Mawhirt v. Ahmed

Decision Date14 February 2000
Docket NumberNo. 96 CV 04773(ADS).,96 CV 04773(ADS).
Citation86 F.Supp.2d 81
PartiesKingsley MAWHIRT, Plaintiff, v. Ashraf Nabil AHMED, M.D., Marsha Tanenberg Karant, M.D., Yakov Greenstein, M.D., Horacio Preval, M.D., John Doe, M.D., John Roe, M.D., Police Officer Gonzalez, Police Officer Romagnoli, Robert Dye, Esq., Lea Irion, R.N. and Barbara Mawhirt, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Kingsley Mawhirt, Holtsville, NY, plaintiff pro se.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General for the State of New York, Mineola, NY by Robert K. Drinan, Assistant Attorney General, for the State defendants Ahmed, Karant, Greenstein, Preval, Doe, Roe, Dye and Irion.

Robert J. Cimino, Suffolk County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY by Arlene S. Zwilling, Assistant County Attorney, for the County defendants Gonzalez and Romagnoli.

Mental Disability Law Clinic Touro College, Huntington, NY (Matthew D. Semel, of counsel), for Amicus Curiae in support of the plaintiff pro se.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SPATT, District Judge.

On September 27, 1996 Kingsley Mawhirt ("Mawhirt" or the "plaintiff") commenced this action alleging violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights as well as state law cause of action for false imprisonment and assault and battery in connection with two involuntary admissions to the University Hospital at Stony Brook ("UHSB") for psychiatric treatment.

Presently before the Court are: (1) the State defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed.R.Civ.P.") seeking dismissal of all claims against Ahmed, Karant, Greenstein, Preval, Doe, Roe and Dye; (2) the State defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 seeking dismissal of the claims against the State defendants based on the doctrine of qualified immunity; (3) the State defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 seeking dismissal of the claims against Nurse Irion based on the undisputed facts; and (4) the County defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). As all of the parties have attached various exhibits and affidavits to their motion papers and have been given the opportunity to present any other relevant material under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the Court will analyze the various motions in the context of a motion for summary judgment. See In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d 288, 295 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that the district court may convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment when all of the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56); see also Cortec Industries, Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir.1991).

I. BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from the plaintiff's first amended complaint and the Local Civil Rule 56.1 statements filed by the parties. On June 13, 1995, the plaintiff went to UHSB complaining of insomnia. The plaintiff was examined by Dr. Preval who described Mawhirt as "having paranoid delusions that FBI, CIA Mafia [are] after him and his family ... feels phones are bugged." Dr. Preval concluded that Mawhirt was psychotic and posed a substantial risk to himself and the community. As a result, the plaintiff was admitted to the psychiatric ward. A separate psychiatric assessment was made by Dr. Cieszkowski and progress notes were prepared recording the plaintiff's extreme paranoia. The progress notes indicated that the plaintiff had previously locked his family in their house.

The plaintiff claims that on June 14, 1995, he was harassed and physically forced by Nurse Irion and his wife, Barbara Mawhirt, to take an anti-psychotic drug called Trilafon. On June 16, 1995, the plaintiff was examined by Dr. Jafri who found that he was suffering from delusions, was very disorganized, anxious and "very paranoid." Dr. Jafri also found the plaintiff's insight and judgment to be poor. Dr. Jafri's report indicates that the plaintiff was fearful that he and his family were being watched and monitored by a camera. In addition, Dr. Jafri's report reveals that the plaintiff believed that he had received messages from the television and toys. Dr. Jafri concluded that the plaintiff showed a tendency to harm his family. Against his will, Mawhirt remained confined at UHSB from June 13, 1995 to June 19, 1995, when he was released.

On October 1, 1995, the plaintiff voluntarily went to the Suffolk County Police Department's Fifth Precinct located on Waverly Avenue in Patchogue, New York. The plaintiff alleges that his wife called the police and gave them false information, which led Officers Gonzalez and Romagnoli to detain Mawhirt and take him to the UHSB psychiatric ward. The plaintiff contends that he was handcuffed and was not asked questions about his wife's allegations. Upon arrival at the UHSB, Officer Gonzalez completed a "Police Escort Information Form" which indicated that Mawhirt had a history of schizophrenia, was not taking his medication, was hearing voices and receiving messages through the television.

