Maus v. Broderick

• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: NICHOLLS, C.J.
• Citation: Maus v. Broderick, 51 La.Ann. 1153, 25 So. 977 (La. 1899)
• Decision Date: 15 May 1899
• Docket Number: 13,078
• Parties: MR. AND MRS. CARL P. MAUS v. THEODORE BRODERICK

25 So. 977

51 La.Ann. 1153

MR. AND MRS. CARL P. MAUS v. THEODORE BRODERICK

No. 13,078

Supreme Court of Louisiana

May 15, 1899

Argued April 22, 1899

ON APPEAL from the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. King, J.

E Evariste Moise, Jno. Wagner and Giunio F. Socola, for Plaintiff and Appellee.

John B Fisher, for Defendant and Appellant.

OPINION

NICHOLLS C.J.

The plaintiffs are husband and wife.

They sue the defendant asking damages to the amount of forty-one hundred dollars, for personal injuries alleged to have been received by the wife from having been thrown violently on to and against the hard, unyielding, asphalt pavement with which St. Charles avenue is paved, from a wagon which she was then driving. The allegations on which the prayer for judgment is based are that a vicious and strong-bodied horse, hitched to a large four-wheeled, heavy, covered vehicle, both horse and wagon belonging to the defendant, had been placed by him in charge of an employee; that said employee carelessly and negligently, and incautiously, left the same standing on Louisiana avenue unattended and unguarded, and having no one in charge of said horse, contrary to and against the ordinances of the city of New Orleans; the said employee having, in the pursuit of the business in which he was engaged, entered one of the premises on Louisiana avenue for the purpose of delivering goods there. That the horse, during the employee's absence, started off, dragging the heavy wagon out Louisiana avenue to Dryades, down Dryades to a cross street, and from said cross street to some point on St. Charles avenue unknown to petitioners, which point was reached with the horse at full speed. That Mrs. Maus was proceeding up St. Charles avenue on the swamp, or wood side, seated in and driving a milk wagon, intending to cross at Second street and go towards the river.

That she crossed St. Charles avenue, to proceed into Second street, when defendant's horse and wagon (coming up the said avenue behind her at full speed, before she could avoid it, or even know of said horse and wagon) ran into and collided with the wagon which she was then driving. That in so doing, and by consequence thereof, she was thrown out of the wagon on to and against the hard, unyielding, asphalt with which St. Charles avenue is paved. That, on striking the pavement, she became and remained unconscious for some time. That from said fall she received severe injuries which she described, and suffered great pains, which were still continuing, and would continue until her death.

That she was confined to her bed for more than eight weeks, and large amounts had been expended by reason of her injuries for physician's fees and medicines. That she had been, by reason of her injuries, rendered incapable of rendering the services and performing the duties which she had been capable of rendering, and had rendered before, and said incapacity was permanent; that petitioner had suffered, and would continue to suffer, loss therefrom.

That these were the direct and immediate consequences of the carelessness and negligence of defendant and his employee; that the employee of defendant having control and custody of the horse and wagon of defendant, in thus leaving the said horse and wagon standing as he did, was violating the ordinances of the city prohibiting him so to do, and it was, in itself, a gross piece of negligence on the part of both the defendant and his employee.

That they well knew the character of the horse, and that he should not be so trusted.

That she had no reason to believe that the horse and wagon coming behind her was without any one in charge thereof, nor had she any reason to suspect or believe that they would turn to cross St. Charles avenue at the very point she turned, but on the contrary, she had every right to believe that they would continue up the street. That petitioners were, neither of them, guilty of any negligence whatever, but, on the contrary, were exercising all the prudence, care, caution and skill which they were called...