Mausolf v. Babbitt

• Decision Date: 05 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-1201MN,95-1201MN
• Parties: , 35 Fed.R.Serv.3d 988, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,317 Jeffrey MAUSOLF; William Kullberg; Arlys Strehlo; and Minnesota United Snowmobilers Association, Appellees, v. Bruce BABBITT, Secretary, Department of the Interior; Roger Kennedy, Director, National Park Service; Mollie Beattie, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; and Ben Clary, Superintendent, Voyageurs National Park, Appellees. Appeal of Voyageurs Region National Park Association; Sierra Club, North Star Chapter; Humane Society of the United States; Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness; National Park and Conservation Association; and Izaak Walton League of America, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1295

85 F.3d 1295

64 USLW 2782, 35 Fed.R.Serv.3d 988,

26 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,317

Jeffrey MAUSOLF; William Kullberg; Arlys Strehlo; and Minnesota United Snowmobilers Association, Appellees, v. Bruce BABBITT, Secretary, Department of the Interior; Roger Kennedy, Director, National Park Service; Mollie Beattie Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; and Ben Clary Superintendent, Voyageurs National Park, Appellees Appeal of Voyageurs Region National Park Association Sierra Club, North Star Chapter; Humane Society of the United States; Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness; National Park and Conservation Association; and Izaak Walton League of America, Appellants.

No. 95-1201MN.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 20, 1995.

Decided June 3, 1996.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug.

5, 1996. ^*

Brian B. O'Neill, Minneapolis, argued (Richard A. Duncan and Michael A. Ponto, on the brief), for appellants.

Corey John Ayling, Minneapolis, argued, for appellees.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

The plaintiffs--three snowmobile enthusiasts and the Minnesota United Snowmobilers Association (collectively, "the Snowmobilers")--sued the Secretary of the Interior and other defendants ("the Government"), seeking to enjoin the enforcement of restrictions on snowmobiling in Voyageurs National Park. The Voyageurs Region National Park Association and other conservation groups (collectively, "the Association") moved to intervene under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24. The Association claimed an interest in the vigorous enforcement of the restrictions and expressed concern that the Government might settle with the Snowmobilers or back away from the rules. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that the Government adequately represented the Association's interests. Mausolf v. Babbitt ("Mausolf I"), 158 F.R.D. 143 (D.Minn.1994) (opinion of Magistrate Judge), approved, Order of November 15, 1994 (order of District Judge). We reverse.

During the pendency of this appeal, the District Court granted the Snowmobilers' motion for summary judgment, and held that the Government's explanation for the restrictions was inadequate under the Endangered Species Act. The Court remanded the case to the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service to supplement the administrative record, and enjoined enforcement of the restrictions on snowmobiling, "[p]ending a sufficient explanation ...." Mausolf v. Babbitt ("Mausolf II"), 913 F.Supp. 1334, 1344 (D.Minn.1996). We think, however, that the question of intervention is not moot, because the Association has appealed this judgment. Jeffrey Mausolf v. Voyageurs Region National Park Ass'n, No. 96-1856 (8th Cir., notice of appeal filed March 25, 1996).

I.

Voyageurs National Park is a watery maze of over 30 lakes and 900 islands along the border between northern Minnesota and Canada. The Park's name pays tribute to the fur traders and explorers who travelled by canoe from Montreal deep into northwestern Canada. ¹ The Park's four largest lakes--Rainy, Kabetogama, Namakan, and Sand Point--surround the Kabetogama Peninsula (about one-half the Park's land area) and are themselves linked by smaller lakes, rivers, and bogs. Most of the Park is quite remote, and accessible only by water. Voyageurs is renowned for its fishing and boating, and visitors often see bald eagles and grey wolves in the wild. Voyageurs has also long been a popular destination for snowmobilers, who have, over the years, used both the Park's frozen lake surfaces and--more controversially--certain overland trails. This case is the latest in a series of disputes over the use and management of the Park. ²

Some background information will make this case easier to understand. In 1991, after several years of study, the National Park Service issued final regulations, based on a series of environmental- and wildlife-impact reports, allowing snowmobiling on practically all the Park's lake surfaces and also on certain trails and portage routes. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.33(b) (1991). ³ The Association then sued, claiming that the regulations, and the Department of the Interior's failure to submit a "wilderness recommendation" for the Park to the President, were illegal. ⁴ The District Court ordered the Secretary of the Interior to make a "wilderness recommendation" within a year, but refused to enjoin snowmobiling in the Park's Kabetogama Peninsula. See VRNPA, 1991 WL 343370 at * 11-14.