In addition, the plaintiff's wife provided a statement in support of an application for involuntary admission. The report disclosed that the plaintiff was verbally abusive, talked about "revenge" and that it was his turn to "beat" people. Mrs. Mawhirt also revealed that the plaintiff instructed her not to talk in the home about private things because the neighbors had installed video cameras in the home to spy on them. Also, Mrs. Mawhirt revealed that the plaintiff was under the belief that two helicopters were flying over their home in an effort to spy on them.

The plaintiff's complaint further states that on October 1, 1995 at 12:30 PM he was examined by Dr. Ahmed who diagnosed Mawhirt as a chronic paranoid schizophrenic with acute exacerbation. Dr. Karant, the attending psychiatrist, performed an examination confirming Dr. Ahmed's diagnosis. In addition, Dr. Greenstein concluded that Mawhirt was delusional and capable of unpredictable violence. Based upon Dr. Karant's conclusion that the plaintiff was "unpredictable" and a "substantial threat," he was certified for involuntary hospitalization.

On October 2, 1995, Mawhirt signed a request for a court hearing. On October 20, 1995 a hearing was held before Acting Supreme Court Justice Saverio J. Fierro. Mawhirt was represented by Robert Dye, Esq., a court appointed attorney. At the hearing, Dr. Ramos testified that he diagnosed Mawhirt as suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and acute exacerbation. Dr. Ramos stated that "I found paranoid delusions and referential delusions as well. The patient would not speak, would not talk about the circumstances surrounding this admission for fear that somebody might be using that information against him." In fact, Dr. Ramos indicated that he overheard Mawhirt telling other staff members that he felt unsafe in certain portions of the hospital due to surveillance cameras that were monitoring his behavior. Dr. Ramos concluded that the plaintiff posed a risk to himself and to society. In addition, Dr. Ramos recommended that the plaintiff be required to take anti-psychotic medication.

The plaintiff also testified at the October 20, 1995 hearing as follows:

Q: Do you ever get any messages from the television set?

A: As far as I was concerned, I saw a blue screen message flash on the T.V.

Q: What did it say?

A: Kind of an insert.

Q: What did it say?

A: I'd have to, you know, think about it, but I saw a blue screen message flash.

* * * * * *

Q: Do you think you're under surveillance?

A: I think I've been under surveillance, yes.

At the conclusion of the evidence Justice Fierro found that the State had met its burden in demonstrating that the plaintiff required medication and confinement due to the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and the substantial risk of physical harm that he posed to himself and to society.

The plaintiff's complaint asserts eleven causes of action. The first cause of action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), alleging that the plaintiff's right to procedural due process was denied when he was involuntarily confined on June 13, 1995 and October 1, 1995. The second cause of action asserts that under Section 1983, the plaintiff's substantive due process rights were violated by Officers Gonzalez and Romagnoli when they brought him to the UHSB. The third cause of action alleges that the defendants Ahmed, Karant, Greenstein and Preval violated his Section 1983 substantive due process right to liberty as a result of his involuntarily confinement. The fourth cause of action alleges that Officers Gonzalez and Romagnoli falsely imprisoned the plaintiff. The fifth cause of action asserts that defendants Karant and Greenstein falsely imprisoned the plaintiff. The sixth cause of action is also a claim of false imprisonment, but against defendants Ahmed, Preval, Doe and Roe. The seventh cause of action alleging that the administration of the anti-psychotic drug Trilafon by defendants Ahmed, Preval, Doe, and Roe deprived the plaintiff of due process of law and thus violated Section 1983. The eighth cause of action is identical to the seventh cause of action, but is asserted against defendant Irion. The ninth cause of action alleges that defendants Irion and Mawhirt committed assault and battery by forcing the plaintiff to take Trilafon. The tenth cause of action, asserts that defendants Ahmed, Preval, Karant, Greenstein, Doe, and Roe subjected the plaintiff to treatment decisions that departed from minimally accepted professional judgment and thus deprived him of due process of law and further violated Section 1983. Finally, the eleventh cause of action alleges a Section 1983 claim that defendant Dye deprived the plaintiff of effective assistance of counsel thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standards of...

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    ...is a re-characterization of the substantive due process claim and, for similar reasons, must be dismissed. See also Mawhirt v. Ahmed, 86 F.Supp.2d 81, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd in part and vacated on other grounds, 8 Fed.Appx. 125, 127, 2001 WL 533595, at * 1 (2d Cir.2001) ("The officers al......
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