research notes and scheduled another meeting for February 2nd. Before that occurred, the committee met with Dr. Jansons to discuss her appraisal of the plaintiff's work. At the conclusion of that conference, some consideration was given to dismissing plaintiff from the doctoral program.

At the meeting on February 2nd, plaintiff again appeared without the thesis data. She testified she did not bring that material because Dr. di Mayorca had told her to bring the extraneous research notes instead. Because plaintiff again did not have the desired material, the committee scheduled a third meeting. Two days later, plaintiff told Dr. di Mayorca she would be unable to present the extraneous research because Dr. Jansons possessed much of it. Dr. di Mayorca was surprised that plaintiff did not have the documents because graduate students normally possess several copies of data from experiments they conduct.

Dr. di Mayorca advised the committee members that plaintiff was unable to produce the requested material, and therefore a majority adopted the previously tentative decision to dismiss. Accordingly, on February 14, 1983, Dr. Rothstein notified plaintiff that she was no longer a candidate for a Ph.D. degree. 1

At trial the district court ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff's termination was an academic dismissal, not a disciplinary one. All claims against Dr. Jansons were dismissed, as were the counts for punitive and compensatory damages against Professors di Mayorca and Rothstein. The compensatory damage claim against the University was submitted to the jury. All defendants, except Dr. Jansons, remained in the case for injunctive purposes.

In response to special interrogatories, the jury found that the University did not provide the requisite procedural due process that the plaintiff's academic performance was not reviewed before dismissal, and that the defendant's action was arbitrary and capricious. The jury awarded $50,015 in compensatory damages.

Finding the verdict excessive, the district court directed a remittitur of $40,000, which the plaintiff accepted. As an equitable remedy, the district court ordered the parties to select an ad hoc committee of three persons, one member selected by plaintiff, one by the defendants, and the third by the two selected members. This committee was to review the plaintiff's thesis research material. Plaintiff was reinstated into the doctoral program and was permitted to make a presentation to the ad hoc committee. 2 The court also denied the defendants' post-trial motions for a new trial and judgment n.o.v.

On appeal, defendants contend that plaintiff did not have a property interest in continuing in the program, but even assuming the existence of such an interest, due process requirements were satisfied, and the dismissal was not arbitrary or capricious. Other issues raised in both the direct and cross-appeals need not be discussed in view of our disposition.

I.

Preliminarily, we address a jurisdictional matter. The district court's order denying the defendants' motions for judgment n.o.v. and new trial was docketed on August 28, 1984. The order stated that a new trial would be granted "unless plaintiff ... consents to remit the sum of $40,000 ... within 14 days." Plaintiff did so, and the acceptance was docketed on August 31, 1984. The notice of appeal was filed on September 28, 1984.

The question is whether the judgment became final when the remittitur order was entered or when the plaintiff's acceptance was filed. We conclude that the latter date is determinative for computing the time for appeal.

In United States v. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 78 S.Ct. 674, 2 L.Ed.2d 721 (1958), the Court said that "[i]t is necessary to determine whether the language of the opinion embodies the essential elements of a judgment for money and clearly evidences the judge's intention that it shall be his final act in the case. If it does so, it constitutes his final judgment." Id. at 232, 78 S.Ct. at 678. To be final, a "judgment for money must,...

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