Accordingly, in August 1991, the National Park Service proposed a wilderness plan which would have significantly reduced overland snowmobiling, but allowed it on major lakes, a few designated portage trails, and the Chain of Lakes Trail. The Park Service then asked the Fish and Wildlife Service for its "biological opinion" about the effect, if any, snowmobiling could have on grey wolves, bald eagles, and other animals in the Park. In March 1992, Fish and Wildlife concluded that the Park Service's plan would not threaten animals' survival or habitats. Nonetheless, Fish and Wildlife directed the Park Service to close specified trails, lakeshores, and lakes to snowmobiles and other motor vehicles. So, in December 1992, Park officials issued an order, without giving notice or inviting interested parties to comment, closing 16 of the Park's lake bays and certain shoreline areas to winter motorized access. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.33(b)(3) (1993) (authorizing temporary closure of lake surfaces for wildlife-management purposes). This order, which was renewed in 1993 and 1994, dramatically reduced the area available for snowmobiling.

These new regulations angered many past and potential Park visitors, including the Snowmobilers, who could no longer enjoy some of the Park's more beautiful and remote areas. The Snowmobilers sued the Government in January 1994, claiming that Fish and Wildlife's biological opinion did not support closing so much of the Park, and that the regulations were therefore arbitrary and capricious. According to the Snowmobilers, not only had the Government turned an abrupt and unexplained "about face," it had also failed to consider the best available scientific and commercial information before imposing the new restrictions. See Mausolf II, 913 F.Supp. at 1335-36; Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 144-45. The Association then moved to intervene so it could vindicate its interest in restricting snowmobiling in the Park and in making sure the new regulations were strictly enforced. The Association contended that for years the Government illegally--and over the Association's objections--permitted unrestricted snowmobiling in the Park and refused to implement proper wilderness-protection measures. The Association asserts that the Government cannot be trusted to protect the Association's interests because of its alleged history of siding with the Snowmobilers. See Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 147.

The District Court conceded that the Association had a recognized interest which might be impaired by the disposition of the case. The Court noted, however, that, under the parens patriae doctrine, government entities are presumed to represent the interests of all their citizens. Would-be intervenors can rebut this "presumption of adequate representation" only by identifying their "local and individual interests not shared by the general citizenry." Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 147-48 (citing Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 1001 (8th Cir.1993)). The District Court was not persuaded that the Government would unduly subordinate the Association's interests to more general, national interests, and, therefore, denied intervention as of right under Rule 24(a). The District Court also refused to exercise its discretion to allow permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), fearing that the Association might delay the case with additional discovery and further joinder of issues and parties. Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 148. However, recognizing the potential benefits of the Association's collective knowledge and perspective, the Court allowed the Association to participate as amicus curiae and to file a memorandum addressing the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Ibid. The District Court confirmed the Magistrate Judge's order, and the Association appealed. We reverse.

II.

The Snowmobilers contend that the Association may not intervene as of right because it lacks Article III standing. The Magistrate Judge concluded, and the District Judge agreed, that "[t]he question of standing ... is irrelevant to our determination of whether the Association may intervene as of right." Mausolf I, 158 F.R.D. at 146. The District Court said that even if the Association did not have standing to sue, it could still intervene under Rule 24(a) if it had a "recognized interest in the subject of the litigation." Id. at 146 n. 4 (citing Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997).

A.

Rule 24(a) says nothing about standing. To intervene as of right, an applicant must (1) have a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation that (2) might be impaired by the disposition of the case and that (3) will not be adequately protected by the existing parties. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997. As the District Court observed, the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether a would-be intervenor must have Article III standing. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 & n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-07 & n. 21, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (an intervenor may not appeal, or continue a suit, without the party on whose side intervention was permitted, unless intervenor has Article III standing). ⁵

The courts of appeals have taken diverse, sometimes "anomalous," id. at 68, 106 S.Ct. at 1706-07, approaches. By way of illustration, at least one circuit has held that Article III standing is required to intervene, see, e.g., Building and Const. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v....